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Information about the catastrophic impacts of climate changeis penetrating global society, from high culture to low culture,at a rapidly increasing rate. Scientific studies about warming
trends are often slapped across newspaper covers. Likewise, sto-
ries about political pressure to subvert science supporting global
warming or interest groups offering bounties to refute climate
change experts have increasingly become hard to ignore. Addi-
tionally, magazines from the Economist to Vanity Fair are trying to
educate people about the importance of going green. 
Worldwide, thousands of people have listened to Mr. Al Gore
explain the Inconvenient Truth about warming temperatures. Quite
possibly it is the palpable effects of the unpredictable weather that
is making them pay attention and demand action. The world is
unable to forget the horror of the 2004 tsunami and Americans
started to pay attention once climate change hit home in a big way
with Hurricane Katrina’s destruction of New Orleans. 
With this onslaught of mass information, it is sometimes hard
to isolate the direst issues. This annual issue of Sustainable Devel-
opment Law & Policy (“SDLP”) hopes to present some of the
most pressing, and important, climate change topics within the
legal and policy arenas. Also included are interesting new devel-
opments, historical looks at climate law, and evaluations of the
effectiveness of current multilateral environmental agreements. 
We hope that the reader walks away with an understanding of
how multifaceted climate law has become. International, regional,
domestic, and sub-national law must be utilized to tackle this
problem. Scientists are finally uniting on an international scale to
declare that humans have undeniably contributed to global warm-
ing; as a result, this fruitless debate must stop. Battles must no
longer take place in the scientific field. Human induced climate
change is a fact. 
The new battle must be waged in the legal and policy fields.
Those with the tools to create legal and political change must act
now; the devastating (or foreboding) impacts of climate change
are being witnessed around the globe. While some argue the tip-
ping point has already occurred, it is never too late to advocate for
sound solutions. We hope that this issue of SDLP helps motivate
individuals within the legal and political communities to head in
the right direction. The ecological footprint upon our globe must
be reduced: our habitat depends upon it. 
Kelly Rain
Maria Vanko
EDITORS-IN-CHIEF
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G
lobal warming is an international issue that requires
leadership across the globe. Despite progress that has
been made at state and local levels, the United States
has failed to provide any real international commitment and
leadership on controlling greenhouse gas emissions. Members
of Congress, Governors, NGO’s and CEO’s are increasingly
pushing for leadership and certainty with regard to this issue.
Everyone is familiar with the litany of possible consequences:
rising sea levels, retreating glaciers, melting permafrost, more
severe droughts, an increase in the intensity of storms and hurri-
canes, and more heat waves. The stakes are high and the risks are
great. We need to begin acting against these risks while it is still
relatively affordable to do so. Given the urgency of the issue and
increasing acceptance from both business and the public, it is
now politically feasible for the United States to implement
economy-wide programs to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide
which our country sends into the atmosphere.
Global warming issues are difficult, but not insurmountable.
We must start by following the states’ example of demonstrating
the political will and resolve to work through this serious and
complicated issue. Previous experiences with the Clean Air Act,
the Clean Water Act, and Superfund demonstrate that as the
states have moved on these issues, it is now the federal govern-
ment’s turn to enact policy. We can do so in a bipartisan manner
that reflects the states’ success, but we cannot continue to delay
if we want to enact a meaningful, consistent national program.
The risks associated with a changing climate clearly justify the
adoption of mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions.
If Congress is going to manage U.S. greenhouse gas emis-
sions effectively, it will need advice and expert analysis from
the business community, the scientific community, and the legal
community. There is a vast gap between what is understood
about global warming by the scientific and policy community,
and what is known by political leaders in the position to steer
U.S. policy. We must close that gap and move our energy and
industrial systems in a fundamentally different direction, or we
risk pushing the planet past a tipping point.
This issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy dis-
cusses many of the current issues within the climate law debate.
Contributors suggest strengthening multilateral agreements,
such as the Montreal Protocol, to help reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. Within this issue the economics of climate change are
explored. Information is provided about the United States taking
a regional approach to fighting climate change, while other arti-
cles discuss the need to link carbon markets. Additionally, vari-
ous other critical issues are explored in this publication. 
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THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING: 
THE NEED FOR COOPERATION & LEADERSHIP
AN OVERVIEW OF THIS ISSUE
by Senator Jeff Bingaman*
* Senator Bingaman won election to the United States Senate in 1982, as a Sena-
tor for New Mexico. Since then, he has been active in solving real problems facing
the citizens of the United States. As Chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural
Resources Committee, Senator Bingaman continues to be a leader in improving
national energy policy and educating Americans about the need for action on
global warming. 
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INTRODUCTION
T
he Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer has been efficient and effective in reducing
damage to the ozone layer. It also has contributed signifi-
cantly to climate mitigation. This paper recommends further
adjustments to the treaty to help finish the job of protecting the
ozone layer, and to provide further though temporary insurance
against the threat of abrupt climate change.1
The Montreal Protocol is widely considered one of the
world’s most successful multilateral environmental agreements,
having phased out 95 percent of ozone-depleting substances
(“ODSs”) in developed countries and 50 to 75 percent of ODSs
in developing countries — placing the ozone layer on a path to
recover later this century.2 The Montreal Protocol’s success is
based on its strict, flexible, and dynamic design, which has
driven continuous technology innovations; its evolution through
amendments, adjustments, and decisions to reflect the most up-
to-date scientific and technological developments; the commit-
ment by developed countries to provide financial assistance to
developing countries to ensure its successful implementation;
and its attention to compliance from the outset.3
Because many ODSs are also potent greenhouse gases
(“GHGs”) that contribute to climate change,4 their phase-out
under the Montreal Protocol has provided an often overlooked
bonus for climate mitigation: by the end of the decade, the Mon-
treal Protocol will have done more to mitigate climate change
than the initial Kyoto Protocol reduction target, reducing emis-
sions in terms of carbon dioxide (“CO2”)-equivalent by five to
six times that of the climate treaty, the equivalent of eleven giga-
tons of carbon dioxide - equivalent per year (“GtCO2-eq. yr-1”).5
In effect, the Montreal Protocol has delayed climate impacts —
including abrupt and irreversible impacts — by about ten years,
and, with the additional measures discussed below, can delay it
still further.6
Partly as a result of the Montreal Protocol’s success, there is
a public misconception that the problem of ozone depletion has
been “solved.” Some in the international community, referring to
the Montreal Protocol, have gone so far as to ask whether the
Montreal Protocol should be dismantled or merged into the still
unproven climate treaty regime.
But the Montreal Protocol’s work to protect the ozone layer
is far from done. In 2006 scientists recorded the near largest
Ozone Hole ever recorded over Antarctica, and new data indi-
cates that the recovery of the ozone layer above the Antarctic
will be delayed by fifteen years, with a return to pre-1980 levels
not occurring until 2065.7 Ozone layer recovery at mid-latitudes
also is delayed and will not return to pre-1980 levels until 2049.8
The new data does not take into account illegal trade in banned
ODS, nor other challenges of compliance,9 especially in devel-
oping countries where the 2010 ban on chlorofluorocarbons
(“CFCs”) is quickly approaching.10 Without full compliance, the
recovery will be delayed further.
The continuing impact of ODSs on the ozone layer, and the
significant contribution ODSs and some of their substitutes are
making to climate change, demonstrate that the Parties’ commit-
ment to protect the ozone layer has not yet been fulfilled, and
that significant challenges remain.11 These challenges to the
future success of the Montreal Protocol — the most efficient and
effective treaty to date in reducing GHG emissions and mitigat-
ing climate change, in addition to protecting the ozone layer —
come at a time when the impacts of climate change are becom-
ing increasingly apparent.12
National Aeronautics and Space Administration scientist
James Hansen warns that we may have as few as ten years left
before positive feedbacks in the climate system could accelerate
global warming and push the climate system across the tipping
point for non-linear change that would create “a different
planet,” with an ice-free Arctic and coastlines obliterated by ris-
ing sea levels.13 Abrupt non-linear changes to the climate, also
known as Rapid Climate Change Events, include the melting of
the Greenland ice sheet. A complete melting of the Greenland
ice sheet would raise sea levels by an estimated seven meters.14
STRENGTHENING THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL:
INSURANCE AGAINST ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE
by Donald Kaniaru, Rajendra Shende, Scott Stone, Durwood Zaelke*
* Donald Kaniaru is an Advocate for Kaniaru & Kaniaru Advocates located in
Nairobi. Mr. Kaniaru is the former Director, Division of Environmental Policy
Implementation, for the United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”).
Rajendra Shende is the Head of the OzonAction Branch in the Division of Industry,
Technology and Economics at UNEP-Paris. Mr. Shende is an expert on the imple-
mentation of multilateral environmental agreements and transfer of environmen-
tally sound technologies to the developing countries, and policy advisor to more
than 150 governments for the implementation of the Montreal Protocol. Scott
Stone is a Policy Analyst for the Institute for Governance & Sustainable Develop-
ment (“IGSD”) and a Research Fellow for the Program on Governance for Sus-
tainable Development at University of California, Santa Barbara (“UCSB”).
Durwood Zaelke is President of IGSD. Mr. Zaelke is the Co-Director for the Pro-
gram on Governance for Sustainable Development, UCSB and Director of the
International Network for Environmental Compliance & Enforcement. Mr. Stone
acts as a Consultant to and Mr. Zaelke is a Managing Partner of the Washington,
DC office of Zelle, Hofmann, Voelbel, Mason & Gette, both currently focusing on
removing barriers to beneficial uses of environmentally superior technology, such
as the current use of HCFC-123 in chillers and the use of hydrocarbons and other
flammable refrigerants as replacements for HFCs. The opinions expressed in this
article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of their
respective organizations and affiliations. The assistance of Sung Ho (Danny)
Choi, JD candidate, May 2007, at American University Washington College of
Law, is gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks also are extended to K. Madhava
Sarma, former Executive Secretary of the Montreal Protocol Secretariat, for his
encouragement and substantive contributions to the article, as well to the other
members of the Stockholm Group.
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But sea levels do not need to rise by seven meters to cause
global catastrophe: a 1.5 meter rise would threaten 36,000
square miles of land along the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coasts
with flooding,15 as well as causing devastation to vulnerable
low-lying island and coastal States. The fallout from this or other
abrupt climate change events could destabilize the world’s social
and governance institutions, which at the very least would
undermine efforts to reduce GHG emissions and at worst could
provoke global military conflicts.16 In any scenario, untold mil-
lions would suffer.
The GHG reductions achievable under the Montreal Proto-
col offer critical low-cost insurance against abrupt changes to
the climate, effectively buying the world more time to get the
Kyoto Protocol’s global carbon market running effectively and
efficiently, and to agree on the post-Kyoto regime. 
The Parties have the opportunity to take immediate action at
the 20th anniversary of the Montreal Protocol in September
2007 to strengthen the ozone regime’s ability to protect the
ozone layer, as well as to maximize its ability to mitigate climate
impacts — in an amount that may exceed the Kyoto Protocol’s
reductions. This may be accomplished by adjusting the Montreal
Protocol to account for the cli-
mate impacts of ODSs and their
substitutes, with due regard for
the special situation of develop-
ing countries and without losing
sight of the other challenges cur-
rently facing the ozone treaty.
This is most effectively accom-
plished by (1) explicitly focusing
on climate benefits in addition to
ozone benefits, using Life-Cycle
Analysis and Life-Cycle Climate
Performance to assess the cumu-
lative environmental impacts of
ODS substitutes and other strategies under the Montreal Proto-
col; (2) minimizing the impacts by favoring the least harmful
ODS substitutes, and promoting further technological innova-
tions, including redesign of equipment, processes, substitutes,
and products, as well as not-in-kind alternatives; and (3) provid-
ing incentives for the destruction of CFCs currently contained in
products and equipment, or otherwise regulating end-of-life
recovery and destruction.
These adjustments to the Montreal Protocol are consistent
with its evolutionary process, as the treaty has repeatedly been
adjusted over its nearly twenty year history to reflect current
developments in scientific understanding and technological
capabilities. Such adjustments also are consistent with more
general principles and concepts of international environmental
law, which create a general obligation to assess and minimize
environmental impacts.
NEW OZONE & CLIMATE CHALLENGES
The ozone layer’s return to pre-1980 levels at mid-latitudes
can be facilitated through two actions. One is to curb higher than
anticipated emissions of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (“HCFCs”)
by 2015. The other is to limit the adverse impacts from emis-
sions of CFCs currently contained in products and equipment
(known as “banks”) that will be emitted to the atmosphere once
those products and equipment reach the end of their useful life.
These actions also will delay the impacts of climate change.
They should be undertaken as part of a broader effort to ensure
that the Montreal Protocol systematically considers and takes
into account the climate impacts of ODSs and their substitutes,
and minimizes the impact of its strategies on climate. 
To protect the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol mandates
the focused phase-out of CFCs and other ODSs, which are used
in refrigerators, air conditioning units, and a variety of foams,
solvents, and other applications such as aerosol propellants,
fumigants, and fire-fighting agents. To facilitate the phase-out,
the Montreal Protocol, through its Multilateral Fund, provides
financial assistance to developing countries to replace CFCs
with chemicals less harmful to the ozone layer, such as
HCFCs.17 HCFCs have lower ozone-depletion potentials
(“ODPs”) and generally have lower global warming potentials
(“GWPs”) than CFCs. They were envisioned as short-term sub-
stitutes, scheduled for phase out by 2030 in developed countries
(with 0.5 percent allowed for
servicing after 2020) and 2040
in developing countries (with
consumption frozen in 2016 at
2015 levels).
While HCFCs were critical
in replacing the more damaging
CFCs, their continued use cre-
ates problems for the ozone
layer and the climate. This is
both a problem of under-regula-
tion, where the production of
chlorodifluoromethane
(“HCFC-22”) is rapidly expand-
ing despite the availability of superior substitutes and alterna-
tives, and where banks are not yet regulated at all; and
over-regulation, where the use of dichlorotrifluoroethane
(“HCFC-123”) is being phased-out despite its negligible impact
on the ozone layer and the higher energy efficiency and lower
GHG emissions achieved by its use in large-building air-condi-
tioning units, know as chillers.
UNDER-REGULATION OF INFERIOR SUBSTITUTE: 
HCFC-22 AND ITS HFC-23 BY-PRODUCT
In addition to delaying the recovery of the ozone layer at
mid-latitudes,18 the production of HCFC-22 results in emissions
of trifluoromethane (“HFC-23”), an unwanted by-product that is
a “super greenhouse gas” 11,70019 times more powerful at
warming the planet than CO2.20 The combined climate emis-
sions of HCFC-22, with a GWP of 1,780, and its HFC-23 by-
product, with GWP of 11,700, are projected to reach 1
GtCO2-eq. by 2015 — roughly equal to the emissions reductions
presently required under the Kyoto Protocol.21
The production and consumption of HCFCs is projected to
expand to levels significantly higher than the 163,000 tonnes by
The Montreal Protocol is
widely considered one 
of the world’s most 
successful multilateral
environmental agreements.
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2015 originally predicted by the Technology & Economic
Assessment Panel (“TEAP”) in 1998. One specific country
alone has an installed annual production capacity of more than
300,000 tons, and over the next decade HCFC production could
increase to as much as 800,000 tons (in addition to feedstock use
which is not currently controlled under the Montreal Protocol).
Approximately 75 percent of all HCFC production will be from
HCFC-22, a transitional chemical used in small air conditioning
units and refrigerators. The projected increase in HCFC produc-
tion is being driven by the transfer of the old technology from
developed to developing countries, as well as by rapid economic
growth in the developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism (“CDM”), as applied to HFC-23, also
is partly to blame.
Under Kyoto’s CDM, the capture and destruction of HFC-23
emissions at facilities producing HCFC-22 can generate Certified
Emissions Reductions (“CERs”). Given the relatively low cost
of HFC-23 destruction compared to the value of CERs on the
global carbon market,22 the CDM is inadvertently creating a
“perverse incentive” that has created windfall profits for HCFC-22
producers — effectively acting as a subsidy that is driving the
expanded production of HCFC-22.23 HFC-23 destruction projects
have dominated the CDM market, accounting for 52 percent of
all project-based carbon volumes transacted in 2006 and 64 per-
cent in 2005.24 The abundance of CERs from HFC-23 destruc-
tion projects appears to be depressing the price of carbon, which
in turn harms the competitiveness of other CDM projects.25
This problem will not be going away anytime soon. Under
the Montreal Protocol, production of HCFC-22 can expand in
developing countries until 2016, when the baseline is set at 2015
levels, and then remain in production for another 34 years, with
the profits from HFC-23 destruction projects discouraging the
transition to superior ODS substitutes that are ozone- and cli-
mate-safe. Without the subsidy from HFC-23 destruction proj-
ects, it is likely that the projections for HCFC-22 production
would be lower. The initial trend of HCFC production and con-
sumption would be higher in such scenario, but later would be
similar to developed countries, many of which have already
accelerated the phase-out of HCFCs and begun the transition to
superior substitutes.26 The European Union (“EU”) has already
phased-out HCFCs altogether27 and other countries such as
Japan and the United States are expected to adopt phase-out
dates for HCFCs ahead of the 2030 deadline imposed by the
Montreal Protocol for developed countries. 
Past transitions from CFCs to HCFCs and hydrofluorocar-
bons (“HFCs”) helped drive technological innovation in substi-
tutes, manufacturing processes, and equipment, which in many
cases resulted in gains in energy efficiency, reduced leakage, or
other technological improvements. To date about eighty percent
of ODSs that would be in use without the Montreal Protocol
have been replaced by non-fluorocarbon chemicals, which do
not deplete the ozone layer. These substitutes include not-in-kind
chemical substitutes and product alternatives (e.g. a roll-on
deodorant instead of a spray can), changes to manufacturing
processes, conservation measures, and doing without. The tran-
sition out of HCFCs is likely to produce similar innovations and
environmental advances. But developing countries, if they con-
tinue their over-reliance on HCFC-22, will be slow to benefit
from these positive changes. 
OVER-REGULATION OF HCFC-123
The Montreal Protocol does not systematically consider the
climate impacts from the levels of energy efficiency achieved in
equipment that uses ODSs. Equipment that achieves a high rate
of energy efficiency is better for the climate, as its lower energy
use results in fewer GHG emissions from power generation
(assuming the power does not come from renewable sources or
sources that do not result in GHG emissions but raise other envi-
ronmental concerns, such as nuclear reactors). It also results in
lower operating costs over the life of the equipment.
Large-building air-conditioning units, or chillers, provide a
case in point.28 The level of their energy efficiency depends in
part on the type of refrigerant used, with HCFC-123 allowing for
greater efficiency than others. HCFC-123 has a low ODP of
0.02, a low GWP of 76, a short atmospheric lifetime of 1.3
years,29 and offers significant climate benefits due to its signifi-
cant advantage in energy efficiency over the primary alternative,
tetrafluoroethane (“HFC-134a”).30 In addition, it operates at a
low pressure in chillers designed to minimize leaks and is there-
fore considered to have a negligible impact on ozone deple-
tion.31 At present, HCFC-123 offers superior performance for
low pressure chillers (although more energy efficient alterna-
tives may be developed in the future).32
UNEP’s Refrigeration, Air-Conditioning and Heat Pumps
Technical Options Committee concluded in their 2002 Assess-
ment that “[b]ased on integrated assessments, considering the
trade-offs between negligible impacts on stratospheric ozone
and important benefits in addressing global warming, these stud-
ies recommend consideration of a phase out exemption for
HCFC-123.”33
But because HCFC-123 is an HCFC, it is scheduled for
phase-out with the rest of the HCFCs. Chillers are very expen-
sive (U.S. $200,000 to $600,000), and have 30-year life-cycles.
As a result, the phase-out of HCFC-123 could force building
owners looking to buy a chiller within the next several years to
use alternatives that are less energy efficient, more costly to
operate, and more damaging to the climate.34
FAILURE TO REGULATE ODS BANKS
The Montreal Protocol does not place any controls on emis-
sions from “banks” and provides minimal incentives for their
recovery and destruction.35 Banks are defined as the chemicals
contained in equipment and products or stored in tanks.36 Large
amounts of CFCs and other ODS substitutes such as HCFCs and
HFCs (not an ODS but a GHG) currently exist in refrigerators, air
conditioners, insulating foams, and chemical stockpiles, where
they can leak. When equipment reaches the end of its useful life,
the chemicals inside are usually released into the atmosphere. 
With limited incentives for recovery and destruction of
ODS banks, most of the CFCs in banks will be emitted into the
atmosphere over the next decade, with detrimental impacts for
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both the ozone layer and the climate. In addition to contributing
to the expected delay in ozone recovery, emissions from CFC
banks by 2015 could equal approximately 7.4 GtCO2-eq. yr-1 37
— more than seven times the size of the emissions reductions
initially targeted by the Kyoto Protocol.38
COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES
The full phase-out of CFCs in 2010 in developing countries
may present the most difficult compliance challenge yet for the
Montreal Protocol.39 Illegal trade in CFCs and other ODSs is
expected to increase once the complete ban on CFCs takes
effect, which will exacerbate the black market operating in both
developed and developing countries.40 Illegal trade currently is
estimated to represent about ten to twenty percent of all trade in
ODSs, which in CFCs alone comprises 7,000 to 14,000 tons per
year, with a value of U.S. $25-60 million.41 The Montreal Proto-
col instituted a licensing system for the transboundary ship-
ments of ODSs to combat illegal trade, but compliance remains
a critical issue.42
Other compliance challenges arise from the lack of control
measures for use of ODSs, such as HCFC-22 and methyl bro-
mide, in feedstock, process agent, and Quarantine and Preship-
ment (“QPS”) applications. This makes it possible for ODSs
produced for these applications to be used illegally in other
applications that have been phased out. Feedstock and process
agent applications are not subject to control measures because,
in theory, the ODSs used in these applications are either con-
verted to chemicals that do not harm the ozone layer or are
destroyed in the conversion process.43 But this does not take into
account any by-products, such as HFC-23 or CTCs, nor the pos-
sibility some will be diverted to illegal trade.
LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS
ASSESSING CLIMATE IMPACTS OF ODS SUBSTITUTES
The Montreal Protocol and its Parties have previously rec-
ognized the need to consider the full environmental impacts of
their strategies, especially the climate impacts of ODS substi-
tutes, which often are the most significant impacts. Article 2F(7)
of the Montreal Protocol sets forth the control measures for
HCFCs and states that in addition to minimizing ozone deple-
tion, the decision to use HCFCs should meet other environmen-
tal standards, i.e.: “Controlled substances in Group I of Annex C
(e.g., HCFCs) are selected for use in a manner that minimizes
ozone depletion, in addition to meeting other environmental,
safety and economic considerations.”
This approach was supported by Decision V/8 (Fifth Meet-
ing of the Parties, Bangkok 1993) which requested the Parties to
consider ODS substitutes in light of Article 2F and their “envi-
ronmental aspects.” This was expanded in Decision VI/13 (Sixth
Meeting of the Parties, Nairobi 1994), stating that the TEAP
“should consider how available alternatives compare with
hydrochlorofluorocarbons with respect to such factors as energy
efficiency, total global warming impact, potential flammability,
and toxicity . . .”
Subsequently, a group of 41 Parties also issued a Declara-
tion at the Tenth Meeting of the Parties (Cairo 1998) reiterating
their support for the consideration of climate impacts, noting the
“scientific indications that global warming could delay the
recovery of the ozone layer” and that “environmentally sound
alternative substances and technologies are commercially avail-
able for virtually all HCFC applications.” The Declaration urged
“all Parties to the Montreal Protocol to consider all ODS
replacement technologies, taking into account their global-
warming potential, so that the use of alternatives with a high
contribution to global warming should be discouraged where
other, more environmentally friendly, safe and technically and
economically feasible alternatives or technologies are avail-
able.”44
The consideration of environmental impacts is part of a gen-
eral obligation under principles and concepts of international
environmental law. Specifically, the Environmental Impact
Assessment (“EIA”) principle places a general duty on States to
consider the cumulative environmental impacts of proposed
actions where there are possible transboundary or global
impacts.45 The EIA principle is related to the concept of Inte-
grated Pollution Prevention and Control (“IPPC”), which was
developed to respond to the fact that environmental regulations
targeting a single problem can simply shift pollution from one
medium to another rather than eliminate it. Broadly, it requires a
holistic assessment of environmental impacts when developing
regulations, particularly for the use of chemicals, and has been
incorporated into numerous multilateral environmental agree-
ments and other international instruments, including the Euro-
pean Commission’s 1996 IPPC Directive.
IPPC requires a “life cycle analysis” of environmental
impacts to measure the “cradle-to-grave” impacts of a product,
chemical, or technology. This kind of Life Cycle Analysis
(“LCA”) was codified by the International Standards Organiza-
tion 14040 Series. It was described in the IPCC/TEAP Special
Report as involving an “inventory of relevant inputs and outputs
of the system itself and of the systems that are involved in those
inputs and outputs (Life Cycle Inventory Analysis). The poten-
tial environmental impacts of these inputs and outputs are then
evaluated . . .”46
The concept of Life Cycle Climate Performance (“LCCP”)
is considered a submethod of LCA.47 LCCP was proposed by the
TEAP to calculate the “cradle-to-grave” climate impacts of the
use of ODSs in equipment, measuring the “direct” GWP of
ODSs as well as the “indirect” GWP from GHG emissions from
power generation used in operating the equipment, placing a pre-
mium on energy efficiency. The TEAP explained LCCP: 
The concept of Life-Cycle Climate Performance
(LCCP) is intended to provide a rational way of assess-
ing only those environmental aspects affecting climate
(i.e. only a sub-segment of item (a)) [of Decision V/8
requesting each Party “ . . . to give consideration in
selecting alternative substitutes . . . to: Environmental
aspects . . .”]. . . The total impact on climate of any
technology results from a combination of the “direct”
emissions of greenhouse gases from the system
throughout its life cycle and the “indirect” emissions of
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greenhouse gases associated with the energy used or
saved by the system. . . When the use of a specific tech-
nology creates an incremental energy saving, the reduc-
tion in CO2 emissions from the energy use can far
outweigh the direct emissions over the expected life of
the product.48
LCCP provides a more complete assessment than an earlier
concept known as Total Equivalent Warming Impact49 because it
includes fugitive emissions from the manufacture of the ODSs
and emissions from operating, servicing, and the disposal of the
ODSs at the end of the equipment’s useful life.50
MINIMIZING THE CLIMATE IMPACTS OF
ODS SUBSTITUTES
Based on such a holistic environmental assessment, the
Montreal Protocol then must minimize the climate impacts of
ODS substitutes and alternatives, an approach that is consistent
with the Montreal Protocol’s ultimate objective of eliminating
the use of ODSs through policies based on “developments in sci-
entific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic
considerations. . .”51
Developments in scientific knowledge include the link
between ozone depletion and climate change. The link is based
on complex atmospheric interactions between ozone and climate
and the fact that many ODSs are also GHGs, as described by
TEAP,52 and the joint IPCC/TEAP Special Report.53 This is
acknowledged in the Montreal Protocol, which states that the
Parties are “[c]onscious of the potential climatic effects of emis-
sions of these substances (i.e. ODSs).” 
The IPCC/TEAP stated that “[o]ptions chosen to protect the
ozone layer could influence climate change. Climate change may
also indirectly influence the ozone layer.”54 The Scientific Assess-
ment Panel elaborated further, noting that climate change is
likely to obscure or even harm the recovery of the ozone layer.55
The replacement of ODSs with substitutes and other alter-
natives, including not-in-kind alternatives, will produce climate
benefits to the extent the changes result in higher energy effi-
ciency or otherwise reduce climate emissions. A more explicit
and focused set of strategies is needed within the Montreal Pro-
tocol to minimize climate impacts. 
This is supported by Agenda 21, which calls on Parties to
“[r]eplace CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances, consis-
tent with the Montreal Protocol, recognizing that a replacement’s
suitability should be evaluated holistically and not simply based
on its contribution to solving one atmospheric or environmental
problem.”56 This is further supported by the exclusion of gases
regulated by the Montreal Protocol from the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. The
exclusion was made with knowledge that many of these gases
have extremely high GWPs and that their emissions can substan-
tially contribute to climate change, thereby placing additional
responsibility on the Parties to the Montreal Protocol to mini-
mize the climate impacts of ODS substitutes.
As with the assessment requirement, the minimization
requirement is based on principles and concepts of international
environmental law that place a general obligation on States to:
(1) ensure that the activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; (2) prevent dam-
age to the environment by reducing, limiting, or controlling
activities that might cause such damage; and (3) cooperate in
addressing environmental problems.57
This obligation, which has been codified in a broad form by
the European Commission’s Integrated Pollution Prevention and
Control Directive, places an affirmative duty on States to take
preventative measures against pollution.58 More specifically, this
obligation is embodied in the Substitution Principle, which is
generally defined as “the replacement or reduction of hazardous
substances in products and processes by less hazardous or non-
hazardous substances, or by achieving an equivalent functional-
ity via technological or organisational measures.”59
The Substitution Principle has been codified domestically in
numerous regulations governing the use of hazardous chemi-
cals.60 Recently, it was included in the European Union’s new
chemical policy entitled the Regulation, Evaluation, Authorisa-
tion and Restriction of Chemicals, which requires manufactures,
importers, and users of chemical substances to “analyse the
availability of alternatives and consider the risks and the techni-
cal and economic feasibility of substitution.”61
UNEP, in conjunction with the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry,
and the Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy, has devel-
oped its own version of the Substitution Principle, known as
Responsible Use, which recommends the use of technologies so
long as the undesirable effects are minimized and the technology
achieves higher environmental performance than its alterna-
tives.62 Responsible Use Principles would permit the use of ODS
substitutes “only in applications where they provide safety,
energy efficiency, environmental, or economic advantage”63 and
where “undesirable effects are minimized and the technology
achieves higher environmental performance than its alterna-
tives.”64
RECOMMENDATIONS
An assessment of the environmental impacts of ODS substi-
tutes, under the cumulative LCA methodology and the climate-
specific LCCP methodology, would include direct impacts from
a substance’s ODP and GWP. Moreover, indirect impacts such as
by-product emissions, leakage, charge size, recovery/destruction
options, and energy efficiency also would be incorporated.
Such an assessment, together with the duty to minimize
environmental impacts, dictates three immediate and attainable
adjustments: 
• accelerating the phase out of HCFC-22; 
• allowing the continued use of HCFC-123 until superior
alternatives emerge; and 
• creating greater incentives for, or otherwise regulating, the
recovery and destruction of ODS banks. 
The problem of compliance also warrants further attention.
In addition to strengthening protection of the ozone layer,
these adjustments have the potential to reduce GHG emissions
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by up to 1–2 GtCO2-eq. by 2015 — which is greater than the
required reductions under the Kyoto Protocol.
ACCELERATED PHASE OUT OF HCFC-22 
AND ITS HFC-23 BY-PRODUCT
The accelerated phase-out of HCFC-22 in the developed
and developing countries will avoid the projected increase of
HCFC-22 production and emissions of its “super greenhouse
gas” HFC-23 by-product.65 It would also reduce the perverse
transfer of the old technology to manufacture HCFC-22 and its
raw material to developing countries.66
The availability of substitutes for ODSs was affirmed by
Regulation (EC) No. 2037/2000 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 29 June 2000 on substances that deplete the
ozone layer, which adopts stricter control measures for ODSs,
including the accelerated phase-out of HCFCs, due to the “ear-
lier than anticipated availability of technologies for replacing
ozone-depleting substances.” The IPCC/TEAP Special Report
also clarified the availability of substitutes for many HCFC
applications, including HFC-134a, HFC blends, CO2, hydrocar-
bons, and ammonia.67 Many of these substitutes provide better
energy efficiency and can be assessed based on LCA/LCCP
before selection. 
Under an LCA/LCCP analysis, determining which substi-
tute offers superior environmental performance depends as
much on the indirect impacts such as leakage, charge size,
potential for recovery/destruction at equipment end-of-life, and
energy efficiency, as it does the more direct measures of ODP
and GWP. For example, HFC-134a and HFC blends would qual-
ify as superior alternatives in minimizing climate impacts only if
they were used in equipment that achieves greater energy effi-
ciency than HCFC-22 and the other substitutes. Reduced leak
rate and greater recovery/destruction also would enhance its
standing. Use of CO2, hydrocarbons, and ammonia would qual-
ify as superior alternatives in minimizing climate impacts only if
their lower energy efficiency levels were improved or offset by
their low GWPs.
The accelerated phase-out of HCFCs raises several issues
that must be resolved by the Parties as they proceed, including
the need to ensure that developed countries will continue to ful-
fill their commitment to provide additional financial assistance
to developing countries through the Multilateral Fund to ensure
compliance with phase-out schedules.68 While some growth in
HCFC consumption may be unavoidable and economically nec-
essary for some developing countries, an aggressive phase-out
schedule is nevertheless technologically and economically feasi-
ble. It should start by moving the base year forward, i.e., to 2006,
perhaps with some controlled growth allowed until 2010, and
then a series of step-downs to ensure continuing progress and
avoid the compliance problems that would otherwise arise (i.e.,
35 percent reduction by 2015, 65 percent reduction by 2020, and
99.5 percent reduction by 2030, with 0.5 percent allowed for
servicing until 2040). This approach, coupled with financial
assistance for the transition to superior substances and technolo-
gies, would ensure immediate and continuous progress, and
avoid the extremely high levels of growth otherwise projected. It
also would make it possible for the global carbon market to fac-
tor in whatever CERs, if any, the CDM allows for the destruction
of HFC-23 from new production beyond that allowed by the cur-
rent methodology.69 Regulators in the EU as well as the archi-
tects of the post-Kyoto regime would be able to calculate the
maximum HFC-23 emissions, and the likely CDM credits possi-
ble, and set the overall emissions cap accordingly.
CONTINUED USE OF HCFC-123 UNTIL SUPERIOR
ALTERNATIVES EMERGE
This same analysis applies to the need to exempt HCFC-123
from phase-out and allow its continued use until superior substi-
tutes are developed. The continued use would be based on its
negligible ozone impacts and the energy efficiency advantage of
HCFC-123 chillers over the primary alternative, HFC-134a,
where HCFC-123 results in lower GHG emissions associated
with power generation to run the chillers, as well as lower oper-
ating costs over the 30-year life of the equipment.
At the Science Symposium held in Prague in 2004 and
chaired by Dr. Mario Molina in conjunction with the 16th Meet-
ing of the Parties, it was reported that “HCFC-123 could be
allowed in specific air conditioning applications where its use
promotes superior energy efficiency and assures near-zero
refrigerant emissions.”70
Without the continued use for HCFC-123 until superior
alternatives emerge, the energy efficiency standard for chillers
will decrease, adversely impacting the climate and lowering the
threshold against which future improvements in energy effi-
ciency will be measured. HCFC-123 has a very low ozone-
depletion potential, a lower global warming potential than
HFC-134a, and operates at a low pressure in chillers designed to
minimize leaks. UNEP and others have stated that its continued
use would have a virtually negligible impact on the ozone while
offering superior environmental benefits over alternatives.71
Allowing the continued use of HCFC-123 would create a
precedent only for ODSs that achieve superior environmental
performance over existing alternatives; its continued use could
be structured to encourage continuing innovation for superior
alternatives, perhaps requiring re-application after 2040, or after
better substitutes are identified by the TEAP, assuming existing
use is permitted through product life cycles. At present, HCFC-
123 is the only ODS that meets this environmentally superior cri-
teria. Moreover, any impact on the ozone layer from HCFC-123
could be offset by requiring the destruction of ODSs from banks
on a ODP-weighted basis of 1:1 or greater, which would have the
added benefit of addressing the other cause of the ozone layer’s
delayed recovery: CFC banks expected to be emitted into the
atmosphere over the next decade. It also would provide additional
incentive for further innovation to find superior alternatives, as
would incentive schemes like the Energy Star Program.72
GREATER INCENTIVES FOR DESTRUCTION
OF ODS BANKS
Emissions of CFCs and other ODSs from banks could be
avoided by creating greater incentives for their recovery and
destruction. The Montreal Protocol should provide greater
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incentives for destruction of banks, for example, by allowing
credits to carry forward for more than one year and to transfer
among chemical groups, where the destruction of an amount of
CFCs would allow the production or consumption of an equal
amount, on an ODP-weighted basis, of HCFCs.73 The Montreal
Protocol could provide still greater incentives by linking with the
Kyoto Protocol to provide Certified Emissions Reductions under
the Clean Development Mechanism for the destruction of ODS
banks, given the high GWPs of CFCs. The destruction of banks
would help ensure compliance, since the ODS in banks could
not be reused or recycled after the CFC ban enters into force in
2010 in developing countries.74
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE
The Montreal Protocol should strengthen its compliance
efforts by building on work already underway in the Secretariat,
UNEP OzonAction’s compliance assistance program, and else-
where, to promote an ambitious capacity building program. This
can be accomplished by linking, for example, with the Green
Customs Initiative of UNEP, and the International Network for
Environmental Compliance & Enforcement (INECE). A much
more aggressive effort is warranted by the combined ozone and
climate benefits from strict compliance.
Under Decision XVII/16, the Parties to the Montreal Proto-
col requested a feasibility study for developing systems for mon-
itoring transboundary movements of ODSs. The study proposed
options for monitoring systems that could help reduce illegal
trade in ODSs, which has become a worldwide problem as the
phase-out of CFCs and other ODSs has progressed.75 To combat
illegal trade, the study made a series of recommendations,
including a proposal to set up a global ODS tracking system that
builds on current licensing and reporting systems and includes
cross-checking of licenses and quotas in a centralized manner.76
With regard to the use of ODSs for feedstocks, process
agents, and QPS applications, requiring mandatory periodic
review of current uses and their direct and indirect impacts on
the ozone and climate, utilizing a Life Cycle Analysis, would lay
the groundwork for future action banning the use of ODSs 
where alternatives that are less harmful to the environment are
available.
CONCLUSION
The Montreal Protocol must explicitly assess the environ-
mental impacts, including both ozone and climate impacts, of
ODSs and ODS substitutes, and implement policies that mini-
mize these impacts by favoring ODS substitutes that are the least
harmful to the environment, until superior substitutes emerge.77
The failure to do so will jeopardize the continued success of the
Montreal Protocol in protecting the ozone layer and mitigating
climate change by perpetuating a market that actually works
against the most environmentally-friendly ODS substitutes.
Conversely, the requirement to assess and minimize the environ-
mental impacts of ODSs and their substitutes will create a 
fair market that favors the most environmentally-friendly ODS
substitutes, resolve the perverse incentives problem, and ensure
the continued success of the Montreal Protocol in protecting 
the ozone layer and mitigating climate change. The Montreal
Protocol also must address the significant ODSs stored in banks
that otherwise will be released at end-of-life, and that represent
more than seven times Kyoto’s reductions in terms of climate
emissions.
Ultimately, avoiding the worst impacts of climate change
depends upon the successful evolution of the Kyoto Protocol
(and its successor), including its international emission trading
system, with universal participation and expanded targets after
2012 to reduce GHG emissions enough to avoid dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate, including abrupt
climate change events. Significant progress has been made with
Kyoto’s market-based mechanisms. But Kyoto and the global
carbon market remain works in progress, with the prospect 
of achieving the substantial reductions necessary to avoid “dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference” still many years, if not
decades, away. 
The emissions reductions achieved under the Montreal Pro-
tocol are buying more time to develop a sufficiently strong cli-
mate regime, with a robust and efficient global carbon market,
that efficiently and effectively delivers the needed carbon reduc-
tions. It is impossible to say just how much the planet will warm
before triggering an abrupt climate change event, but critical
thresholds could be as near as ten years away, and it is imperative
to adjust the Montreal Protocol to avoid every ton of CO2-eq.
emissions that it can. In addition to finishing the job of protect-
ing the ozone layer, this is one of the best insurance policies the
world can buy to give us time to succeed with our long-term cli-
mate controls. And it is an insurance policy that we can be confi-
dent will be delivered by the world’s best environmental treaty.
1 Several Parties have submitted adjustments for the 20th Anniversary meeting
of the Montreal Protocol in September 2007. 
2 World Meteorological Organization & UN Env’t Programme, Science Assess-
ment Panel of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion: 2006, Executive Summary, 
at 3 (Aug. 18, 2006), available at http://www.wmo.ch/web/arep/ozone_
2006/exec_sum_18aug.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Science
Assessment of Ozone Depletion: 2006].
3 RICHARD BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING
THE PLANET (Harvard University Press 1991); see also STEPHEN O. ANDERSEN &
K. MADHAVA SARMA, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: THE UNITED NATIONS HIS-
TORY (Earthscan Publications Ltd. 2002); DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN &
DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY, Ch. 9
(Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2007).
Endnotes: Strengthening the Montreal Protocol
Endnotes: Strengthening the Montreal Protocol continued on page 74
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INTRODUCTION
T
he current international climate change regime comprises
a network of agreements and mechanisms.1 A high water
mark in the evolution of this regime was the entry into
force in February 2005 of the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nat ions  Framework Convent ion on Cl imate  Change
(“UNFCCC” or “Framework Convention”).2 However, the
Kyoto Protocol will not be the final word on the issue. Its emis-
sion limits cover only a fraction of the world’s greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions and those limits expire in 2012. 
Addressing climate change presents unique challenges for
international law, which already is complicated to negotiate and
difficult to enforce. Climate policies potentially reach all activi-
ties that burn fossil fuels and
therefore go to the heart of each
country’s economy. In addition,
the nature of the issue is such
that it will require a very long-
term response under conditions
of scientific uncertainty. For
these reasons, governments are
understandably cautious about
making commitments under
international law to limit GHG
emissions and are sensitive to
whether their trade competitors
will commit to undertake com-
parable efforts. 
This article will examine
how governments have attempted,
so far, to address the issue of cli-
mate change through interna-
tional law. The article will provide
an overview of the different
treaties, rules, and institutions that comprise the existing interna-
tional climate change regime, including a review of the negotiat-
ing history that has brought the regime to it current status.
THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
The foundation for the international climate change regime
is the Framework Convention, a treaty with practically global
participation by governments. The Framework Convention was
opened for signature in 1992 and garnered a sufficient number of
ratifications to enter into force in 1994. It currently has 189 Par-
ties, including the United States.3 The Kyoto Protocol is a direct
and formal outgrowth of the Framework Convention.
The Framework Convention is the first chapter in the evolu-
tion of the climate change regulation, serving as a constitution-
like document guiding intergovernmental cooperation on this
issue. The UNFCCC does not establish binding limits on GHG
emissions for any countries. Rather, true to its name, it forms a
framework for further action and cooperation on the issue of cli-
mate change. 
Article 3 of the Framework Convention sets forth a series of
guiding “principles” that attempt to balance the aims of environ-
mental protection, economic development, and the general divi-
sion of burdens between developed and developing country
Parties. One of the principles is the so-called “precautionary
principle,” which provides that where there are “threats of seri-
ous or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason
for postponing [precautionary]
measures.”4 However, such
measures should be “cost-effec-
tive so as to ensure global bene-
f i t s  a t  the  lowes t  cos t .” 5
Furthermore, the Parties have a
“right to, and should promote
susta inable  development ,”
taking into account “that eco-
nomic development is essential
for adopting measures to
address climate change.”6
A fundamental and recur-
ring theme in the UNFCCC is
that developed and developing
country Parties have “common
but differentiated responsibili-
ties and respective capabili-
ties,”7 reflecting a view that
developed countries bear a greater historical responsibility for
the accumulation of GHG emissions and have greater capacity to
take action. Thus, the Framework Convention divides the Parties
into two main groups: the Annex I countries, which comprise
primarily developed countries, and the non-Annex I countries,
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which comprise primarily developing countries. In setting forth
commitments under the treaty, the UNFCCC makes certain com-
mitments general to all Parties, but also assigns certain addi-
tional obligations to the Annex I Parties.
The UNFCCC provides that all Parties will develop and
submit national inventories of emissions by sources and
removals by sinks,8 implement national plans that include meas-
ures to mitigate climate change,9 promote and cooperate in tech-
nology transfer,10 and encourage and assist in scientific research
on climate change.11 Each Party is required to submit “national
communications” reporting on its progress in meeting these var-
ious commitments.12 The Framework Convention also states that
the extent to which developing country Parties effectively imple-
ment their commitments will depend on the level of assistance
from developed countries.13
The UNFCCC outlines certain commitments only relevant
to Annex I Parties. Article 4.2 obliges Annex I Parties to adopt
national policies to mitigate climate change and to report on the
progress of these policies “with the aim of ” returning emissions
to their 1990 levels.14 This became a “soft” commitment; Annex
I Parties generally have not met this target, and many missed the
target by a wide margin. However, the 1990 emissions “base-
line,” became a touchstone for development of binding emis-
sions limits under the Kyoto Protocol.
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
The Kyoto Protocol is the current apogee of international
efforts to address global climate change and a significant mile-
stone in the evolution of international environmental law gener-
ally. As a non-party, the United States has no obligations under
the Protocol, nor does it currently participate in the Conference
of Parties meetings Parties to the Protocol (“COP/MOP”). 
A BRIEF HISTORY
The origins of the Kyoto Protocol can be found in the report
of UNFCCC COP-1 in Berlin (1995). The Parties to the Frame-
work Convention determined that a more forceful international
response to the threat of climate change was needed,15 leading to
a commitment to develop a protocol with binding emission lim-
its.16 Consistent with the principle of “common but differenti-
ated responsibilities,” it was agreed that such limits should apply
only to the developed country Parties. 
Subsequent negotiations resulted in the Kyoto Protocol,
which was adopted by the Parties at UNFCCC COP-3 at Kyoto
in 1997. The Protocol outlined emission limits for the Conven-
tion’s Annex I Parties. However, many key details about the Pro-
tocol were not resolved and negotiations continued. During this
period, the United States government negotiated under a cloud of
uncertainty as the U.S. Senate passed in 1997 a near-unanimous
resolution directing the government not to enter into agreements
under the Convention that “mandate new commitments to limit
or reduce GHG emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the pro-
tocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled
commitments to limit or reduce GHG emissions for developing
country Parties within the same compliance period.”17
Negotiations surrounding the Protocol reached a crisis point
at UNFCCC COP-6, which was held in November 2000 in the
Hague. After nearly reaching a compromise, the negotiations
collapsed. This was followed by the election of George W. Bush.
The Bush Administration quickly repudiated the Protocol,
asserting that it “fails to establish a long-term goal based on sci-
ence, poses serious and unnecessary risks to the U.S. and world
economies, and is ineffective in addressing climate change
because it excludes major parts of the world.”18
The exit of the United States from the Protocol created a cri-
sis in the negotiations because the Protocol rules for entry into
force were designed to privilege the position of the United States
and Russia. The United States’ repudiation of the Protocol (fol-
lowed by Australia) meant that Russia became the keystone for
entry into force. The Protocol received a sufficient number of
ratifications to enter into force in February 2005 after Russia rat-
ified. November of that same year saw a parallel session of the
COP (COP-11) and the first meeting of Parties to the Protocol
(COP/MOP-1). 
OVERVIEW OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL’S STRUCTURE
The Kyoto Protocol sets forth binding emission limits for
developed country Parties for the period of 2008–2012. Parties
effectively have full discretion in developing national measures
to meet their limits. Furthermore, they can take advantage of
certain “flexible mechanisms,” which offer market-based
approaches for achieving emission reductions across borders.
The Protocol is buttressed by a compliance system that com-
bines facilitative systems with harder enforcement mechanisms. 
Emission Limits
The central element of the Protocol is its binding quantified
emission limitation and reduction commitments, which are
established by Article 3 and inscribed in Annex B and apply only
to Annex I Parties under the UNFCCC. The commitments vary
on a Party-by-Party basis and are calculated, with some varia-
tions, with reference to each Party’s 1990 emissions level. Each
Annex I Party must meet its commitment as an annual average
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International climate change agreements and mechanisms aim to protect
areas vulnerable to global warming, such as the polar regions.
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during the period 2008–2012, which is referred to as the “first
commitment period.” Collectively, the assigned amounts of the
Annex I Parties correspond to a 5.2 percent reduction below
their 1990 emissions levels. 
Basket of Greenhouse Gases 
Each Annex I Party’s commitment applies on the basis of a
“basket” of six GHGs: carbon dioxide (“CO2”), methane
(“CH4”), nitrous oxide (“N2O”), hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”),
perfluorocarbons (“PFCs”), and sulfur hexafluoride (“SF6”).19
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”)
determined the “global warming potential” of each of these
types of GHGs relative to carbon dioxide.20 The Protocol
expresses each Party’s limit in the form of a “carbon dioxide
equivalent” in tons of GHG emissions. In addition, for HFCs,
PFCs, and SF6, the Protocol allows the use of 1995 as a base
year, easing the stringency of requirements for those GHGs.21
The “basket” approach allows each Annex I Party a degree of
flexibility in determining a cost-effective combination of reduc-
tions of different types of GHGs. 
Consideration of Russia and Economies in Transition. 
The Protocol provides former Soviet-bloc countries,
referred to in the treaty as Parties “undergoing the process of
transition to a market economy,” with certain flexibility. Under
certain circumstances, these Parties may use a base period other
than 1990 for their emission commitments.22
Also, Russia has a significant and somewhat controversial
accommodation under the Protocol. Russia’s Annex B commit-
ment limits the country to its emissions level in 1990. However,
because of the collapse of the Russian economy in the 1990s, the
country’s emissions are below its 1990 level and are projected to
stay below that level through 2012. Accordingly, Russia has sig-
nificant headroom between its projected emissions and its
assigned amount. This arrangement eases Russia’s compliance
burden and provides the country with a potential surplus of cred-
its it can trade for profit. The Russian surplus, among other con-
cessions, was critical to securing the country’s participation in
the Protocol. However, critics deride Russia’s arrangement as
watering down the overall environmental effectiveness of the
treaty. These critics assert that Annex I countries can reduce their
need to implement “new” emission reductions in their own
countries by purchasing credits from Russia that resulted from
“old” emissions reductions, also called Russian “hot-air.”23
Commitment Period Approach
One of the elements of the treaty designed to provide for
cost-effective compliance is the commitment period approach.
Instead of a single fixed-year limit, the Protocol’s emission com-
mitments apply as an annual average to be achieved over a five-
year period. This approach responds to the concern that a
country’s GHG emissions could rise or fall in any particular year
because of difficult-to-control factors such as the vagaries of the
business cycle or weather fluctuations affecting power produc-
tion. The commitment period approach makes a government’s
efforts to mitigate its emissions less vulnerable to such factors. 
European Union “Bubble” 
Article 4 of the Protocol provides that two or more Annex I
Parties may agree to fulfill their Article 3 commitments jointly,
in which case they become subject to a summed assigned
amount, rather than their individual commitments. The Euro-
pean Union (“EU”) opted to take advantage of this provision,
replacing each Member State’s Annex B commitment with a col-
lective commitment. The EU separately negotiated a burden-
sharing agreement that re-distributes emission commitments
among the EU Member States.24 Under the EU burden-sharing
agreement, Member States with relatively fast-growing
economies have relatively more lenient emissions commitments.
Accounting for Land Use, Land Use Change, 
and Forestry
Activities that lead to deforestation, or even clearing of agri-
cultural land and disturbance of soils, result in substantial
releases of carbon dioxide. For these reasons, issues related to
land use, land use change, and forestry (“LULUCF”) have been
a significant topic of discussion at the COPs. Notwithstanding
the general benefits of focusing on LULUCF for purposes of cli-
mate change mitigation, LULUCF is controversial. Data on
emissions and removals associated with LULUCF activities are
less certain and reliable than data associated with industrial and
power generation activities. Moreover, some governments and
non-governmental organizations view LULUCF activities as
distracting from investments in cleaner energy technologies. 
The Protocol embodies a complicated set of compromises
on these issues. First, the Protocol provides that, in meeting their
Article 3 commitments, Annex I countries only may take into
account a finite set of relatively easily-measured activities: “net
changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals
by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change
and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and
deforestation since 1990.”25 The Protocol did not fully resolve
whether forest management other than afforestation and refor-
estation could count toward targeted reductions. 
Annex I Parties that opt to use LULUCF activities to meet
their commitments must issue certain credits for the tons
sequestered by these activities, referred to as Removal Units
(“RMUs”). Annex I Parties may add RMUs to their assigned
amount or trade them through the Kyoto flexible mechanisms;
however, banking surplus RMUs for future commitment periods
is prohibited.26 Finally, the Parties established certain limits to
LULUCF-related projects under the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (“CDM”).
National Policies and Measures
Central to the Protocol’s structure is an understanding that
Annex I Parties are free to determine what combination of poli-
cies and measures they will develop to meet their quantified
commitments. Article 2.1 provides that each Annex I Party, in
meeting its Article 3 commitment, shall “implement and/or fur-
ther elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its
national circumstances.” It goes on to delineate a list of pre-
ferred examples of such policies, including enhancement of
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energy efficiency, enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of
GHGs, and increased use of renewable energy. In all, Article 2 is
more hortatory than obligatory in form.
Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have developed or are
developing a variety of different national programs to meet their
Article 3 commitments. A particularly noteworthy program is
the cap-and-trade program established by the European Union
Member States to help contribute to compliance with their “bub-
ble” commitment, known as the European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”). 
The 25 EU Member States developed the EU ETS as a cap-
and-trade program, which will operate over two phases. The first
phase runs from 2005 to 2007 and the second phase runs for the
duration of the first commitment period, 2008 to 2012. During
the first phase, each Member State must include in the program
all of its “installations” in the following sectors: (1) energy
(electricity and refineries with direct emissions); (2) production
and processing of iron and steel; (3) minerals (cement, glass, and
ceramic production); and (4) pulp and paper. Approximately
12,000 installations are covered in the first phase. In addition,
Phase I will cover only emissions of carbon dioxide — the cov-
ered sectors represent 46 percent of the EU’s carbon dioxide
emissions. In Phase II, the EU might extend the ETS to cover
other sectors and other GHGs. In the years before the onset of
the first commitment period, the EU ETS has been a powerful
engine for the development of a global emissions trading mar-
ket, generating U.S. $18.8 billion in the first three quarters of
2006.27
The Flexible Mechanisms 
Perhaps the most important international environmental law
innovation of the Kyoto Protocol is its establishment and signifi-
cant reliance on market-based instruments, often referred to as
the “flexible mechanisms.” These mechanisms are the Article 17
emissions trading system, Article 6 Joint Implementation, and
the Article 12 CDM. Each provides a pathway through which an
Annex I government, and entities regulated by that government,
can meet the Article 3 commitments by investing in emission
reduction or sequestration opportunities in other countries. 
The rationale for the flexible mechanisms is straightfor-
ward. All emissions of GHG have an identical impact on the
atmosphere regardless of their location, but the cost of achieving
emission reductions varies substantially. The flexible mecha-
nisms exploit these characteristics by providing what has been
referred to as “where” flexibility. In theory, “where” flexibility
can ensure that reductions will be implemented wherever they
can be achieved at lowest cost.
In addition to the flexible mechanisms, the Protocol has
other features that promote other kinds of flexibility and cost-
effectiveness. For example, the Protocol also provides “what”
flexibility: it allows Annex I governments to use their discretion
to promote cost-effectiveness that make sense under their
national circumstances. The Protocol also provides for “when”
flexibility, which also promotes cost-effectiveness. Elements of
the Protocol’s “when” flexibility include the multi-year commit-
ment period approach and the ability of Annex I Parties to
“bank” surplus Kyoto credits to use in subsequent commitment
periods. 
Article 17 Trading
As discussed above, each Annex I Party’s Article 3 commit-
ment translates into an “assigned amount,” of GHG emissions
over the five-year commitment period. At the end of the commit-
ment period, an Annex I Party’s emissions cannot exceed its
assigned amount. The Protocol further provides that a Party’s
assigned amount can be subdivided into “assigned amount
units” (“AAUs”), with each AAU corresponding to the right to
emit one carbon dioxide equivalent ton of GHG emissions. Arti-
cle 17 directs the COP to develop rules under which Annex I can
trade AAUs with one another. 
A concern identified during the Protocol negotiations was
that the Article 17 system could create a risk of “overselling.” To
address this risk, the Protocol provides that an Annex I Party
may not engage in trades that would bring its holdings of AAUs
or other Kyoto credits below the level of its “commitment period
reserve,” a limit calculated for each Annex I Party. For most Par-
ties, the commitment period reserve precludes the sale of all but
ten percent of their initial allotment of AAUs. 
Article 6 Joint Implementation
The Protocol also establishes a form of emissions trading
among Annex I countries that revolves around projects that
reduce or remove emissions, referred to as Joint Implementation
(“JI”). In a JI transaction, an Annex I Party invests in a project in
the country of another Annex I Party, presumably because the
cost of achieving such reductions is lower in the host country
than in the investing country. The host Annex I Party then trans-
fers a corresponding portion of its assigned amount to the invest-
ing Annex I Party in the form of Emission Reduction Units
(“ERUs”). The investing Annex I Party can add these ERUs to its
assigned amount. ERUs may be earned only for reductions or
removals occurring during the 2008–2012 commitment period. 
The requirement that the project achieve mitigation results
“additional to any that would otherwise occur” is a central, com-
plicated, and controversial touchstone for project-based emis-
sions trading — both for JI and for the CDM. At the heart of the
so-called “additionality” requirement is the view that credits
should not go to reductions that would have occurred even with-
out the intervention of an investing Annex I Party or legal entity. 
Article 12 Clean Development Mechanism
A significant innovation of the Kyoto Protocol is the estab-
lishment of the CDM. Through the CDM, Annex I governments
(and companies or other persons authorized by them) can earn
certified emission reductions (“CERs”) by investing in emission
reduction projects in non-Annex I countries. Like JI, the CDM
provides for project-based emissions trading. In this way, the
CDM has been the primary mechanism for involvement of
developing countries during the Kyoto Protocol’s first commit-
ment period. Because of a perceived abundance of low-cost mit-
igation project opportunities in developing countries, many
experts believe that Annex I Parties are likely to rely on CDM
projects as a significant strategy for compliance with their Arti-
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cle 3 commitments. 
Article 12 of the Protocol outlines the fundamental ele-
ments and requirements for the CDM. CDM projects, like JI
projects, are required to achieve reductions in emissions that are
“additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certi-
fied project activity.”28 Participation in each project must be 
voluntary and approved by each Kyoto Party involved.29 Govern-
ments have established “Designated National Authorities” to
approve projects and project participants. Article 12 adds an
overlying “purpose” for CDM projects that is additional to cli-
mate change mitigation: to assist non-Annex I Parties in
“achieving sustainable development;”30 the determination of
which is left to host country Designated National Authorities. 
At the heart of the CDM is its project approval cycle. The
cycle is a process through which the CDM Executive Board
approves a project and then issues CERs for that project. The
CDM Executive Board has taken a number of steps to facilitate
and expedite the project cycle — and, indeed, to avoid a full
project-by-project review whenever possible. One of the steps
taken by the Executive Board has been to accredit a number of
private companies to serve as project reviewers; these accredited
companies are known as Designated Operational Entities
(“DOEs”). DOEs have the primary responsibility for validating
that a proposed CDM project meets all relevant requirements
and for verifying on annual basis that the project has generated
reductions. A second expediting strategy adopted by the Execu-
tive Board has been to build up a library of standard emissions
baseline methodologies for certain types of commonly-imple-
mented projects. The Executive Board has encouraged project
participants to use these pre-approved methodologies. New pro-
posed methodologies go before a subcommittee of the Executive
Board, referred to as the Methodology Panel.
With this overview, the discussion that follows outlines the
various steps in the project cycle. The first step is for the project
participant(s) to develop a Project Design Document, for which
there is a specific template. The Project Design Document con-
tains critical information about the project, including whether it
has earned host country approval from the Designated National
Authority. The Project Design Document also describes the pro-
ject’s baseline, including whether the project participant is using
a standard methodology or proposing a new methodology, and
sets forth the case for the project’s additionality. 
A DOE reviews the Project Design Document. If the DOE
determines that the project meets the CDM rules, then the DOE
transmits a “validation” report for the project to the Executive
Board. If the Executive Board agrees with the recommendations
of the DOE, it “registers” the project. A registered project is eli-
gible to receive CERs. 
For each year of the project’s crediting period, the project
participant must deliver a monitoring report. The participant
must retain a second DOE, different than the one responsible for
the validation of the project, to verify these results. The DOE
delivers its verification report to the Executive Board. If the
Executive Board concurs with the DOE’s verification, it will
issue CERs into the national registry or registries requested by
the project participant. In other words, issuance of CERs is on a
post hoc basis; it occurs only after a demonstration that the proj-
ect has achieved reductions.
Recognizing that the burdens of the standard CDM project
approval process might exceed the resources of the developers of
small projects, the CDM Executive Board has developed a set of
streamlined procedures for approval of “small-scale” projects.
Eligible project categories include certain types of renewable
energy projects and certain types of energy efficiency projects. 
Compliance
The Kyoto Protocol compliance system is more robust than
that of any other international environmental agreement and has
introduced a number of innovations to international law gener-
ally. The Protocol’s compliance system includes mechanisms to
generate information about performance, mechanisms to facili-
tate compliance, and mechanisms to deter non-compliance
through penalties. 
The fundamental measure of compliance under the Protocol
is the obligation of each Annex I Party to hold a sufficient com-
bination of credits at the end of the commitment period to cover
its emissions. To this end, the Protocol establishes a number of
mechanisms to generate information about holdings of credits
and emissions. For example, Article 5 of the Protocol requires
Annex I Parties to develop national systems for estimating emis-
sions by sources and removals by sinks. Article 7 requires each
Annex I Party to submit an annual emissions inventory that pro-
vides information necessary to determine progress toward com-
pliance with its Article 3 commitment. 
To evaluate compliance, Article 8 of the Protocol calls for
the establishment of expert review teams. These teams are
empowered to audit information submitted by Annex I Parties
pursuant to Article 5 and Article 7. Claims of non-compliance
come before the Compliance Committee,31 which consists of
two bodies: the Facilitative Branch and the Enforcement Branch,
each consisting of delegates appointed by the Parties. The Facil-
itative Branch, consistent with its name, has assistance and early
warning functions and aims to prevent non-compliance before it
occurs. It can direct financial and technical assistance to Parties.
The Enforcement Branch, by contrast, has quasi-judicial func-
tions. It assesses compliance by Annex I Parties with respect to
reporting requirements and Article 3 commitments. The
Enforcement Branch is empowered to determine that Annex I
Parties are ineligible to participate in the flexible mechanisms
and can apply adjustments to emission inventories in response to
information provided by Expert Review Teams. Under certain
circumstances, a Party may appeal a decision of the Enforce-
ment Branch to the COP/MOP.
An Annex I Party that fails to fulfill its Article 3 commit-
ment — i.e., because its emissions exceed its holdings of credits
— is subject to a penalty. The violating Party’s second commit-
ment period assigned amount will be reduced by a number of
credits sufficient to restore it to compliance — plus a penalty
“interest rate” of 30 percent. The hope is that this penalty will be
sufficient to deter willful non-compliance. Yet, its deterrent
effect will be diminished if the negotiation and adoption of
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assigned amounts for a second commitment period extends into
the first commitment period. 
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CLIMATE REGIME
Article 3.9 of the Protocol provides that the COP/MOP shall
initiate no later than 2005 the consideration of commitments for
subsequent commitment periods — but only with respect to
Annex I countries. Article 9 provides that a broader review of the
Protocol should take place at the second meeting of the
COP/MOP; such a review presumably could include considera-
tion of commitments for non-Annex I parties.
At the COP-11/MOP-1 meeting, the parties to the Protocol
agreed to launch an ad hoc working group to consider post-2012
commitments for Annex I Parties. They also consented to
extending an invitation to all Parties to submit their views on
how an Article 9 review should proceed. At the same time,
pressed by the United States and other large developing coun-
tries, the COP agreed on an initiative aimed at enhancing long-
term cooperation on climate change through the UNFCCC,
including cooperation with regard to technology.32 The launch-
ing of these parallel consultation processes reflects the wide dif-
ferences of opinion on where the international climate change
regime should go after 2012. 
Negotiations on possible commitments after 2012 will need
to contend with the range of criticisms that have emerged about
the Kyoto Protocol’s architecture. One criticism is that the Proto-
col’s emission targets do not conform to the most cost-effective
approach to addressing the problem. According to many experts,
reducing the risk of global climate change ultimately will
require very steep reductions in emissions but that the optimally
cost-effective path to achieving these reductions involves start-
ing with relatively modest commitments and then imposing
more stringent commitments over time. In this light, the Protocol
is “too much, too soon,” imposing sharp, near-term reductions
that force costly premature retirements of capital stock while
leaving uncertain the long-term path of reductions.33
Indeed, critics of Protocol often assert that few Annex I
countries are on track to meet their Article 3 commitments and
that, for several countries, compliance appears increasingly out
of reach. In 2006, the government of Canada announced that it
expected to miss its target. Another fundamental criticism of the
Protocol is that it does not extend commitments to developing
countries, including major emitters such as China and India,
even though the emissions from developing countries are
expected to surpass those of industrialized countries in the next
two decades. 
To be sure, the Protocol’s architects assert that its structure
is consistent with the Framework Convention’s principle of
“common but differentiated responsibilities.” According to this
view, the first commitment period necessary had to impose com-
mitments only on Annex I Parties in order to lay the foundation
for key developing countries to adopt limits in the subsequent
commitment period. The text of the Protocol, however, does not
make any such bargain explicit much less enforceable. 
Moreover, there is some question as to whether the Proto-
col’s architecture of absolute emissions caps can be feasibly
extended to developing countries. One issue is political; devel-
oping countries are reluctant to accept fixed limits on their emis-
sions, lest they effectively amount to limits on their economic
growth. The second issue is administrative; many developing
country governments lack the capacity to develop an economy-
wide regulatory program that could achieve a precise numerical
limit on emissions. 
Indeed, the Bush Administration and like-minded critics of
the Protocol argue that an emissions targets approach is funda-
mentally flawed. They assert that the key elements of the prob-
lem — the ultimate need for substantial reductions in emissions
and the imperative of involving developing countries — point
away from an emissions targets approach and toward a technol-
ogy-based program. In their view, the Protocol’s near-term emis-
sions targets are a costly and inequitable distraction from this
technology-based path.
Proposals for future directions of international efforts on
climate change are multiplying rapidly.34 While the majority of
proposals assume the continued negotiation of commitments by
governments under the auspices of the UNFCCC, a few would
abandon the UNFCCC and the Protocol for some other form and
forum. For instance, some proposals would bring together a
more limited number of major-emitting and like-minded coun-
tries. Part of the theory behind the approaches that propose an
alternative forum is the difficult of making progress under the
United Nations “mega-conference” approach. 
Similarly, there are different proposals as to how to develop
commitments to mitigate GHG emissions. While some propos-
als would maintain the top-down approach of multilateral nego-
tiation of national commitments, other proposals would
encourage countries to make pledges of particular domestic
measures. 
In addition, experts have come forward with various
approaches to the design of commitments. Some propose
extending the Protocol’s quantitative emission targets, but with
variations. Other designs would replace or supplement the emis-
sions targets approach with harmonized domestic policies and
measures, which could take the form of coordinated carbon
taxes, energy efficiency standards, or technology policies. 
CONCLUSION
The Kyoto Protocol has broken new ground in international
law. The Protocol’s flexible mechanisms have spawned an inter-
national market in emissions trading, which generated upwards
of U.S. $21.5 billion in transactions in the first three quarters of
2006.35 The treaty also has established a more robust compliance
system than most other international agreements. The long-term
evolution of the Protocol, however, remains in question. 
Endnotes: An Overview of the International Regime 
continued on page 76
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T
he recent Supreme Court case Massachusetts v. U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency1 captivated those who
follow the climate change debate. However, litigation
regarding global climate change is not a recent trend, and law-
suits on this topic are on the rise.2 One statute that has surfaced
consistently in climate change litigation is the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (“NEPA”).3
NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare a detailed
statement, or what is called an Environmental Impact Statement
(“EIS”), for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment. . .”4 An EIS requires a federal
agency to include the environmental impacts of the proposed
action and to offer alternatives to the proposed action, including
a “no action” alternative.5 While NEPA is one of the oldest envi-
ronmental statutes in the United States, the issue of greenhouse
gas (“GHG”) emissions reveals that clearer guidance is needed
under NEPA regarding the regulation of transboundary impacts. 
For example, in Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher6 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia held that plaintiffs had standing to sue the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (“OPIC”) and the Export-Import Bank
of the United States (“Ex-Im”) when they failed to undertake an
environmental review of their actions pursuant to NEPA.7 OPIC
and Ex-Im, both U.S. federal government corporations, offer
insurance, loan guarantees, and financing support for projects in
developing nations that emit large amounts of GHGs.8 The
plaintiffs allege that the impacts of these foreign projects can be
felt domestically within the United States because such projects
contribute to GHG emissions that “increase the incidence and
intensity of floods and droughts, raise sea levels enough to inun-
date up to 7,000 square miles of U.S. coastline,” and contribute
to other domestic environmental problems.9 Because such
impacts directly affect the United States, the plaintiffs argue that
OPIC and Ex-Im were required to comply with NEPA.
This case is currently under appeal and a lingering question
remains — does NEPA apply in an extraterritorial context? Typ-
ically, a presumption against extraterritoriality exists when U.S.
statutes are applied abroad, mostly out of concern for foreign
policy implications and national security, and this presumption
applies equally to NEPA. Out of such concern, Executive Order
12,114 was written to generally exclude projects from NEPA
review that have “significant effects on the environment outside
the geographical borders of the United States and its territories
and possessions. . .”10 The projects funded by OPIC and Ex-Im
take place on foreign soil; however, the effects that plaintiffs
allege can be felt within the United States. Therefore, it is
unclear whether Executive Order 12,114 would apply to the
OPIC and Ex-Im projects or whether the agencies have to com-
ply with NEPA.
Projects that have extraterritorial impacts are treated differ-
ently, and such impacts generally fall into two categories: (1)
proposed actions that take place within the United States, but the
environmental impacts are felt in other countries; or (2) pro-
posed actions that are conducted outside the United States and
the environmental impacts are typically felt outside of the
United States. For the former, the White House Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality (“CEQ”)11 has issued a memorandum12 that
provides guidance to federal agencies that is consistent with the
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-
boundary Context and the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment. For the latter, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive
Order 12,114 in 1979, which provides special procedures for
conducting an environmental review for major federal actions
significantly affecting the environment outside of the jurisdic-
tion of the United States.13 In addition, the CEQ has supple-
mented the Executive Order with guidance regarding
environmental effects abroad.14
What is missing, however, is any guidance on federal
actions that take place abroad but have domestic impacts.15 Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund v. Massey,16 the leading case regarding
NEPA and extraterritoriality, is equally of no assistance because
in that case, the federal action took place in Antarctica, which is
not a sovereign nation and does not have the same kind foreign
policy implications. As the world is becoming smaller and
smaller, and environmental impacts can span across the globe,
the time has come for clearer guidance in the area of transbound-
ary impacts and NEPA.
Endnotes:
1 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted 126 S. Ct.
2960 (2006).
2 See generally ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GLOBAL WARMING: THE
LITIGATION HEATS UP (Apr. 3, 2006), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/
CRs/abstract.cfm?NLEid=173 (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
3 See MELTZ, id.
4 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000).
5 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2005).
6 The case was originally captioned Friends of the Earth v. Watson, 2005 WL
2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005), but was changed because of OPIC staff
changes. 
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INTRODUCTION
R
enewable energy plays an important role in mitigating
climate change by reducing carbon dioxide emissions,
advancing energy security by diversifying an energy
mix and reducing the impact of fossil fuel price uncertainty, and
stimulating economic development by generating jobs, increas-
ing incomes, and reducing poverty. The key to successful renew-
able energy development is the implementation of a sound legal,
policy, and regulatory framework that will attract large-scale
investment in renewable energy.
RENEWABLE ENERGY — GLOBAL STATUS
& WORLD BANK EFFORTS
Renewable energy is making a difference in the way the
world meets its power needs. In 2005, worldwide renewable
power capacity expanded to 182 gigawatts (“GW”), excluding
large hydropower, which is
about four percent of global
power sector capacity. Develop-
ing countries have 44 percent of
this capacity. The top six coun-
tries were China (42 GW), Ger-
many (23 GW), the United
States (23 GW), Spain (twelve
GW), India (seven GW), and
Japan (six GW). Counting tradi-
t iona l  b iomass  and  la rge
hydropower, renewable energy
supplies seventeen percent of the
world’s primary energy. Invest-
ment in new renewable energy
reached U.S. $38 billion in 2005.
Forty-nine countries have renewable energy targets and promo-
tion policies in place, including fifteen developing countries, 
and the list is growing.1
At the 2004 International Conference on Renewable Ener-
gies in Bonn, Germany, the World Bank Group (“WBG”) com-
mitted to increasing lending for renewable energy (“RE”) and
energy efficiency projects by an average of at least twenty per-
cent per year for the next five years. For the second year in a row,
the WBG has outperformed its Bonn target. In fiscal year 2006,
the WBG’s financial support for renewable energy and energy
efficiency was U.S. $860 million. Commitments for new renew-
able energy2 and energy efficiency were U.S. $668 million, more
than double the Bonn twenty percent target. This represents a 45
percent increase over the amount of commitments made by the
WBG to new renewable energy and energy efficiency in fiscal
year 2005.3
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR
GRID-CONNECTED RENEWABLE ENERGY
Twenty-five years of experience with successful renewable
energy programs demonstrates that the implementation of an
enabling environment of legal, policy, and regulatory frame-
works that will attract large-scale capital investments is instru-
mental. Key success factors for RE policies require a legal and
regulatory framework that ensures fair and open grid access and
stable tariffs for Independent Power Producers (“IPPs”). Long-
term price predictability through long-term power purchase
agreements (“PPAs”) with transparent and adequate pricing is
the most important factor to attract investors. 
Experience from industrialized countries shows that deregu-
lating the power sector has the potential to expand service,
attract private investment, and attract IPPs to the market, which
appears to be essential for
renewable energy development.
However, the privatization of the
power sector is inherently
biased against capital-intensive
investment in RE.4 Privatized
utilities are more reluctant to
purchase intermittent renewable
energy resources. However, an
effective legal framework can
establish policies to promote
renewable energy. 
It is essential that RE be
considered early in the design of
power sector reforms, not after
the reforms are complete. Power
sector structures influence the
approach to RE market penetration. Vertically integrated utilities
provide economies of scale, but the amount of RE capacity is
determined by a monopoly that may be resistant to change, and
there is little risk sensitivity. In an unbundled system, competi-
tion exists, and the market rules allow more flexibility. In addi-
tion, increased opportunities exist for private generators to
compete though they may need special treatment, and each actor
manages his/her own risk. In such cases, long-term contracts are
important.5
To date, three major mandated market policy options to pro-
mote RE operate in the marketplace: (1) price-based feed-in
laws, which require mandatory purchase of renewable energy at
a fixed price (i.e., used in Germany, Spain, and France); (2)
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quantity-based renewable energy portfolio standards (“RPS”),
which require a minimum share of power or a minimum level of
installed capacity in a given region is met by renewable energy
(i.e., used in Australia, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, some
states within the United States); and (3) tendering mechanisms,
which involves government-sponsored competitive bidding
processes for the acquisition of renewable electricity whereby
long-term contracts are awarded to lowest priced projects (i.e.,
used in the British Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation, Ireland, and Cal-
ifornia). All these three mandated market policies ensure the
right for the RE power suppliers to recover incremental costs
between RE and conventional energy from consumers and to
connect to the grid. Each approach has its own advantages and
disadvantages. 
Feed-in laws produce high penetration rates in a short
period, create local manufacturing opportunities, provide strong
incentives for private investments, and can be cost effective if
the tariff is periodically and wisely adjusted. To date, feed-in
laws demonstrate the highest installation rates for RE and are
considered most desirable by investors given their price cer-
tainty. RPS mechanisms are good at reducing cost and price with
competitive bidding, yet tend to favor least-cost technologies
and established industry players unless separate technology tar-
gets or tenders are put in place. They are also more complex to
design and administer than feed-in laws. Tendering policies are
effective at reducing cost, but ensuring that signed contracts are
realized is a key challenge.6
The types of instruments selected should be based on objec-
tives, country conditions, and power sector structure. There is no
single solution. The effectiveness of a particular policy will rely
on how well it is designed and enforced. A case study of China
Renewable Energy Law, described later in this article, provides
insights and lessons on how these policy instruments are
selected, designed, and applied. A comparison of these three pol-
icy options is summarized in the table below.
Each policy option must consider who will pay for the
incremental costs between renewable energy and conventional
energy sources, whenever appropriate. Passing costs onto cus-
tomers by way of systems benefits charge, a carbon tax on fossil
fuel, or a dedicated fund financed by the government or with
donor support are the most frequently used approaches for cov-
ering this incremental costs and funding the various policy
measures. 
Furthermore, a range of financial incentive policies can
level the playing field between conventional energy and RE
investments. These policies can decrease upfront capital costs
through subsidies, reduce capital and operating costs through tax
credits, improve revenue streams with carbon credits, and pro-
vide financial support via loans and guarantees. Experience
demonstrates that output-based incentives are generally prefer-
able to investment-based incentives for grid-connected RE. The
investment-based mechanisms do not necessarily provide incen-
tives to generate electricity or maintain the performance of the
RE plants once they are installed, while the output-based incen-
tives promote the desired outcome — generation of electricity
from RE.8
Finally, various models of public-private partnership for
financing renewable energy exist. In general, public sector funds
must be highly targeted to catalyze, not displace, private capital.
Public funds can be used to support infrastructure development
through methods such as loans and equity investment in compa-
nies and projects, business development, marketing campaigns,
technical assistance, research and development, standards devel-
opment, and public awareness.
Renewable Energy Policy Options Comparison7
Quantity Cost/ Resource Market Local Investor Simplicity
Of RE Price Diversity Sustainability Industry Certainty
Development Reduction Development
Feed-In Large Cost efficient Excellent Technically & Excellent Can reduce Most
Laws amounts RE if the tariff is economically investor risk simple to
in short time periodically sustainable with price design,
and wisely guarantee & administer,
adjusted PPA enforce, & contract
RPS If enforced, RPS and Favor Technically & Favor Lack of price More
can meet tendering least-cost economically least-cost certainty complex to
realistic best at technologies sustainable technologies difficult for design &
targets reducing & established investors/PPA administer
cost & industry can reduce & complex
price with players risk for generators
competitive
bidding
Tendering Related only Good at Favor Tied to Favor Can provide More
to quantity reducing least-cost resource least-cost certainty if complex 
RE established cost technologies planning technologies well designed than feed-in, 
by process sustainable process & established (more risk simpler than RPS
if planning industry than feed-in)
supported, players
stable funding
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LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR
OFF-GRID RENEWABLE ENERGY
In many sparsely populated and remote areas, off-grid RE
can provide least-cost solutions to rural electrification compared
to grid extension or fossil fuel based options, such as diesel and
kerosene. These renewable energy resources are fueled by
indigenous resources and are environmentally benign. In addi-
tion, off-grid RE, particularly RE mini-grids, can also contribute
to productive uses and social services, as well as generate heat,
motive power, and other non-electric energy. Compared to fossil
fuel based options, however, off-grid RE has unique characteris-
tics with high upfront investment requirements but low energy
costs. 
It is essential that the rural electrification planning and pol-
icy frameworks clearly define the roles and criteria for grid
expansion and off-grid options and ensure a level playing field
between grid and off-grid alternatives. Grid extension and 
off-grid options should complement each other rather than 
compete. In locations where off-grid RE systems are the most
economically viable option, governments should explicitly 
consider and encourage diffusion of these options in lieu of 
grid extension. In dispersed
markets where often multiple
service providers exist, the gov-
ernment should encourage busi-
ness expansion and competition
through the establishment of a
conducive institutional and reg-
ulatory environment. 
The regulation of mini-
grids, whether from RE or con-
ventional sources, must be
performed in different ways rel-
ative to the same regulatory
tasks for grid extension. Mini-grid electrification uses different
business models and often requires the need to coordinate tariffs
with subsidies. Utilities and major private sector players with
large financial resources generally invest in grid extensions.
Mini-grids, on the other hand, are usually developed by local
entrepreneurs or community-based organizations. Currently,
most mini-grid service providers are often not regulated or are
over-regulated. The regulatory frameworks for mini-grids should
allow “light-handed” procedures and processes, and the regula-
tor should delegate regulatory tasks to the rural electrification
agency or rural electrification fund that inevitably is the de facto
regulator. The regulatory framework should also permit private
sector entities to enter the market, and ensure fair competition
for all service providers.9
Tariffs allowing the RE providers to recover their costs are
probably the single most important factor determining the long
term commercial viability of mini-grid and other rural electrifi-
cation projects. However, it is usually unrealistic to expect a full
cost-recovery tariff, given the low ability to pay in rural areas. It
is important to keep a balance between ensuring commercial
viability of the service providers and meeting rural consumers’
ability to pay.10 Rural household surveys in many developing
countries demonstrate that rural consumers can afford to pay up
to five percent of household income on electricity and up to ten
percent on all energy use, such as candles, kerosene, and dry cell
and car batteries in un-electrification areas, ranging from three to
twenty U.S. dollars per month.11 When designing tariff struc-
tures for rural electrification projects, including mini-grids, a
principle should be born in mind that the tariff should at least
recover operation, maintenance, and management (“O&M&M”)
costs, and preferably partial capital investment costs.12
An adequate tariff structure for RE mini-grids should:13
• Recover at least O&M&M costs;
• Reflect cost structure — a high fixed charge (higher than
typical tariff structures applied in large grid systems) to
reflect fixed O&M&M costs, a variable charge to reflect
fuel costs, and a levelized capital cost charge partially
reflect capital investment costs; and
• Remain below consumers’ ability to pay. 
Following this principle, a fixed monthly fee may be a more
appropriate tariff scheme for RE mini-grids since it is more
directly related to the cost structure of a RE system, and it pro-
vides the operator with a clearer financial forecast. Other pricing
schemes such as pre-payment
and binary real time pricing as
well as new solutions for intelli-
gent metering, such as energy
dispensers and behavior-based
charge controllers, have been
applied in a few pilot RE mini-
grid projects. Such tariffs can be
differentiated by customer seg-
ments with different consump-
tion patterns in order to be more
proportionate to the customer’s
ability to pay.14 In addition,
community involvement is critical for RE mini-grids. Communi-
ties sometimes can pay up to ten to twenty percent of the capital
investment of RE mini-grids up front in the form of labor, mate-
rial, and cash.
Worldwide, almost all rural electrification programs involve
some form of subsidy. In principle, subsidies should be applied
to access costs (connections), not to operating costs (ongoing
consumption).15 Following the principle that tariffs should
recover O&M&M costs, while subsidies should buy down initial
investment costs, RE mini-grids can become more attractive
than diesel genset, because they require lower tariffs compared
to diesel generators and are less exposed to fuel price volatility.
Sometimes, in a remote area where the price of diesel is quite
high, the O&M&M costs for diesel generators can be higher
than the local consumers’ ability to pay. 
A CASE STUDY — CHINA RENEWABLE
ENERGY LAW
China has the largest renewable energy capacity in the
world, with an installed capacity of 42 GW in 2005, mostly
small hydroelectric power. At the Beijing International Renew-
Grid extension and 
off-grid options should
complement each other
rather than compete.
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able Energy Conference in 2005, the Chinese government
announced an ambitious target to achieve sixteen percent of
energy consumption from renewable energy by 2020, which is
equivalent to an installed capacity of 75 GW of small hydro, 30
GW of wind, and 30 GW of biomass. 
China passed Renewable Energy Promotion Law in Febru-
ary 2005, which took effect on January 1, 2006, making it one of
the first countries in the developing world to adopt mandated
market policies for renewable energy. The World Bank China
Renewable Energy Scaling-Up Program provided U.S. $213 mil-
lion in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
loans and Global Environment Facility grants to assist China in
implementing the Renewable Energy Law and investing in wind
farms, biomass power generation, and small hydro plants. 
The development of the Chinese Renewable Energy Law
offers valuable insights and lessons on how RE policy instru-
ments are designed and applied in the real world. After carefully
examining the three options of the mandated market policies
through study tours and workshops, the Chinese government
decided to adopt the feed-in tariff approach in the Renewable
Energy Law that was passed in 2005. 
While the Renewable Energy Law in 2005 provided critical
principles and frameworks, it did not include detailed opera-
tional guidelines for implementation and enforcement, which
were left to be developed in the Implementation Regulations.
While feed-in laws have produced the highest RE penetration
rates and are relatively easy to administer, it is tricky to set up
the feed-in tariff level at the beginning, particularly when there
are no reliable cost benchmark data available on large-scale
commercial wind farms and biomass power plants from real
world experience in China. If the feed-in tariff is set too low, it
will not provide sufficient incentives to the investors, thereby
defeating the purpose. If the feed-in tariff is too high, it will cre-
ate high rent and not be cost-effective. In addition, considera-
tions in regional equity added another layer of complexity. Given
the wide variations in renewable energy resources, coal
resources, economic development status, and electricity tariff
levels among different regions, a question of whether the feed-in
tariff should be set at the national level with regional differences
or at provincial level also generated a major debate. Drafts of the
Implementation Regulation, circulated for public comments in
November 2005, had clearly stated that the wind power tariffs
would be set at baseline coal-fired power prices in each province,
plus a subsidy of RMB 0.23/kWh (U.S. $0.028 US/kWh).
Contrary to expectations, the Implementation Regulation
announced on January 1, 2006 did not apply the feed-in tariff to
wind power, only to biomass. Biomass power tariffs are set at
province-specific average coal prices plus a premium of RMB
0.25/kWh Chinese Renminbi, which is equal to three U.S. cents
per kilo-watt-hour (“cents/kWh”). Wind power tariffs, however,
are established through the ongoing concession process.16
The Chinese government introduced competitive bidding
for wind farm development in 2003, to steadily ramp up new
wind power capacity at the lowest possible costs. After years of
high wind electricity tariffs, the government hoped that such a
concession approach would drive down and reveal the cost of
wind farms in China. Under the Wind Power Concession pro-
gram, the National Development and Reform Commission
invited international and domestic investors to develop 100
megawatt (“MW”) wind farms on a potential wind site. Winning
bidders are granted approval to develop the selected project site,
a PPA for the first 30,000 hours of the project operation, guaran-
teed grid interconnection, financial support for grid extension
and access roads, and preferential tax and loan conditions by the
central government. This backing of the central government cre-
ates a comparatively lower-risk investment environment for
wind farm developers in China.17
The first round of bidding took place in October 2003, with
two projects awarded 200 MW. While the winning bid prices
were significantly lower than any previous wind farm price in
China, they were below the long-run marginal costs. The
selected developers experienced difficulties in obtaining financ-
ing, and project construction was delayed. The subsequent
rounds of bidding from 2004 to 2006 awarded an additional
2000 MW capacity.18 The winning bid price for the wind con-
cession projects to date ranged from 4.6 to 6.2 U.S. cent/kWh,
while current average cost of wind power in China is estimated
to be between 6.3 and 8 U.S. cent/kWh.19
To date, the concession caused a major concern to the wind
industry in China because the bidding process resulted in prices
that are too low to be financially viable. As a result, there are
reduced incentives for developers to invest in this nascent indus-
try. In addition, the number of companies attempting to bid for
the concession projects actually fell from the first round of con-
cessions to the second round, contrary to expectations that the
number of participants would increase with the program’s
increased visibility and the “success” of the first two conces-
sions. Furthermore, better wind resource measurement is needed
to decide the selection of concession sites and the bid prices. 
CONCLUSION
Renewable energy is an effective approach to mitigate cli-
mate change. Worldwide, renewable energy technologies are
growing rapidly and have become a mainstream industry. Devel-
oping countries have done more than expected to promote
renewable energy development, and China is a world leader on
renewable energy capacity. 
The key to success for renewable energy development is the
implementation of a sound legal, policy, and regulatory frame-
work that will attract large-scale investment in renewable energy.
Successful renewable energy policies must be long-term and
consistent; have a secure and predictable payment mechanism;
provide fair and open grid access; possess strong governance
conditions, clear administration procedures; and low transaction
costs; have strong public acceptance; and enforcement is key.
Countries should start simple in the design of energy policies,
and always remember that “the devil is in the details.”
Endnotes: Legal and Policy Frameworks 
continued on page 77
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T
he term “clean coal” figures prominently in discussions
about the future of United States energy policy, but what
exactly is it, and can it really help? Coal generates over
half of the electricity used in the United States,1 and accounts for
36 percent of the United States’ overall releases of carbon diox-
ide (“CO2”).2 Coal-fired power plants in general are the largest
source of man-made CO2, and these plants account for over one
quarter of the world’s total emissions.3
Clean coal technology (“CCT”) is actually a variety of 
technologies designed to reduce the environmental impact of
coal-f ired power plants. CCT
encompasses technologies for
coal preparation, coal gasifica-
tion, pollutant removal, and 
carbon capture and storage.4
Despite improvements to coal-
fired plant efficiency, carbon
emissions still remain a problem
for using coal to produce elec-
tricity. Carbon capture and 
storage (“CCS”) technology
captures CO2 and stores it deep
underground, preventing the gas
from entering the atmosphere.5
CO2 could be pumped into and
stored in underground saline
aquifers, or pumped into oil fields to maintain pressure and facil-
itate oil extraction.6
Coal gasification plants are considered a key element for a
zero-emissions power system; however, the technology has not
yet been proven on a wide-scale commercial basis.7 When coal
is gasified, it is not actually burned; rather it is broken down into
its chemical components and chemical reactions are performed.
Impurities are removed from the resulting gas, many of which
are valuable by-products. This process also produces significant
amounts of CO2; however, unlike traditional coal-fired power
plants, separating the CO2 requires little to no additional effort
or expense, making carbon capture economically feasible, par-
ticularly if the gasifier has a market for the CO2.8
If captured CO2 is used to recover more oil through
enhanced oil recovery, thus encouraging more oil consumption,
is there really a net benefit?9 Supporters of CCS say yes. When
using man-made CO2, rather than natural CO2, it is substantially
decreasing what would otherwise be emitted into the atmos-
phere. This outcome is of course dependent on the fact that the
CO2 actually stays in the ground
and does not leak out. Studies
are taking place around the
world, but it could be years
before we know whether storage
is a viable option.10
CCT could  potent ia l ly
make great strides for stabiliz-
ing and reducing U.S. and global
CO2 emissions, but it could
come at the cost of the natural
landscape. Additional coal
demand will naturally encour-
age more coal mining. The face
of coal mining has changed
from the ubiquitous under-
ground shafts of Pennsylvania to open pit mining in the Western
states and mountain-top removal mining in Appalachia. The
question remains, are we simply trading one ecological disaster
for another?
THE BUZZ ABOUT CLEAN COAL
by Jennifer Rohleder*
Clean coal technology is
actually a variety of
technologies designed to
reduce the environmental
impact of coal-fired 
power plants.
* Jennifer Rohleder is a JD candidate, May 2008, at American University Wash-
ington College of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
D
espite the fact that water covers approximately seventy
percent of the planet, the ocean is the Earth’s least pro-
tected area.1 While the ocean absorbs carbon dioxide
(“CO2”) from the atmosphere and therefore helps to mitigate
some of the effects of climate change,2 the ocean can also aggra-
vate global warming. Warmer ocean water absorbs less CO2, so
as its temperature increases the ocean’s ability to absorb CO2
diminishes.3 This phenomenon has the potential to create a “pos-
itive-feedback cycle” where warming temperatures increase the
temperature of the ocean, resulting in less CO2 absorbed and
more CO2 in the atmosphere, which in turn will cause higher
global temperatures.4 Higher global temperatures also cause
more water vapor, a greenhouse gas (“GHG”), to evaporate from
the ocean’s surface, further contributing to the build up of GHGs
in the atmosphere.5
Additionally, climate change affects animals living in and
around the ocean. Birds suffer reduced nesting areas, fish move
further toward the poles to escape warming waters, and crea-
tures, such as corals, which cannot migrate to cooler waters,
start to die.6 Addressing global climate change will require a
comprehensive mixture of domestic and international law
because much of the ocean lies beyond the national jurisdiction
of any one state. This article surveys a few of the existing inter-
national environmental treaties requiring states to curb activities
that contribute to climate change and discusses gaps in their
respective coverage. It concludes by suggesting a few improve-
ments to these existing treaties to facilitate further protection of
marine species and ocean habitats from the impacts of climate
change.
EXISTING TREATIES ARTICULATE SOME
PROTECTION FOR OCEANS
Mandatory reductions in GHG emissions is the proverbial
“elephant in the corner” in any international conference con-
cerning climate change: at meeting after meeting, the partici-
pants acknowledge the scope of the problem,7 but when it comes
to recommending solutions, language calling for emission cuts
is replaced with language calling for more studies.8 With the cre-
ation of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, a few dozen countries finally
committed to curbing emissions of GHGs.9 Since its adoption,
however, the United States has withdrawn from the Protocol and
many of the states that committed to reductions are experiencing
difficulty in meeting their obligations.10 Kyoto is further compli-
cated by the fact that many states interpret it as a trade agree-
ment as much as an emissions treaty.11
In attempting to build political pressure to force state action
on climate change, it is useful to examine other instruments that
articulate obligations to curb GHG emissions. Specifically, the
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage (“World Heritage Convention”), the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), and
the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) each contain
provisions imposing responsibilities on states to reduce emis-
sions in order to protect the ocean.
THE WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION
The World Heritage Convention requires a state to “do all it
can,” within its capabilities to “ensur[e] the identification, pro-
tection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future
generations” of areas of outstanding natural beauty or cultural
EXISTING LEGAL MECHANISMS TO ADDRESS
OCEANIC IMPACTS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE
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Oceans are home to numerous species threatened by climate change, such as
these Antarctic penguins. 
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heritage.12 Once recognized as a World Heritage Site, protection
of the site becomes the combined responsibility of the interna-
tional community as a whole;13 states cannot deliberately take
measures that would damage these sites, “directly or indi-
rectly”14 and must adopt internal policies to protect and rehabil-
itate its own heritage sites.15 It does not stretch the imagination
to interpret these provisions to include cuts in GHG emissions
among the many measures a state should take to “do all it can.”16
Designation as a World Heritage Site affords some protec-
tion to threatened marine areas because the establishment of
preservation areas allows species to recover more quickly.17 For
example, the listing of the Sian Ka’an biosphere reserve on
Mexico’s Yucatán peninsula allowed for the establishment of
local non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) in the area,
increased national and international funding for the reserve, and
gave the local community enough political power to lobby the
government to establish strict development regulations for the
surrounding areas, thereby limiting the type and number of pri-
vate development projects that can be built in its vicinity.18
Increasing the number of designated World Heritage marine
sites will provide additional protection necessary to allow
marine species and habitats to
recover or adapt to climate
change. 
When listing alone does not
halt the decline of a heritage
site, the Convention provides
that sites threatened “by serious
and specific dangers,” can be
designated as being “in dan-
ger.”19 In danger status increases
the amount of funding and inter-
national attention given to a
site.20 If successfully listed as in
danger, the member state must
develop a “programme for corrective measures” to abate the
causes of the site’s deterioration.21 Consequently, in danger sta-
tus requires affirmative steps to repair damaged areas, in effect
reversing the causes of the destruction in the first place, on top of
the general obligation against taking deliberate measures that
could harm a site.
In November 2004, a NGO in Belize tested the power of
these provisions to force member states to take steps mitigating
the impacts to oceans from climate change by filing a petition
with the World Heritage Committee requesting that it list the
Belize Barrier Reef as an in danger site.22 While the Committee
declined to place the Reef on the in danger list, forestalling a
showdown over climate change at the time, it left the door open
for future consideration.23 The Committee ordered a policy
paper from the World Heritage Centre on the impacts of climate
change to sites.24 It then took a decision recognizing that climate
change was impacting at least 125 heritage sites and indicated
that it would continue to review petitions to grant in danger sta-
tus to sites threatened by climate change on a “case by case
basis.”25
In addition to foot-dragging by the Secretariat, those hoping
to force action through the World Heritage Convention face
other problems. For example, the Convention lacks a method for
listing sites existing outside the national jurisdiction of a state.26
This includes the approximately sixty-four percent of the ocean that
constitutes the high seas and belongs to the world as a whole.27
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA
In contrast with the World Heritage Convention, UNCLOS
covers the entire ocean, not just areas within a State’s territory.28
The treaty’s provisions on conservation and preservation of the
marine habitat can assist in understanding states’ responsibilities
with regard to impacts on the ocean from climate change.29 As
an umbrella rule, UNCLOS contains a general obligation on the
parties to protect the marine environment.30 While the sovereign
right to exploit national resources within the areas of territorial
control somewhat qualifies the obligation to protect,31 UNCLOS
recognizes this right in conjunction with the obligation.
Arguably the obligation to protect is, therefore, at least co-equal
with the right to exploit. UNCLOS further clarifies that protec-
tion extends to that “necessary
to protect and preserve rare or
fragile ecosystems” and threat-
ened marine life.32 Upon discov-
ering ocean pollution, states
must “eliminat[e] the effects. . .
and prevent or minimiz[e] the
damage,” albeit “to the extent
possible,” and take necessary
measures to abate “pollution of
the marine environment from
any source.”33
GHG emissions appear to
be pollution covered under
UNCLOS,34 because UNCLOS
defines “pollution of the marine environment” as “the introduc-
tion by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into
the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is
likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living
resources and marine life.”35
UNCLOS implies a collective duty on the part of signatory
states to implement strategies to combat climate change.36
For states unwilling to participate in the fulfillment of this 
obligation, UNCLOS conveniently contains a dispute resolution
mechanism, allowing the parties to refer disputed matters to 
an international court or tribunal.37 However, the provisions 
concerning the protection and conservation of the marine 
environment have not yet been interpreted by an international
tribunal, leaving little guidance on how they might ultimately 
be applied.38
THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
The CBD is a conservation-oriented convention providing
for the protection of biological diversity, the promotion of sus-
tainable development, and the equitable sharing of benefits
Warmer ocean water
absorbs less CO2, so as 
its temperature increases
the ocean’s ability to
absorb CO2 diminishes.
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derived from natural resources.39 In similar fashion to the World
Heritage Convention, the CBD only covers areas existing within
the control of individual states.40
Under the CBD, states develop strategies for the conserva-
tion of their biodiversity and create “as far as possible and
appropriate. . . a system of protected areas or areas where special
measures need to be taken to conserve biological diversity.”41 In
doing so, states should also “[p]romote the protection of ecosys-
tems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable populations
of species in natural surroundings.”42 The CBD specifically
includes “marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecologi-
cal complexes of which they are part,” as part of the definition of
biological diversity, while mandating implementation “with
respect to the marine environment consistently with the rights
and obligations of states under the law of the sea.”43
Broadly interpreted then, the Convention obligates member
states to establish protected marine areas and to take steps to
shelter these areas from the impacts of climate change. Addi-
tionally, because the ocean is one of the least understood and
least studied areas,44 the CBD could require states to increase
their funding for scientific studies into the predicted aquatic
impact from climate change. It might also require member states
to consider potential ocean impacts when conducting environ-
mental assessments or deciding whether to grant certain permits,
such as those for factories intending to emit GHGs. 
Under the CBD, states have been successful in establishing
protected areas, but the Secretariat acknowledges that marine
protected areas remain “under represented.”45 The CBD also rec-
ognizes the establishment of marine protected areas outside the
areas of national jurisdiction as a priority.46 Conceding that the
impacts from climate change will not simply disappear, even if
GHG emissions are cut, the CBD recommends the development
of “biological corridors” to facilitate the unhampered migration
of species to more suitable habitats.47
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
The establishment of marine protected areas specifically to
preserve regions threatened by climate change acknowledges
both that marine areas have intrinsic value and that these areas
are ripe for protection.48 Marine protected areas also offer a
haven where threatened species can escape the myriad pressures,
including climate change, that jeopardize their existence and
endanger their habitat. Amending all three treaties to allow for
the multilateral establishment of marine protected areas outside
the boundaries of national jurisdictions would help accomplish
these objectives. 
Because so much of the ocean is beyond the borders of any
state, any amendment of the conventions should include a
process for the establishment of protected areas on the high seas.
In this process, a member states could nominate areas of the high
seas for protection, subject to review by a committee before sub-
mission to the parties for inclusion within the relevant conven-
tion’s protocols.49 Since complete unanimity is rare, some sort of
qualified majority of the voting parties — similar to the way
chemicals are added to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants or new ozone depleting substances are
included within the phase-out schedule to the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer — could be enough
to secure passage of the proposed protected area.50
Within the areas of national jurisdiction, providing incen-
tives to designate marine protected areas could encourage states
to establish new areas. For example, member states that have
also signed the Kyoto Protocol could receive some sort of credit
for creating the protected area. These measures might follow the
Clean Development Mechanism provisions of the Kyoto Proto-
col that allow for the allotment of credit to industrialized coun-
tries for financing sustainable development projects in
developing countries51 or the Joint Initiative programs that foster
the exchange of credits for similar projects between developed
country signatories to the Kyoto Protocol.52 States would receive
credit after taking into account such factors as the size or sophis-
tication of the protected area and its contribution to helping
marine species survive climate change impacts. 
Admittedly, amendment of the conventions requires
extreme coordination between the parties, but amendment is fea-
sible. Further, to avoid concerns about control over otherwise
neutral areas, an international conservation committee to over-
see and manage these protected areas should be established. The
committee could be comprised of member state representatives
and technocrats from the relevant conventions or it could fall
under the auspice of the United Nations. The coordination com-
mittee will also have the added benefits of increasing communi-
cation between the various conventions and potentially result in
greater cross-pollination of their respective obligations. 
CONCLUSION
While imperfect, the existing treaties articulate a general
obligation on states to reduce their GHG emissions and protect
existing marine resources. Because each treaty speaks differ-
ently about a state’s obligations to the ocean, taking advantage of
all three instruments to establish a global network of marine pro-
tected areas provides maximum protection. Under the World
Heritage Convention, designation of a World Heritage Site
makes funds available for the protection of the actual site and
builds pressure for protective measures in the surrounding areas.
Any deterioration of a Site helps focus international attention on
the underlying factors contributing to the decline. Establishing
protected areas pursuant to UNCLOS does not create this same
obligation, but the creation of protected marine areas will help
fragile marine ecosystems and threatened species weather the
climate change storm without additional human-induced pres-
sures. Finally, protected areas under the CBD reminds parties of
their responsibilities to preserve the planet’s biodiversity and
focuses attention on developing a holistic strategy for marine
protected areas that include features, such as migratory corri-
dors, which would allow marine species to migrate or adapt to
climate change. Additionally, these protected areas should exist
both within areas of national jurisdiction and on the high seas.
Developing a system of protected marine areas under the World
Heritage Convention, UNCLOS, and the CBD will help species
recover from, and adapt to, climate change.
Endnotes: Existing Legal Mechanisms on page 78
25 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
I
n the 2007 State of the Union speech, President Bush dis-
cussed his new energy policy.1 The President espoused envi-
ronmental benefits of an increased use of hybrid vehicles
and alternative automotive fuels,2 part of the Advanced Energy
Initiative. He also proclaimed that this would reduce the reliance
of the U.S. economy on oil producing nations abroad.3 Upon
closer inspection, nuances appear that may frustrate both efforts.
There are approximately 250 million vehicles currently in
domestic operation.4 This year, an anticipated seventeen million
new vehicles will be sold.5 Most of these vehicles are powered
by traditional automotive technology. The White House expects
that it will take a total of fifteen years for effective transition to
new technology.6 Consumers will need to purchase entirely new
automobiles as part of this plan, and most will finance those pur-
chases by selling their older vehicles. The environmental bene-
fits to hybrid and alternative fuel utilization are reduced by the
existence of downstream markets.7
Legal mechanisms to prevent the older, less efficient vehi-
cles from ending up in developing nations with either non-exis-
tent or non-enforced emission standards are not currently in
place.8 This means that even if the United States (and/or other
developed nations) decrease overall emissions domestically by
increasing hybrid and alternative utilization, emissions abroad
will still increase (and probably by a higher percent since fuel
refining standards are lower in the developing world). This
would lead to not only more emissions, but also more pollution
of other kinds. Furthermore, alternatives like ethanol and bio-
diesel have limited climate benefits, because they also involve
carbon emissions and encourage land-use change, a major con-
tributing factor to climate change.9 Hybrids, even highly effi-
cient ones, still require gasoline, and the extraction and
refinement process will continue to result in emissions. This
transition may be further prolonged because oil producers will
continue to explore for new oil fields, and such discoveries lead
to lower petroleum prices, which reduce consumer incentives for
vehicle replacement.
Another complication is that as these older vehicles help
developing nations grow economically, the commercial ties
between the United States and these nations would also increase.
Widespread ethanol utilization would magnify this effect,
because arable land limitations will likely increase agricultural
imports (and prices). Sea level rise and increased soil evapora-
tion due to climate change will also intensify the problem. Oil
producing nations will maintain their potential to wreak havoc
upon the world economy, because developed nations will depend
on developing nations for crucial commodities (such as food or
fuel), and those developing nations will continue to be depend-
ent on petroleum. The symbiotic relationship that would develop
will hinder developed nations like the United States from escap-
ing the influence of current energy geopolitics.
The issue of climate change represents a challenge that goes
beyond the borders of any one nation, and the policies of any
sovereign power must reflect that reality. The United States must
consider potential complications to climate and energy policies
prior to enactment. This “Left-Over” problem represents a foun-
dational crack in the automotive wedge of climate stabilization
in its current form.10 The success of this strategy will require
proactive measures to address this potential complication that
could unravel the entire plan.
Endnotes:
1 See Press Release, President Bush Delivers the State of the Union Address
(Jan. 23, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/
20070123-2.html (last visited, Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Bush].
2 Bush, id.
3 Bush, id.
4 See Press Release, State of the Union: The Advanced Energy Initiative (Jan.
31, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/
20060131-6.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter State of the Union].
5 State of the Union, id.
6 State of the Union, id.
7 See UN Statistical Abstract, Forty-Ninth Issue, United Nations, 2002–2004, at
518 (illustrating that the number of motor vehicles in use increased over time,
year by year. In fact, of the 177 nations listed, 29 of them recorded a doubling
of motor vehicles in less than a decade. This shows that the total number of
vehicles is increasing).
8 See generally, Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, Old Car
Buy Back Program, available at http://www.sbcapcd.org/edu/facts-ocbb.pdf
(last visited Feb. 13, 2007) (providing an example of a voluntary buy back pro-
gram. However, no larger, mandatory program is currently in force).
9 See United Nations Environmental Programme, CO2 Emissions from Land
Use Change, available at http://www.grida.no/climate/vital/10.htm (last visited
Feb. 13, 2007) (providing a map showing the location of carbon emissions from
land use).
10 See generally Robert Pacala & Stephen Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: 
Solving the Climate Problem for the Next Fifty Years with Current Technologies,
305 SCIENCE 968 (2004), available at http://fire.pppl.gov/energy_socolow_
081304.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
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INTRODUCTION
H
uman activities, particularly the combustion of fossil
fuels and the large-scale transformation of land cover,
affect ecosystems around the world. Changes in 
temperature, precipitation, and water chemistry are altering our
environment. These changes will also affect environmental regu-
latory frameworks, either rendering them ineffective or forcing
them to adapt to achieve their goals under changing conditions. 
Global temperature has increased by 0.8°C over the last
century. Climate scientists estimate that we are committed to an
additional 0.5°C increase due to the amount of carbon dioxide
(“CO2”) that is already present in the atmosphere.1 Rising tem-
peratures have been accompanied by a wide range of environ-
mental changes, including, retreat of sea ice and glaciers, sea
level rise, and changes in the intensity and frequency of storms
and precipitation events.2 Rising CO2 concentrations has not
only changed the composition of the air, but it is also changing
the chemistry of the water: CO2
is absorbed by the oceans, which
forms carbonic acid, causing the
acidification of the oceans.3
These changes mean that
regulations intended to protect
natural resources and promote
conservation will be applied
under conditions significantly
different from those that pre-
vailed when they were drafted.
Achieving the original goals of
these regulations will require a
careful assessment of long-standing assumptions, as well as
decisive action to change regulatory practices in ways that
accommodate, offset, and mitigate climate change. Three such
laws will be explored in this article: the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”), the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), and the Clean Air Act
(“CAA”).
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT
The stated purpose of the ESA is “to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved.”4 The architects of
the ESA intended to save creatures from proximal threats, such
as bulldozers and dams. Yet, today we see clear evidence that cli-
mate change creates new threats to already imperiled species by
contributing to the disruption of ecological processes essential to
entire ecosystems. Deteriorating conditions will impact the via-
bility of endangered species and the practices used to protect
them through implementation of the ESA (e.g., listing, “take”
permitting, and recovery planning).
For example, in 2006, two species of Caribbean coral,
Elkhorn (Acropora palmata) and Staghorn (A. cervicornis)
coral, were listed as “threatened” for their entire range under the
ESA. The listing stated that “the major threats to the species’
persistence (i.e. disease, elevated sea surface temperature, and
hurricanes) are severe, unpredictable, likely to increase in the
foreseeable future, and, at current levels of knowledge, unman-
ageable.”5 This listing identifies three key threats that all relate to
climate change: rising sea surface temperatures, disease suscep-
tibility, and hurricane-related impacts. Sea surface temperatures
are closely related to increasing global surface air temperatures.
A severe Caribbean coral-bleaching event in 2005 demonstrated
that high temperatures cause coral bleaching and bleaching
corals become more susceptible to disease.6 Moreover, as global
temperatures rise, the intensity
and frequency of hurricanes may
increase.7 The timing of this list-
ing was particularly profound as
it followed the unprecedented
2005 Caribbean summer, during
which the region experienced
the hottest water temperatures
ever recorded with large-scale
bleaching followed by disease,8
and a record breaking hurricane
season.9
Recently, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service proposed listing Polar Bears (Ursus mar-
itimus). The bears rely on Arctic sea ice for access to food and
breeding sites. Their primary food source, the ringed seal (Phoca
hispida), is also an ice dependent species. The loss of nearly 30
percent of Arctic ice cover over the past century, together with
the possibility that the Arctic will be seasonally ice-free before
the end of this century, strongly suggest that climate change will
jeopardize the survival of this species.10
Another example is the Key Deer, which is now limited to
living on two islands in the Florida Keys. Most of the Keys have
less than two meters of elevation. If sea levels were to rise one
meter, most the Key Deer habitat would be lost. The only way to
limit sea level rise and protect remaining Key Deer habitat is to
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take action to mitigate the rate and extent of climate change.11
These three species represent the tip of the iceberg, so to
speak. Because climatic conditions are central to basic ecologi-
cal processes that control the distribution and abundance of life,
the list of species that are or will be endangered by climate
change is potentially enormous.12 The most direct way to protect
the ecosystems in which these species live — the mandate of the
ESA — will be to address the cause of climate change: green-
house gas emissions. However, because some impacts are
inevitable, it is important that we also consider how implementa-
tion of the ESA can be used to reduce the vulnerability of imper-
iled species and aid in their recovery despite changing conditions. 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT13
The CWA provides the legislative foundation for the protec-
tion and restoration of the waters of the United States. The Act
seeks to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and bio-
logical integrity of the nation’s waters” with the goal of achiev-
ing water quality that “provides for the protection and
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and recreation in and
on the water.”14 The CWA gives the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA”) the statutory authority to establish water
quality standards and to regulate the discharge of pollutants into
waters of the United States. 
Climate and water quality are linked by hydrologic
processes involved in the global water cycle. These processes
move water from the oceans, into the atmosphere, and back
down into rivers, streams, wetlands, and estuaries. The net result
is a sustainable supply of clean, fresh water and a wide variety
ecosystem services, such as recreational opportunities and food
production. It has long been recognized that humans intervene in
this cycle through activities that intercept, store, utilize, or other-
wise alter natural hydrologic processes (e.g., the expansion of
impermeable surfaces, application of excess fertilizer, and
removal of ecological filtration processes such as wetlands). The
CWA provides a framework for understanding these sources of
impairment and acts to restore impaired waters and prevent fur-
ther degradation. Over time, the CWA contributed to significant
improvements in surface water quality in the United States
despite a steadily growing population and expanding economy.
Climate change adds a new and potentially disruptive ele-
ment to these long-running efforts. The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change predicts a wide variety of changes, including
rising air temperature, more frequent heat waves, more intense
precipitation events, and increasingly severe dry-spells and
droughts.15 These changes reflect the biophysical consequences
of an overall acceleration of the global hydrologic cycle, and
these general conclusions have been a feature of the scientific lit-
erature for nearly twenty years. However, the local and regional
consequences of these complex processes remain difficult to pre-
dict. The key conclusion for local and regional decision makers
is that “change” will be the operative word, and historic observa-
tions will provide an increasingly unreliable guide to future con-
ditions. Changes in hydrologic processes will be reflected in
changes in the quantity and quality of surface waters, and, in
many cases, they are likely to undermine important assumptions
used in the implementation of the CWA. For example: 
• More intense precipitation events will increase nonpoint
source pollution loads.
• Increasing storm water volumes may exceed expectations
and design specifications for water treatment works and
sewer infrastructure.
• Decreases in flow volume may increase in-stream pollu-
tant concentrations and reduce the ability of waters to
accommodate pollutant discharges.
• Increases in ambient air temperature will raise tempera-
tures in surface waters and threaten aquatic ecosystems.
• Humans may respond to some climate change-related
impacts through increased use of some pesticides, fungi-
cides, and fertilizers, increasing the concentrations in sur-
face and groundwater (e.g., expanding nuisance species).
• Climate change may also decrease the toxicity thresholds
of bioindicators to these pollutants.
These changes have significant implications for the most
important and far-reaching CWA programs, including the con-
trol of point source discharge, management of nonpoint source
pollution, and environmental monitoring.
Point source discharges are typically managed by engi-
neered systems. Most modern systems are designed to accom-
modate a relatively wide range of environmental conditions.
However, there are limits, and climate change may drive systems
unexpectedly close to their design tolerances — sometimes risk-
ing catastrophic outcomes (e.g., levies surrounding New
Orleans). Changes to long-term, capital-intensive investments
such as sewer and stormwater facilities are costly and time con-
suming. Consequently, those involved in their design, construc-
tion, and operation need to begin anticipating the impacts of
climate change immediately.
Nonpoint source pollution represents a different kind of
problem. By definition, nonpoint loads come from many small
sources. Pollution is controlled by means of so-called Best Man-
agement Practices (“BMPs”), such as riparian buffers, retention
ponds, and cover cropping. Climate change will alter both the
volume and concentration of nonpoint source pollution and the
effectiveness of BMPs. Managing nonpoint source pollution
under changing climatic conditions will require thoughtful mon-
itoring and attention to the relative sensitivities of different land
uses and BMPs. In many cases, thoughtful land use planning and
the selection of climatically-robust BMPs may be able to achieve
many nonpoint source pollution control goals despite changing
conditions.
CWA programs are based on observations of the actual
water quality conditions and activities that may contribute to
impairment. Observations include information about a water
body’s physical, chemical, and biological condition. These indi-
cators are used to assess compliance with water quality stan-
dards and attribute degradation to specific sources. This process
typically assumes that drivers of change can be found within a
given watershed. However, climate change will alter water qual-
ity regardless of local actions and, in most cases, climate-related
changes will compound or exacerbate on-going water quality
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problems and a myriad of existing conditions and on-going
restoration activities. In other words, climate change will make
an already complicated analysis significantly more challenging.
Untangling complex, changing mixtures of factors con-
tributing to water quality will require monitoring systems that
allow for separation of climatic and non-climatic factors. The
EPA uses a system of bioindicators to evaluate the biological
integrity of surface waters.16 These are typically fish, aquatic
insects, and other organisms that have well-known responses to
changes in water quality. These bioindicators provide synthetic
measures of water quality that can help diagnose specific causes
of impairment or degradation. However, bioindicators are them-
selves part of ecological systems that will respond to changes in
both climate and water quality.17 The myriad examples offered in
toxicological literature demonstrate that elevated temperature
and altered water chemistry can exacerbate the toxicity of pollu-
tants. Consequently, the use of this important information for
attribution will require understanding the response of specific
bioindicators to changing conditions and specifically selecting
indicators with methods that allow for partitioning between 
climatic and non-climatic impacts.18
CLIMATE CHANGE AND
THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The stated purpose of Title
IV of the CAA is “to reduce the
adverse effects of acid deposi-
tion.”19 It seeks to address Con-
gressional findings that:
(1) the presence of acidic
compounds and their pre-
cursors in the atmosphere
and in deposition from the
atmosphere represents a
threat to natural resources, ecosystems, materials, visibil-
ity, and public health;
(2) the principal sources of the acidic compounds and their
precursors in the atmosphere are emissions of sulfur and
nitrogen oxides from the combustion of fossil fuels; 
(3) the problem of acid deposition is of national and interna-
tional significance; 
(4) strategies and technologies for the control of precursors to
acid deposition exist now that are economically feasible,
and improved methods are expected to become increas-
ingly available over the next decade; and
(5) current and future generations of Americans will be
adversely affected by delaying measures to remedy the
problem.20
The CAA is primarily targeted at reduction of sulfur
(“SOx”) and nitrogen oxides (“NOx”). It also may be interpreted
or amended to apply to greenhouse gases. Rising atmospheric
CO2-levels acidify ocean water and threaten marine resources
and ecosystems. Reducing CO2 emissions would help mitigate
this global problem, potentially using CAA mechanisms origi-
nally designed for SOx and NOx. For example, Title IV of the
CAA encourages “energy conservation, use of renewable and
clean alternative technologies, and pollution prevention as a
long-range strategy, consistent with the provisions of this title,
for reducing air pollution and other adverse impacts of energy
production and use.”21 These activities also reduce CO2 emis-
sions and in so doing mitigate the effect of atmospheric CO2 on
the ocean. 
Finally, CO2 acidification, like SOx and NOx, is a problem
of national and international scope. Current and future genera-
tions will be affected by any delay in taking action. Due to the
fact that roughly half of anthropogenic emissions end up in the
oceans and because CO2 remains in the atmosphere for a sub-
stantial period of time, CO2 will continue to acidify the Earth’s
oceans for decades or centuries to come. Failure to limit anthro-
pogenic emissions will only perpetuate this problem. The likeli-
hood that reducing greenhouse gas emissions will limit
acidification is very high.
To date, the EPA has been unwilling to regulate CO2 as an
air pollutant, and legal action by states and municipalities on this
issue awaits a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Interpreting
or amending the CAA to regulate CO2 as an acidifying agent
may be an effective mechanism
for curbing CO2 emissions.
CONCLUSION
The ESA, the CWA, and the
CAA form the foundation of the
effort to protect and restore the
environment in the United
States. Climate change under-
mines the ambitious goals of
these laws. Changes in climate
can jeopardize the survival and
recovery of endangered species.
Climate change is likely to alter hydrologic processes in ways
that could undermine the goal of providing clean, safe water
resources. Climate change can also exacerbate long-standing air
quality issues by increasing the likelihood of unhealthy or 
ecologically-damaging conditions. The first step is to take our
collective foot off our fossil fuel-powered accelerator by imple-
menting prompt and deliberate measures to reduce the emission
of greenhouse gases. 
This first step, while necessary, is not sufficient. We are
already committed to significant levels of climate change due to
the accumulation of CO2 in our oceans and atmosphere. Achiev-
ing conservation and resource protection goals will require
developing robust and resilient practices that explicitly antici-
pate and address the potential for changing conditions. In the
years ahead, efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change will
constitute important, new dimensions to these critical pieces of
environmental legislation.
Climate and water quality
are linked by hydrologic
processes involved in the
global water cycle.
Endnotes: Climate Change and Federal Environmental Law 
on page 79
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G
reenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions from energy produc-
tion and transportation often dominate the anthro-
pogenic climate change debate. While the attention paid
to non-carbon dioxide (“CO2”) GHGs in economic analyses of
GHG abatement has increased in recent years,1 developing
nations must not ignore, and should promote the mitigation of,
methane (“CH4”) emissions from municipal solid waste
(“MSW”) management.
As organic wastes decompose in the anaerobic conditions of
modern, sealed landfills (“sanitary landfills”), landfill gas
forms,2 which consists of approximately 50 percent CH4, 50 per-
cent CO2, and small concentrations of other organic com-
pounds.3 A potent GHG,4 CH4 accounted for approximately
fifteen percent of total global
GHG emissions in 2000.5 Waste
management, including MSW
landfilling, was responsible for
approximately 21 percent of
such methane emissions.6
Whi le  most  developed
nations regulate landfill CH4
emissions, many developing
countries do not.7 Historically,
developing nations have not
been significant landfill CH4
emitters,8 due to the use of open
dumps, which allow oxygen to
permeate the waste and limits CH4 formation.9 However, rapid
increases in population, income, and industrialization increase
MSW generation.10 Developing nations also face escalating CH4
emissions11 as they divert more MSW into sanitary landfills, a
practice intended, paradoxically, to improve public health and
environmental conditions.12 Thus, as MSW generation and sani-
tary landfilling increase, global atmospheric CH4 emissions also
likely will increase,13 perhaps by as much as nine percent
between 2005 and 2020.14
Non-CO2 GHG emissions growth, including CH4 emis-
sions, is predicted to be greatest from 1990–2020 in the Middle
East (197 percent), Africa (104 percent), Latin America (86 per-
cent), South and Southeast Asia (64 percent), and China/Cen-
trally Planned Asia (58 percent), while projected emissions in
developed nations are expected to increase only ten percent dur-
ing that period.15 China is illustrative of the potential risk, as it
now generates more MSW than any other nation, a dubious
honor that until recently belonged to the United States.16
While population growth in China, which more than dou-
bled between 1950 and 1990, is stabilizing, its annual per capita
economic growth, averaging approximately nine percent over
the past 25 years, is unprecedented.17 Presently, China’s quar-
terly GDP growth exceeds ten percent,18 having hovered steadily
around that level since 2001.19 Moreover, many urban centers in
China are transitioning to sanitary landfilling as their primary
MSW management strategy, while they continue to struggle
with unsurpassed generation increases, changing MSW stream
composition, and minimal waste reduction efforts.20 MSW gen-
eration in urban China alone could increase 250 percent from its
2004 volume by 2030.21 Never has a nation experienced as large,
or as rapid, an increase.22
In light of the potential for increased CH4 emissions from
rapidly developing nations, policymakers and the public in such
nations, as well as the interna-
tional community, should recog-
nize and seize the opportunity to
reduce atmospheric CH4 con-
centrations. Because CH4 is the
primary constituent of natural
gas23 and is recoverable for use
as  an  a l te r na t ive  energy
resource,24 such programs may
simultaneously and effectively
serve the dual purposes of
abatement of landfill CH4 emis-
sions and reduction of fossil
fuel consumption. By doing so,
developing nations that pose a potential CH4 emission risk might
achieve a substantial reduction of that risk while at the same
time being able to use recovered energy for further development.
Endnotes:
1 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
METHANE AND NITROUS OXIDE ABATEMENT OPPORTUNITIES: REPORT TO ENERGY
MODELING FORUM, WORKING GROUP 21 1 (June 2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/nonco2/econ-inv/pdfs/methodologych4.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2007).
2 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GLOBAL ANTHROPOGENIC EMIS-
SIONS OF NON-CO2 GREENHOUSE GASES: 1990–2020 6-2 (June 2006), available
at http://www.epa.gov/nonco2/econ-inv/pdfs/GreenhouseGasReport.pdf (last
visited Jan. 31, 2007) [hereinafter ANTHROPOGENIC EMISSIONS]; U.S. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GLOBAL MITIGATION OF NON-CO2 GREENHOUSE
GASES, Section III. Waste, at 1 (June 2006), available at http://www.
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INTRODUCTION
O
n Wednesday, November 29, 2006, the United States
Supreme Court heard the oral arguments for Massachu-
setts v. Environmental Protection Agency.1 The case
revolves around the ability of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) to regulate carbon dioxide (“CO2”) under the
Clean Air Act (“CAA”); a seemingly minute point of law, unim-
portant to those outside of the environmental community and
those regulated by the EPA.2 In reality, the case has the potential
to affect how the United States goes forward in developing a pol-
icy to address climate change.3 It is the first time the Supreme
Court will deal with the issue of climate change. The opinion of
the Court will surely have a ripple effect: impacting pending cli-
mate change cases in lower courts, shaping the future of the
standing doctrine, and spurring Congress to develop a climate
change policy in the face of an administration that has, to date,
decided not to mandate any reg-
ulation of CO2 emissions.4
Unsatisfied with the admin-
istration’s response, many envi-
ronmental groups, states, and
local governments are looking to
current environmental and tort
law to begin regulating the emis-
sion of CO2 and other green-
house gases (“GHGs”) through
court orders.5 This is evident by
the litany of current litigation
ranging from states bringing nui-
sance suits against power compa-
nies and automakers to the line
of cases arguing for federal regulation under the CAA, such as
Massachusetts v. EPA.6 Another line of cases falls under the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).7 While unable to
force the regulation of CO2, NEPA does require federal agencies
to consider the environmental impacts of their actions, potentially
including the impacts of CO2 emissions.8 Though the usefulness
of bringing NEPA litigation for the lack of or inadequacy of con-
sideration given to CO2 emissions is debatable,9 this article will
focus on a narrow question: Can courts force federal agencies to
take a “hard look” at the impacts of climate change due to the
release of CO2 emissions stemming from the agency’s actions?
While NEPA does not provide a means to create, or force
the administration to develop, any such regulations,10 NEPA can
force federal agencies to at least consider and disclose to the
public the impacts their actions will have due to contributions to
CO2 emissions. This article examines the requirements and case
law of NEPA with respect to climate change and explores a
hypothetical lawsuit concerning the lack of federal environmen-
tal documentation for the planned reliance on coal-fired power
plants (“CFPPs”) to provide the majority of the nation’s new
sources of electric power.11 Next, this article will introduce the
basic requirements of NEPA and the Council on Environmental
Quality’s (“CEQ”) implementing regulations, and the science of
climate change. The article will analyze what little case law there
is on NEPA and climate change, including Border Power Plant
Working Group v. Department of Energy, Mayo Foundation v.
Surface Transportation Board, and Friends of the Earth v. Mos-
bacher, two of which are currently pending. Finally, the article will
discuss the planned future reliance on CFPPs and a hypothetical
lawsuit challenging such plans as a violation of NEPA. 
NEPA AND
CLIMATE CHANGE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT
The National Environmen-
tal Policy Act requires federal
agencies to take a “hard look” at
the environmental consequences
of their proposed actions.12 Sec-
tion 102, the action forcing sec-
tion, requires agencies to write
Environmental Impact State-
ments (“EIS”) for “major Fed-
eral actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.”13 NEPA sepa-
rates all federal agency actions into three categories: major
actions, non-major actions, and categorical exclusions.14 Of
these three, only major actions fall under the purview of
NEPA.15 Major federal actions are further broken down into two
categories: those that have a significant impact on the quality of
the human environment and those that have no significant
impact.16 In making the determination if an action will have a
significant impact, agencies begin by preparing an Environmen-
tal Assessment (“EA”).17 Much more concise than an EIS, EAs
provide public documentation of what the agency took into con-
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sideration to determine whether their proposed action will have a
significant impact on the environment.18 If there is no significant
impact, the agency issues a document explaining how the agency
came to their conclusion called a Finding of No Significant
Impact (“FONSI”).19 On the other hand, if it appears that the
proposed action will have a significant impact, the agency must
prepare a full EIS.20 Courts have maintained that NEPA is purely
procedural and has no enforceable substantive mandates.21
Therefore, as long as an agency follows the appropriate proce-
dure in making decisions, an agency can take a course of action
that is not the most environmentally sound.22
In order to satisfy the requirements of NEPA, an EIS must
discuss, among other things: environmental impacts, including
adverse effects, of the proposed action; alternatives to the pro-
posed action; and irreversible commitments of resources.23 The
CEQ, through its implementing regulations, further clarified and
expanded upon the requirements set out in section 102(C) of
NEPA, primarily through defining “effects” as those that are,
“direct, indirect, or cumulative,” and “cumulative impacts,” as,
“past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regard-
less of what agency (federal or non-federal) or person under-
takes such other actions.”24 It is through these definitions that
NEPA has the potential to evolve and broaden its scope as the
scientific understanding of the environment grows of just how
significant the impacts of climate change, induced by anthro-
pogenic emissions of CO2 and other GHGs, truly are.
CLIMATE CHANGE IS A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT
The necessity of constraining GHG emissions is a global
problem, but the United States is responsible for largest percent-
age of the problem, compared to all other nations.25 CO2 is not
the only GHG, but it is by far the most prevalent, and in 2002,
the United States accounted for over twenty percent of the
world’s total CO2 emissions.26 While a large portion of the world
is trying to decrease emissions, any net increase in CO2 emis-
sions from the U.S. will only serve to exacerbate the impacts of
climate change.27 Nevertheless, the question remains whether
U.S. emissions are “significant” under NEPA? One effect of a
major federal action may be a slight, seemingly miniscule,
increase in worldwide CO2 emissions.28 An increase in CO2
emissions that amounts to less than one percent of worldwide
emissions of CO2 is not the sole cause of climate change, and
preventing or lessoning that amount of the CO2 emissions will
not stop climate change.29 It is also currently not possible to
determine the correlation between the CO2 emissions from one
action and the increase in temperature.
Perhaps a direct correlation between cause and effect and
comparing the CO2 emissions from one action to total world-
wide emissions is the incorrect approach, both in theory and in
law. After all, NEPA and the CEQ regulations require the consid-
eration of cumulative impacts.30 As stated earlier, cumulative
impacts include those that are, “past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable.”31 Moreover, “cumulative impacts can result from
individually minor but collectively significant actions taking
place over a period of time.”32 The release of CO2 emissions and
impacts of climate change could arguably fall under the scope of
cumulative impacts. The court’s interpretation of cumulative
impacts, however, has likely neutered this approach.33 Cumula-
tive impacts must be related to the proposed project and within
the affected area.34 Because of the narrow view of “cumulative
impacts,” it is unlikely that impacts of the CO2 emissions from
any one project and related activities will be seen as significantly
impacting the environment via climate change. 
Another potential option to have the impact of an increase in
CO2 emissions deemed significant is through Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statements (“PEIS”). Along with individ-
ual agency actions, programs also fall under the purview of
NEPA.35 These broader EISs have the ability to look at the larger
scale impacts of multiple projects that may later each get their
own NEPA analysis. It remains to be seen if federal agencies or
courts will ever view the emissions of CO2 as “significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment,” and the out-
come of pending cases may determine which of the approaches,
if any, will be successful. 
CURRENT CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
INVOLVING NEPA
The perceived inaction on climate change has given rise to
several lawsuits.36 Of these, a court has decided only one NEPA
case,37 while three other NEPA cases are currently pending.38
The cases follow one of two strategies: (1) Attacking individual
actions by agencies, and their corresponding NEPA documen-
tation, for failure to consider impacts GHG emissions; or 
(2) Attacking agency programs on a broader scale for their fail-
ure to do a PEIS. This article will analyze three of these cases.
The first, Border Power Plant Working Group v. Department of
Energy (hereinafter “BPPWG”), was successful in requiring the
Department of Energy (“DOE”) to include CO2 emissions and
impacts on climate change, however, DOE ultimately skirted the
issue by dismissing the amount a CO2 emitted as “negligible” in
their EIS.39 The second case, Mayo Foundation v. Surface Trans-
portation Board (Mid State Coalition for Progress v. Surface
Transportation Board) (hereinafter “Mayo”), was also success-
ful in requiring an agency to consider the impacts of climate
change.40 Again, the agency skirted the issue by stating that the
increase in emissions would be minor.41 The plaintiffs are now
challenging the adequacy of the Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement (“SEIS”).42 The final case, Friends of the
Earth v. Mosbacher, formerly Friends of the Earth v. Watson
(hereinafter “FOE”), differs as it takes the approach that the
defendant agencies are required to do a PEIS under NEPA.43
BORDER POWER PLANT WORKING GROUP V. 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
In BPPWG, plaintiffs challenged a DOE FONSI for permit-
ting transboundary transmission lines entering the United States
from Mexico.44 The planned transmission lines were to originate
from two different power plants, the La Rosita Power Complex
(“LRPC”) and the Termoelectrica de Mexicali power plant
(“TDM”).45 After determining the plaintiffs had standing, the
court moved to the merits of the case — did the emissions of the
power plants fall under the purview of NEPA via indirect
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effects.46 The court, after analyzing the case law, concluded that
the “indirect effect” must be causally linked to the federal
action.47 In order to determine if DOE needed to consider the
emissions of power plants, the court looked at the likelihood of
each plant operating without the transmission lines, thereby
establishing, or not, a causal link to the federal action.48 The first
plant, LRPC, consisted of four turbines — two for production of
electricity for use primarily in Mexico, and two for the export of
electricity to U.S. markets.49 All of the turbines at the TDM
power plant were for the production of electricity to export to
U.S. markets.50 Based on this, the court held that the impacts
from the two LRPC turbines and all the TDM turbines had to be
considered under NEPA, while the impacts from the two LRPC
turbines for use in Mexico did not need to be considered.51
The District Court in BPPWG fashioned a well-reasoned
opinion to require DOE to take into account CO2 emissions from
the power plants. Though exclusion of the two LRPC turbines is
not desirable, it is understandable: even without the transmission
lines, those turbines would exist and emit CO2.52 It is reasonable
to see the pollution from those two turbines as unconnected to
the federal action. Unfortunately, after such a favorable court
opinion, DOE summarily dis-
missed the CO2 emissions as
“negligible.”53 Such actions begs
the question, are the emissions
from any one federal action ever
enough to be considered signifi-
cant? The following two cases
try to deal with this question and
find a means around it.
MAYO FOUNDATION
V. SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION BOARD
Before the court in Mayo is
the Surface Transpor tat ion
Board’s (“SBT”) Section on Environmental Analysis’s (“SEA”)
EIS that approved new rail lines and upgrading of older lines.54
The plaintiffs in Mayo challenged the EIS in a prior lawsuit, and
the court found the EIS to be inadequate, in part because, “SEA
wholly failed to consider the effects on air quality that an
increase in the supply of low-sulfur coal to power plants would
produce.”55 SEA argued that the rail lines would not affect the
demand for coal.56 The court did not agree with SEA’s argument,
and agreed with the intervener rail company’s (“DM&E”)
assessment that it would increase the demand for coal.57 How-
ever, DM&E argued that despite the increased demand, SEA’s
EIS did not need to consider the impacts on air quality because
they were too speculative.58 The court, to the contrary, viewed
the “speculative” impacts as “indirect impacts” and therefore
NEPA still required their consideration.59 Indirect impacts must
still be “reasonably foreseeable.”60 The court found that even
though the “extent” of the impacts is not certain, the “nature” of
the impacts was reasonably foreseeable.61 SEA also argued that
because the pollutants emitted were regulated under the CAA,
any emissions from increased use of coal would not be signifi-
cant.62 The court also found this argument unconvincing.63 Ulti-
mately, the court held that even though some of the gases emit-
ted into the air would be capped under the CAA, they would still
have an environmental impact, and not all of the gases emitted,
notably CO2, are regulated under the CAA.64 The court went as
far as to say that the EIS’s lack of analysis with respect to the
increased coal consumption was “irresponsible.”65
After the 2003 court decision, STB published an SEIS.66
The SEIS, using models of coal supply and demand, concluded
that any increases in coal consumption would be minor.67 There-
fore, STB reasoned, that any increase in emissions would not
have significant impacts.68 The plaintiffs from the 2003 case
have brought suit again claiming the SEIS’s consideration of the
impacts is inadequate, including the treatment of climate
change.69 How the Eighth Circuit treats this new challenge may
determine how plaintiffs proceed with NEPA lawsuits as a
means to address climate change. As with BPPWG, Mayo’s
defendant agency ultimately did discuss climate change in its
EIS. However, both agencies dismissed the amount of emissions
as not significant, and therefore did not fully analyze their contri-
bution to the broader impacts on the environment due to climate
change. If the court finds that
STB did adequately consider the
impacts, the decision has the
potential to allow all agencies to
dismiss the impacts of GHGs as
minor because each individual
project does not emit a large
percentage of total worldwide
emissions.
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
V. MOSBACHER
FOE is attempting to get
around the problem of negligi-
ble emissions by arguing the
defendant federal agencies, the Overseas Project Investment
Corporation (“OPIC”) and the Export Import Bank (“EIB”),
must do a PEIS. OPIC and EIB provide financing for oversea
projects, including fossil fuel projects without any NEPA analy-
sis.70 Collectively, plaintiffs asserted that the defendants must
write a PEIS and the projects they support account for eight per-
cent of worldwide emissions.71 With a larger percentage of
worldwide total emissions affected by the agencies’ actions, this
case could prove to require the agencies to actually consider the
impacts of climate change instead of brushing them aside as
negligible.
The only decision in regards to the case, in August of 2005,
allowed the plaintiffs to survive a challenge to their standing and
the claim that there has been no final agency action.72 On April
14, 2006, the court heard arguments on the merits of the case.73
The court’s 2005 opinion denying the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is optimistic. In determining the plaintiffs
have standing, the court recognized that potential injuries caused
by climate change and increased emissions are not speculative,74
and in moving forward on the merits, the defendants have con-
Under NEPA, it is possible
that CO2 emissions from
an individual coal fired
power plant need to 
be considered.
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ceded that their actions do impact the environment and are
instead arguing that they are not subject to NEPA.75 While com-
pelling, those arguments do not need to be addressed for the pur-
poses of this article.
COAL FIRED POWER PLANTS HYPOTHETICAL
As of September 2006, the National Energy Technology
Lab, an agency under DOE, estimates there are currently 154
proposed or new (since 2000) CFPPs, and by 2030, there could
be as many as 300 new CFPPs.76 Though it is difficult, if not
impossible, to estimate the increase in CO2 emissions these
plants will create, one thing is certain: the forecasted depend-
ence on a large number of new CFPPs will affect climate
change.77 Absent a mandatory federal policy on climate
change,78 it is unclear if the emissions of CO2 from the new
CFPPs will be regulated or even analyzed for their total cumula-
tive impacts. Under NEPA, it is possible that CO2 emissions
from an individual CFPP need to be considered, but it is unlikely
that individual CFPP’s emissions would exceed 0.5 percent of
world CO2 emissions and therefore, pending the decision in
Mayo, could be considered “negligible.”79 In order to gain a bet-
ter understanding of how much of a significant impact the over
150 new CFPP CO2 emissions will have on climate change, a
more comprehensive analysis should be done under NEPA via a
PEIS, but determining which federal agency is responsible for
the PEIS could prove to be a fatal flaw in such an approach.
The continued reliance on coal presents a tremendous envi-
ronmental challenge. In order to even begin to understand just
how much of an increase in CO2 emissions will result from the
new “boom” in CFPPs, some sort of environmental analysis is
needed from the federal government. However, it is difficult to
determine which federal agency is responsible for these new
CFPPs. While DOE tracks the construction, production, and
emissions of these new plants, they have little to no actual per-
mitting or regulatory authority over them.80 The majority of the
authority to permit the construction and operation of the plants
rests with the states the CFPP resides in or with EPA under the
CAA.81 Even under the CAA though, EPA has delegated the
majority of its permitting authority to the states and is not
required to do any NEPA review.82 With no clear solution, a
broader approach must be taken. The plaintiffs in the above-dis-
cussed cases took such approaches in order to get at the underly-
ing issue — GHG emissions from the combustion of coal and
other fossil fuels.83 In order to address the issue of new CFPPs in
their entirety, a PEIS is needed. However, such broad programs
that have causal connections to the construction of new CFPPs
are not abundant, and the ones that do exist likely have PEISs in
place or in production. If so, prospective plaintiffs can challenge
the PEIS if it did not adequately discuss the impacts of increased
CO2 emissions from CFPPs. 
One such potential agency program that may have a causal
link to increased emissions of CO2 is the Department of Inte-
rior’s Office of Surface Mining (“OSM”). OSM, among other
things, regulates mountaintop mining — a process in which the
top of a mountain is removed through the use of explosives to
get the coal within the mountain.84 For this, OSM, in conjunc-
tion with the Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Services, and the EPA, produced a lengthy PEIS.85
Within the over 500 pages of analysis — that do not mention cli-
mate change, CO2, or other related issues — lays a potential
challenge due to inadequate consideration of the indirect effects
of increase in the coal supply, analogous to Mayo, but on a
wider, programmatic level, such as in FOE.86 In event that nei-
ther Mayo nor FOE produces a favorable outcome, a lawsuit
attacking the mountaintop mining PEIS may still succeed. Such
a suit would not face the dilemma of the scope of significant
impacts, as mountaintop mining has a much greater impact than
either a single CFPP or railroad. Additionally, the proposed suit
would not face similar issues raised by the defense in FOE, as
there is clear final agency action; a PEIS has already been pub-
lished. The main issue blocking a decision on the merits for this
proposed lawsuit is, however, on the first page of the PEIS. The
agencies do accept that the PEIS was required under NEPA.87 If
such a suit is possible depends, as all suits do, on multiple other
factors as well, all of which need more review and will not be
discussed in this paper.
CONCLUSION
With climate change becoming a certainty, the United States
needs to take mandatory action to reduce its share of emissions.
In the absence of such regulation, groups are attempting to
address the problem through existing U.S. law, including through
NEPA. The impacts of climate change are significant under
NEPA, and federal agencies need to consider their contributions
to climate change prior to taking action. Some agencies are
accepting that emissions cause an impact, but the trick is now in
finding a way around dismissing each action’s individual emis-
sions as negligible. After all, it is now easy for a court to accept
climate change. However, it is more difficult for a court, and not
necessarily scientifically accurate, to accept that the small
increase in worldwide emissions from a single project will have
a correlative impact on the environment via climate change. This
very dilemma turned the seeming victory of BPPWG into noth-
ing more than a Pyrrhic victory. The pending court case, Mayo
and FOE, will play a large role in the future of climate change
litigation and NEPA analysis. If one of the cases is successful and
the agencies are either required to broaden their scope of impacts
in terms of climate change or required to do a PEIS that takes a
“hard look” at the impacts of CO2 emissions, a door will open for
further litigation. This litigation can serve to not only gain a bet-
ter understanding of climate change and the impacts it will have
on our environment, but also to aid in demonstrating the need for
mandatory regulation. With continued efforts to evolve the scope
of NEPA to encompass the full impacts of climate change, future
litigation can succeed without losing the greater struggle. 
Endnotes: The Evolving Scope of Significant Effects on the 
Environment on page 80
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POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE IMPACTS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
FISH STOCKS AGREEMENT
by Dr. William C.G. Burns*
INTRODUCTION
While the international community developed institutional
responses to climate change in the 1990s, through the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”)1 and the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC,2 these
have proven to be wholly inadequate to the task. Resistance by
several nations, most prominently, the United States, to manda-
tory reduction targets for greenhouse gas emissions led the
drafters to resort instead to “constructive ambiguities” and
“guidelines, rather than a legal commitment.”3 Thus, the
UNFCCC merely calls on the Parties in Annex I (developed
countries and economies in transition) to “aim” to return their
emissions back to 1990 levels.4
This article examines a potential international forum in
which the threat of climate
change might be addressed,
specifically the Agreement for
the Implementation of the Provi-
sions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the
Sea (“UNFSA”).5 Actions to
address climate change under
UNFSA could be salutary for
several reasons. First, the
commercial fisheries sector may
be profoundly and adversely
affected by climate change. This
includes many fish stocks regu-
lated under UNFSA: highly
migratory species, which have
wide geographic distribution
and undertake significant migrations,6 and straddling stocks,
which occur both within and beyond Exclusive Economic Zones
(“EEZs”).7 Second, the United States, both the world’s largest
emitter of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) and a State with an abject
record in addressing climate change, is a Party to UNFSA, and has
played an active leadership role in its implementation.8 UNFSA
thus presents an excellent forum in which to engage the United
States, as well as other major GHG emitters, including the Euro-
pean Union and China, on climate issues. Finally, unlike the other
international fora for a where climate change actions have been
pursued to date, UNFSA provides a dispute resolution mecha-
nism with teeth.9
An article of this length necessarily cannot discuss all of the
intricate scientific and legal issues that an action of this nature
would invoke; rather, it seeks to lay a foundation for further
research and discussion. In this pursuit this article will: (1) out-
line the potential impacts of climate change on fish species, with
an emphasis on the potential impacts of climate change on
highly migratory fish species and straddling stocks; (2) provide
an overview of UNFSA and potential actions for climate change
damages under the Agreement; and (3) briefly discuss potential
barriers to such actions.
URGENCY OF EXAMINING ADDITIONAL
FORA TO ADDRESS GLOBAL WARMING
While the Kyoto Protocol constituted an important step for-
ward because it established binding commitments by industrial-
ized parties to reduce emissions,10 it by no means is a panacea to
the specter of climate change. First, the United States, responsi-
ble for 25 percent of the world’s
GHG emissions, rejected the
Kyoto Protocol in 2001.11 While
the Bush administration has
touted a voluntary, technologi-
cally-driven approach,12 the
UNFCCC Secretariat recently
projected that U.S. GHG emis-
sions in 2010 will be more than
32 percent above 1990 levels,
and more than 50 percent above
1990 levels by 2020.13 To date,
the United States has failed to
present a realistic scenario for
stabilizing or reducing its GHG
emissions.
Second, it is by no means
clear that many of the Parties to the Protocol will even meet their
modest commitments under Kyoto.14 Finally, the Protocol’s ini-
tial commitments constitute only an extremely modest down
payment on what ultimately must be done to stabilize atmos-
pheric concentrations of GHG emissions. Climate researchers
have estimated that full implementation of Kyoto would reduce
projected warming in 2050 by only about one twentieth of one
degree.15 By contrast, stabilization of atmospheric GHGs will
ultimately require the global community to reduce GHG emis-
sions by 60 to 70 percent.16 This will necessitate industrialized
countries, including the United States, committing themselves to
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A Party to UNFSA
pursuing an action based
on climate change
damages would face some
imposing barriers, though
none need prove fatal.
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reductions of as much as 80 percent by the middle of the century
if developing nations are to be permitted some growth in their
emissions levels.17 It will also ultimately necessitate deep cuts
by large developing States with rapidly growing emissions, such
as China and India.18
At this point, it is difficult to be sanguine about the
prospects. While the UNFCCC Secretariat lauded the purported
“Spirit of Nairobi” at the latest Conference of the Parties held in
Kenya,19 in reality the Parties made very little progress develop-
ing a framework for long-term reductions in GHG emissions.
Rather, the focus was on adapting to climate change impacts that
increasingly seem inevitable.20
The inadequacy of domestic legislation and treaty responses
to climate change to date has led to a parallel commencement of
judicial and quasi-judicial actions. Several actions related to cli-
mate change have been initiated in national courts and regula-
tory agencies in several countries,21 as well as two actions in
international fora, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights,22 and the World Heritage Committee.23
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT
OF CLIMATE CHANGE
ON FISH SPECIES
Fish species are ectothermic
(cold blooded); thus, water tem-
perature is the primary source of
environmental impact on fish,
including growth and maturity
rates, distribution and migration
patterns, and incidence of dis-
ease.24 Substantially rising
oceanic temperatures through-
out this century will likely have
negative impacts on highly
migratory and straddling stocks
species in many regions, espe-
cially those near the edge of their
temperature tolerance range. For example, the range of colder
water fish species, such as capelin, polar cod and Greenland hal-
ibut, is likely to shrink, resulting in a decline in abundance.25 A
decline in nutrient upwelling as a consequence of increased strat-
ification between warmer surface waters and colder deep water in
warming oceans could also result in a decline in big eye and yel-
low fin tuna in the central and western Pacific.26
Warming oceans could also radically change the distribu-
tion of some straddling stock and high migratory species. For
example, rising ocean temperatures could result in a shift of the
distribution of herring northward, upsetting a delicate agreement
in the Northeast between coastal States who harvest herring
within their EEZs and distant water fishing nations who fish on
the high seas.27 Should cooperative management agreements
collapse, it might lead to “strategic over fishing” of a stock that
is currently recovering from a historical decline.28 Warming in
the Pacific could similarly result in a redistribution of tuna
resources to higher latitudes, such as Japan and the western
equatorial Pacific.29
Temperature increases will also adversely affect prey
species of many straddling stocks and highly migratory species.
For example, in the North Atlantic, strong biogeographical shifts
in copepod assemblages associated with warming trends could
substantially reduce the abundance of fish in the North Sea and
ultimately result in the collapse of the stocks of cod, an impor-
tant straddling stock species.30
There may also be direct biological effects from rising lev-
els of carbon dioxide entering the oceans. By the end of this cen-
tury, projected increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide will
result in an almost threefold increase in surface ocean carbon
dioxide concentrations relative to pre-industrial levels.31 This, in
turn, could result in the average pH of the oceans falling by 0.5
units by 2100, which would translate into a three-fold increase in
the concentration of hydrogen ions, making the oceans more
acidic than they have been in 300 million years.32 Acidification
of the oceans will result in a decrease in the concentration of 
carbonate and related ions that reef building and other 
calcifying organisms33 draw upon to produce calcium car-
bonate.34 Among the species that might be severely affected
are a snail species, the pteropod.
In the Ross Sea, the subpolar-
polar pteropod Limacina helic-
ina sometimes replaces krill as
the dominant zooplankton
species in the ecosystem.35 A
recent study indicates that
increased acidification of ptero-
pod habitat in the Sea might 
ultimately result in the disap-
pearance of the species from
Antarctic waters, or shift its 
distribution to lower latitudes.36
The potential exclusion of
pteropods from other polar and
subpolar regions could also have
negative impacts on several straddling stock species for which it
is a prey species.37 
Given the severe impacts that climate change may have on
straddling stocks and high migratory species, it is germane to
next assess the prospects for enhancing their protection through
the primary international legal instrument for their management
and conservation. 
OVERVIEW OF UNFSA
The Third United Nations Conference of the Law of Sea
convened in 1973 and culminated nine years later in the adop-
tion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”).38 UNCLOS entered into force in 1994 and cur-
rently has 148 parties.39 UNCLOS consists largely of provisions
for the regulation of fisheries, with an emphasis on the sovereign
rights of coastal States to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage
living natural resources, including fish stocks, within their
respective 200-mile EEZs.40
While many have characterized UNCLOS as “a constitution
for the oceans,”41 it provides only general governing principles
It is by no means clear
that many of the Parties
to the Protocol will 
even meet their 
modest commitments
under Kyoto.
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for the management of straddling stocks and high migratory
species. In cases where stocks are found within the EEZs of two
or more coastal States, or an EEZ and an area beyond it, UNC-
LOS merely requires that the pertinent fishing States “seek” to
agree upon management measures either directly or through
sub-regional or regional organizations.42 In the case of highly
migratory species, coastal States and other States with nationals
fishing in the region are exhorted to cooperate directly or
through international organizations “with a view” to ensuring
conservation and optimal utilization.43 A proposal by some
coastal States for an arbitration clause was beaten back by dis-
tant-water fishing nations and subsequently withdrawn.44
The lack of binding obligations in UNCLOS for high migra-
tory species and straddling stocks was largely attributable to the
fact that fishing in these regions was not considered to be a
major issue in the early 1980s.45 However, as coastal States
began to claim their rights within their EEZs, large distant-water
fishing fleets were increasingly displaced from their traditional
fishing grounds, placing increasing pressure on stocks on the
high seas and straddling stocks.46 This shift quickly took its toll.
In 1994, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”)
reported that straddling fish stock catches in EEZs and high seas
had been declining since 1989, and that many highly migratory
fish stocks, including a majority of tuna species, were depleted,
in some cases, severely.47
In 1992, the participants at the UN Conference on Environ-
ment and Development called for an intergovernmental confer-
ence under the auspices of the United Nations to address to
promote effective implementation of UNCLOS provisions
related to straddling stocks and highly migratory species.48 
In 1993, the UN General Assembly convened an intergovern-
mental conference, culminating in UNFSA. UNFSA entered
into force in December of 2001 and currently has 62 Parties,49
“including most States with significant interests in international
fisheries.”50
The Agreement’s overarching objective is to “ensure long-
term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks
and highly migratory fish stocks.”51 The Agreement’s primary
means of effectuating this is through engendering cooperation
between coastal States and States fishing on the high seas,
through, inter alia:
• Seeking agreement between coastal States and States on
the high seas to agree upon necessary measures for con-
servation of stocks in the high seas areas and straddling
stocks through direct agreements and cooperation in
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations;52
• Collecting and exchanging of critical data with respect to
straddling stocks and highly migratory species;53 and
• Expanding the duties of Flag States to ensure enforcement
of and compliance with the Convention’s provisions, as
well as the rights of other States, including port States, to
ensure compliance with the Agreement.54
However, the focus of UNFSA is on the relationship
between coastal States and States fishing in areas beyond EEZs,
there are a large number of provisions that could give rise to
claims associated with climate change impacts on straddling
stocks and highly migratory species. 
UNFSA AND CLIMATE CHANGE
It should be noted at the outset of this section that UNFSA
adopts the well-recognized “no harm rule” of international envi-
ronmental law,55 providing that “States Parties are liable in
accordance with international law for damage or loss attributa-
ble to them in regard to this Agreement.”56 Many of the provi-
sions of UNFSA, in turn, could provide the basis for a Party to
bring an action against one or more other Parties for climate-
related damages to fisheries.
As indicated above, the Agreement’s primary objective is to
ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of strad-
dling fish stocks and highly migratory species,57 mandating that
its Parties take conservation and management measures to fur-
ther this objective. While the Agreement’s primary focus is on
the impacts of the harvesting of fish stocks, it clearly contem-
plates the regulation of other potential factors that could inflict
damages on fish stocks. For example, UNFSA requires the Par-
ties to assess the impacts of “other human activities and environ-
mental factors on target stocks and species belonging to the
same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the target
stocks.”58
Moreover, the Agreement requires the Parties to “minimize
pollution.”59 While the Agreement does not define the term “pol-
lution,” given the relationship of the agreement to UNCLOS it
would seem reasonable to apply its definition of this term. In
pertinent part, UNCLOS defines “pollution of the marine envi-
ronment” as:
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of sub-
stances or energy into the marine environment . . .
which results or is likely to result in such deleterious
effects as harm to living resources and marine life . . .
hindrance to marine activities, including fishing.60
While rising ocean temperatures related to climate change
could not reasonably be construed as a “substance” under UNC-
LOS, it would likely be construed by a dispute resolution body
as “energy,” much as introduction of heat, such as waste water
from production processes, appears to fall under this rubric.61
Moreover, as developed above, the uptake of carbon dioxide into
the oceans can result in direct deleterious impacts on marine life,
which clearly brings carbon dioxide under the definition of a
polluting “substance” under UNCLOS. 
Where necessary, UNFSA also imposes obligations on the
Parties to adopt conservation and management measures for
“species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or
dependent upon target species” and to “protect biodiversity of
the marine environment.”62 Thus, to the extent that climate
change may diminish certain stocks, or alter their distribution in
a way that adversely affects the interests of discrete Parties, a
cause of action could arise under the Agreement.
Rare among international environmental agreements,
UNFSA provides for a binding dispute resolution mechanism
where efforts to resolve the dispute through non-binding meth-
ods proves to be unavailing. Part VIII of the Agreement applies
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the dispute resolution mechanism set out in Part XV of UNC-
LOS to any dispute under the Agreement, even where one or
more of the disputants are not Parties to UNCLOS.63
As one scholar observed, UNCLOS “creates a binding sys-
tem of obligations and dispute resolutions, which confers on a
forum international jurisdiction, authority, and implementing
powers that exceed those of other international environmental
law forums and rival those conferred on the World Trade Organi-
zation.”64 Part XV of UNCLOS provides States with four poten-
tial fora for settlement of disputes:65 the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”),66 the International Court of
Justice; an arbitral panel; or a special arbitral panel.67 States may
choose to declare their choice of forum, but in cases where they
have not, or Parties to a dispute have not accepted the same pro-
cedure for dispute settlement, the dispute must be submitted to
binding arbitration unless the Parties agree otherwise.68 To date,
the vast majority of Parties to UNCLOS have, de facto, chosen
arbitration by their silence on the matter, as have most Parties to
UNFSA.69
POTENTIAL BARRIERS
TO CAUSES OF ACTION
UNDER UNFSA
A Party to UNFSA pursuing
an action based on climate
change damages would face
some imposing barriers, though
none need prove fatal.
General Causation
In many cases, declines of
fish stocks or shifts in distribu-
tion may be attributable to a
number of factors, including
over fishing,70 habitat destruc-
tion,71 or diminution of prey
species.72 A Party defending
itself against a claim of climate
change may thus contend that it
is not possible to link species decline or distribution shifts solely
to climatic factors, and thus it cannot be held liable under
UNFSA. This argument should not prevail. First, even if other
factors may constitute threats to regulated species, clearly, cli-
mate change is a substantial peril for many of these species. A
tribunal or panel could assess the extent of this threat by employ-
ing statistical probability analysis73 to support a finding of liabil-
ity at a reasonable level of probability. This would in turn trigger
the responsibility74 of major emitters of GHGs to adopt meas-
ures to reduce these emissions to levels that substantially reduce
the threat to high migratory and straddling stock species. Sec-
ond, UNFSA provides for wide application of the precautionary
approach to protect living marine resources.75 Thus, even under
scenarios of uncertainty about a given threat “[t]he absence of
adequate scientific information shall not be used as a reason for
postponing or failing to take conservation and management
measures.”76
Specific Causation
The target of a climate-related UNFSA action might argue
that climate change is caused by a multitude of anthropogenic
sources, and thus, any specific harm cannot be attributable to a
specific Party, even a large GHG emitting State such as the
United States. While this is certainly the case, an UNFSA action
likely would not seek monetary damages, where the issue of spe-
cific causation would be clearly germane. Rather a Party bring-
ing such an action would likely be seeking a commitment by the
targeted Party to fulfill its “duty to cooperate” under the treaty77
by enacting effective measures to contribute to the goal of “long-
term sustainability of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
fish stocks.”78 Thus, any Party failing to meet this obligation
could be found to be in violation of the treaty.
Reluctance of Dispute Resolution Bodies to 
Address Climate Change
Experience with climate change litigation to date in the
United States, at least, has
demonstrated some reluctance
on the part of members of the
judiciary to address climate
change issues given their lim-
ited scientific expertise. Con-
sider, for example, Justice
Scalia’s flippant but telling com-
ment in the recent oral argu-
ments in the recent Supreme
Court oral arguments in Massa-
chusetts, et al. v. Environmental
Protection Agency:79
JUSTICE SCALIA: . . .
your assertion is that after
the pollutant leaves the air
and goes up into the strato-
sphere it is contributing to
global warming. 
MR. MILKEY: Respect-
fully, Your Honor, it is not the stratosphere. It’s the tro-
posphere. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Troposphere, whatever. I told you
before I’m not a scientist. 
(Laughter.) 
JUSTICE SCALIA: That’s why I don’t want to have to
deal with global warming, to tell you the truth.80
Parties bringing an action before ITLOS or an arbitral panel
might experience similar reservations on the part of the dispute
resolution body to grapple with the complicated technical issues
associated with climate change, especially since the primary
area of expertise of tribunal or panel members may be more tra-
ditional fisheries issues, such as the impact of harvesting on
species. UNFSA provides two mechanisms to help address this
concern. First, in cases where “a dispute concerns a matter of a
technical nature,” the States involved in a dispute may refer the
dispute to an “ad hoc expert panel,” which will confer with the
Substantially rising
oceanic temperatures
throughout this century
will likely have negative
impacts on highly
migratory and straddling
stocks species in 
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Parties and seek to resolve the dispute without recourse to bind-
ing procedures.81 A Party seeking to press a climate change
claim could certainly seek to engage another Party in such nego-
tiations initially, and should this fail to resolve the dispute, seek
to introduce the panel’s scientific findings in a binding dispute
resolution forum. Additionally, if both Parties agree to it, cases
of this nature can be referred to a “special arbitral panel.” Under
UNCLOS’s dispute resolution provisions in this context, which
UNFSA fully incorporates, a panel hearing a climate change-
related dispute could be constituted by experts in the fields of
fisheries, marine environmental protection, marine scientific
research, drawn from the FAO, the United Nations Environment
Program and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commis-
sion,82 all of whom have expertise on the nexus of fisheries and
climate change. 
Perhaps an even more imposing barrier to a cause of action
under UNFSA may be the perceived threat to the legitimacy of a
dispute resolution body should it enter a decision against a hege-
monic State. As Strauss observes, international tribunals care-
fully marshal their political capital in an effort to preserve and
enhance their legitimacy:
While the official function of international tribunals is
to find the pre-existing law; in reality, for judges to have
their decisions so accepted, they must engage in the
creative process of negotiating the differing global
interests to formulate results that are in accord with the
international community’s normative center of gravity.
In arriving at politically viable legal standards, in addi-
tion to formally reviewing submitted briefs and memo-
randa and informally reading other legal commentary,
judges engaged in a pragmatic assessment of the politi-
cal situation, by factoring in the relative power of the
protagonists and the interests of other important inter-
national actors.83
The primary threat to the legitimacy of a UNFSA dispute
resolution body in the context of climate change may be that a
powerful State would choose to not comply with the decision
given the dramatic policy changes that it might necessitate. As
Silk recently observed, States may choose to not to comply with
“binding” decisions when they deem it against their interests:
In international law, even allegedly binding dispute set-
tlement mechanisms such as arbitration may be ignored
when a state disagrees with the decision. To illustrate,
in the Beagle Channel dispute between Chile and
Argentina, Argentina challenged the validity of the
arbitrators’ decision on dubious grounds and, despite
the implausibility of Argentina’s repudiation, the deci-
sion was never enforced . . . . Under UNCLOS, there
might be strong domestic and international pressures to
sign a fishery agreement regardless of the costs of com-
pliance, but when the time for compliance comes, nar-
rower national interests may prevail.84
Indeed, the fear that decisions against the United States
might be ignored may explain the recent decisions of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and World Heritage
Committee to reject petitions to address climate change under
these respective regimes.85
CONCLUSION
In a perfect world, the threat of climate change would be
effectively addressed through the international institutional
responses developed in the 1990s. Unfortunately, the specter of
climate change looms larger now than it did a decade ago, and
the prospects for adequate responses within the UNFCCC
framework appear increasingly remote. Now more than ever,
those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change must
explore alternatives that may finally galvanize the major green-
house emitting States into action. UNFSA is one option that
deserves further exploration.
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I
n a 2004 Hollywood movie entitled “The Day After Tomor-
row,” a climatologist tries to save his son who is stuck in
frozen New York because the world was suddenly plunged
into a new Ice Age. The movie was an exaggeration to be sure;
designed to entertain moviegoers. Nonetheless, a growing con-
sensus of both scientists and policymakers are taking rapid cli-
mate change seriously. What if global warming causes rapid
climate change and what are the policy implications if that did
happen? 
Scientific evidence confirms that over the past millions of
years the global climate has been on a pendulum from warm or
interglacial periods to cold glacial conditions. The grand climate
shifts occur during spans of tens of thousands of years, caused
by a combination of changes in the tilt of the Earth’s rotational
axis (every 41,000 years), changes in the orientation of the
Earth’s elliptical orbit, called the
“precession of the equinoxes”
(ever y  23 ,000  years ) ,  and
changes in the shape (more or
less round) of the elliptical orbit
(every 100,000 years).1 Conse-
quently, the traditional scientific
view of climate change is that it
is slow and gradual over a span
of tens of thousand or at least
thousands of years. 
However, through ice cores
from Greenland and Antarctica,
evidence has been mounting
since the 1970s that, in between
the grand shifts in climate, there
are serious oscillations in cli-
mate — occurring within the
span of decades rather than thousands of years.2 This phenome-
non, called “rapid climate change,” is followed by long inter-
ludes at equilibrium in significantly warmer or colder states. The
best known example is the Young Dryas cooling of 12,000 years
ago, a transitional climate event that is thought to have begun
and ended within a decade and, for the one thousand year dura-
tion thereafter, the North Atlantic region was five degrees Cel-
sius cooler.3 A shorter cool period occurred more recently in the
Little Ice Age which occurred from 1300 AD to about 1800 AD.4
Historical events, such as the Vikings leaving Greenland, have
been attributed to the Little Ice Age.5 Scientific evidence,
through lake sediment as well as ice core studies, suggests that
rapid climate change occurs with relative frequency: “during the
past 110,000 years, there have been at least [twenty] such abrupt
climate changes.”6
Scientists are unclear what causes rapid climate change but
one highly viable mechanism is an ocean dynamic called the
“Great Ocean Conveyor Belt.”7 The Great Ocean Conveyor Belt
is a circulation system that transports heat throughout the
world’s oceans. Much of the ocean circulation is dependent upon
the salinity of the oceans. As warmer weather melts the ice
around Greenland and the Arctic, the melted fresh water makes
major North Atlantic Ocean regions less salty, and the cold, less
salty water then sinks. Fresh water is less dense and does not
sink as readily, which would slow down the Ocean Conveyor.
The significance of this slowdown is that presently, “[t]he con-
veyor circulation increases the northward transport of warmer
waters in the Gulf Stream at mid-latitudes by about 50 [percent]
over what wind-driven transport
alone would do.”8 Should seri-
ous disruption in the Great
Ocean Conveyor occur, model
calculations indicate the poten-
tial for cooling of three to five
degrees Celsius in the ocean and
atmosphere — causing weather
repercussions of the same mag-
nitude as the Little Ice Age.9
Various government, inter-
governmental entities, and non-
government organizations have
researched the possible public
policy implications in the event
such rapid climate change
occurs. According to one study
done in the United States,10
rapid climate change may potentially cause: (1) an annual aver-
age drop in temperature by up to five degrees Fahrenheit over
North America and Asia, and a drop of six degrees Fahrenheit in
northern Europe, making northern Europe’s climate more like
Siberia’s; (2) an annual temperature increase by up to four
degrees Fahrenheit in areas throughout South America, Aus-
tralia, and Southern Africa; (3) the persistence of drought-like
conditions for a majority of the decade in important agricultural
regions and in areas providing water resources for population
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centers in eastern North America and Europe; (4) shortages of
food because of decreases in overall global agricultural produc-
tion; (5) commercial fisherman that fish in a specific region 
will have diff iculty in adapting to the massive f ish 
migrations; (6) decreased quality and availability of fresh water
in important regions because of
shifting precipitation patterns,
which will likely cause more 
frequent droughts and floods; 
(7) restricted access to energy
supplies because of extensive
sea ice and storms; and (8) mass
migrations, including those stem-
ming from northern Europe.11
Developing nations will be
most affected by the struggle for
food, energy, and water as they
lack the resources and capacity
to quickly adapt to the climate
change.12 In particular, for the over 400 million people living in
drier, subtropical, often over-populated and economically poor
regions, climate change and its effects are likely to pose severe
risk to political, economic, and social stability.13 Some nations,
especially those with poor relations with their neighbors, are
also likely to be involved in struggles over food, clean water, and
energy.14 Meanwhile, nations with relatively intact resources,
such as the United States, “may
build virtual fortresses around
their countries, preserving
resources for themselves.”15
As the science on rapid cli-
mate change improves, nations
should prepare for its contin-
gency and inevitable effects.
Suggestions on preparations
include determining which
countries will be the most vul-
nerable to changing climatic
conditions, identifying strate-
gies to enhance water manage-
ment capabilities, and rehearsing various adaptive responses.16
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INTRODUCTION
T
his article proposes a method to account for the concur-
rent environmental benefits of stratospheric ozone pro-
tection and greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reductions when
evaluating investments in new technologies. The method demon-
strates how the phaseout of ozone-depleting substances
(“ODSs”) under the Montreal Protocol can be consistent with
climate policy when the global warming potential and energy-
efficiency characteristics of substitute technologies are fully
considered. This approach would increase investment to rapidly
phase out ODSs, resulting in significant environmental benefits
by avoiding both climate change and increased incidence of
harmful ultraviolet radiation. This article illustrates the possi-
bility of gains from coordinating global warming and ozone
depletion policies through a modification of the Montreal Proto-
col on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer to allow pro-
duction and consumption of
HCFC-123 when GHG emis-
sions are reduced to near zero
levels and these emissions are
offset by collecting and destroy-
ing ODSs contained in existing
equipment and foam — sources
of ODS emissions that are not
currently controlled. 
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
AND MONTREAL
PROTOCOL DISCONNECT
Although the physical and
chemical processes responsible
for depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer and climate change
are related,1 coordination between the Montreal Protocol and the
global effort to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference”2
in the climate system has been limited and unsystematic. The
Montreal Protocol does not properly take account of the global
warming impacts of the ODSs it regulates or the greenhouse gas
hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”) that are chemical replacements
for some applications. The Kyoto Protocol, on the other hand,
excludes from its list of controlled substances those covered by
the Montreal Protocol. As such, economic incentives under
Kyoto cannot be applied to a more rapid phase-out of ODS
greenhouse gas production and consumption, or to the collection
and destruction of ODSs contained in refrigeration and air con-
ditioning equipment and thermal insulating foam.3 One could
argue that this construction of the Kyoto list of controlled sub-
stances implicitly empowers the Montreal Protocol to address
the global warming impacts of the substances it regulates; how-
ever, this option has not yet been exercised by the Parties to the
Montreal treaty. More significantly, the Multilateral Fund of the
Montreal Protocol has no access to Clean Development Mecha-
nism funds under the Kyoto Protocol, and the emissions trading
options of Kyoto cannot be applied directly to ODSs.
COORDINATING ENVIRONMENTAL EFFORTS
Given the interaction between the stratospheric ozone layer
and the climate system, and the fact that all the ODSs regulated
by the Montreal Protocol (with the exception of halons) are pow-
erful GHGs,4 coordination of the two regulatory regimes is nec-
essary to effectively address the environmental concerns at
stake. Yet, it is not easy to see how this can be done in practice.
For example, how might the environmental and economic desir-
ability of two projects, both of
which affect greenhouse gas
emissions and emissions of
ODSs, be compared? 
The net benefits from the
climate change mitigation and
ozone layer protection aspects of
the projects are extraordinarily
difficult to quantify.5 The aggre-
gate benefits can be monetized
only by making highly con-
testable assumptions about the
“value of a statistical life” across
countries in different stages of
development. A method for
comparing costs and benefits
across generations has not been agreed upon. A major compo-
nent of the benefit of climate stabilization depends on what
assumption is made about risk aversion (and not all those
affected can be presumed to share a common degree of risk aver-
sion). Estimates of the cost of greenhouse gas reductions range
from negative to positive, with the magnitudes of the positive
cost estimates differing by a factor of four.6 Even if the aggre-
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gate impacts were known with more certainty than seems possi-
ble with today’s knowledge, the response curves of impacts to
changes in GHG or ODS emissions are almost certainly non-lin-
ear. Therefore, the marginal effect of specific projects cannot be
inferred from aggregate impacts. More fundamentally, it is
debatable whether cost-benefit analysis is the appropriate tool
for analysis of problems that are global in scope, non-marginal
in impact, cover centuries of time, and involve the fate of non-
human species as well as human beings.7
Nevertheless, real money has been and is being spent to
reduce both ODS and GHG emissions. (It should be noted at the
outset that this article will ignore those emissions-reduction
projects that can be undertaken at a pure profit by private-sector
firms or governmental agencies. These “no regrets” opportuni-
ties should be seized regardless of their environmental benefits
and are uncontroversial from a policy perspective.)8 The current
expenditures for emissions reductions provide a benchmark of
the “political willingness to pay” (“PWTP”) of present-day gov-
ernments.9 Political willingness to pay demonstrates collective
decisions to finance the most important functions of society such
as homeland security, national defense, public health, education,
and environment even when traditional cost-benefit calculations
are inappropriate or impossible. Although the decisions to invest
in ozone layer protection and climate change mitigation have
been made independently, the expenditures on these projects
provide a basis for estimating the current level of combined reg-
ulatory stringency of the two Protocols.
DEVELOPING A COMMON ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
Consider a two-dimensional mapping of project characteris-
tics with reductions in ozone depletion potential (“ODP”) per
dollar spent on one axis and reductions in “life-cycle climate
performance” (“LCCP”)10 per dollar on the other. Data on the
money spent to eliminate or reduce ODSs are available in the
database maintained by the Multilateral Fund operating under
the Montreal Protocol,11 or from case studies of ODP reduction
projects undertaken by firms or government entities. From these
data, it is possible to infer the maximum PWTP to reduce ODP,
as well as various measures of the central tendency of PWTP.
Similarly, information is available on the cost of GHG reduction
projects undertaken by private firms, international projects certi-
fied under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, and the prices of CO2 emissions permits traded on the
European Climate Exchange. The ODP or LCCP reductions per
dollar spent on these projects can be represented in the kind of
diagram familiar to economists by points along the two axes as
shown in Figure 1. The circles on the axes represent the emis-
sions changes per dollar of the different projects (either ODP or
LCCP reductions).12 The square “dots” reflect the fact that most
ODP reductions have also reduced the global warming impact.
This occurs because either the replacement technologies use
gases with a lower direct global warming potential than the
CFCs they replaced, or the new technologies have been more
energy-efficient, or both. Nevertheless, it is possible for an ODP
reduction to be associated with an increase in GHG emissions so
that the “improvement” in LCCP/$ is negative. Cases of this type
would show square dots below the horizontal axis. 
The diagonal line AB, in Figure 1, is drawn to reflect the
combined degree of stringency implicit in the two regulatory
regimes. This line connects the central tendencies (e.g., the
means or medians) of the distributions of the LCCP reduction
project points and the ODP reduction project points. Shifting the
AB line towards the origin represents an increase in regulatory
stringency; if the axes had been drawn in units of $/ODP reduc-
tion and $/LCCP reduction, increasing regulatory stringency
would be expressed by a movement away from the origin.13 The
slope of AB is a rough measure of the dollar tradeoff between
LCCP reductions and ODP reductions embodied in current lev-
els of PWTP. 
The tradeoff line could also have been drawn in other ways.
For example, the dotted line A’B’ connects the most expensive
emissions reduction projects.14 It could be maintained that A’B’
more accurately reflects the PWTP frontier than AB because all
projects currently funded lie above and to the right of A’B’.
Alternatively, if it were decided under the successor to Kyoto
that there should be, for example, a global emissions charge of
$125/tonne of CO2, the anchoring point of the AB line on the
vertical axis would be at 0.008 (=1/125) with the LCCP axis
scaled in tonnes of CO2 equivalent per dollar. 
The area above and to the right of the AB line (or of the
A’B’ line, if the more inclusive definition of PWTP is being used
as the standard) represents those projects that are “clearly justi-
fied” at the current levels of regulatory stringency of the two
Protocols, while projects falling in the area below and to the left
of the line AB (or A’B’) are not so clearly justified. This is not to
suggest that projects on the axes below point A or to the left of
point B should not have been undertaken. Indeed, if A and B are
central tendencies, a considerable number of projects will lie on
either side of these points by definition. It may also be the case
that PWTP has not yet caught up with the socially desirable
degree of emissions reductions, so a shift of line AB (or A’B’)
down and to the left would improve general welfare. Note also
that if only the Montreal Protocol proceeds to a complete phase-
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out of the substances controlled under it, the line AB would
rotate about point A until it coincides with the vertical axis. Sim-
ilarly, a complete ODS phaseout under A’B’ would pivot on A’
until the point B’ coincides with the origin.
PRACTICAL POLICY APPLICATIONS OF A
COMMON ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
This conceptual framework offers two advantages. First, it
enables policy makers to evaluate projects with both global
warming and ozone-protection benefits in a unified way, given
the current levels of regulatory stringency implicit in the two
Protocols. Second, this framework shows how projects might be
compared in the cases in which one is not preferable to the other
along both dimensions. Thus, in Figure 2, Project C is preferable
to Project D because C results in more cost-effective reductions
in both ODP and LCCP. But what about comparisons between
Project D and Project E, or between Project D and Project F? All
three lie in the region above and to the right of line AB, so in one
sense all three should be undertaken at current levels of regula-
tory stringency. However, E is preferable to D at the current
tradeoff rate between LCCP/$ and ODP/$ as indicated by the
slope of AB. On the other hand, D is preferred to F at the AB
tradeoff rate, but F could be preferred to D if the slope of the
tradeoff line were steep enough (i.e. sufficiently negative). Fig-
ure 2 also shows the case of point G, a project with a large
enough ODP-reduction potential to be worth undertaking even
though it has an undesirable global warming impact.
This analytical framework has direct applicability to some
of the immediate issues that need to be considered in strengthen-
ing the Montreal Protocol. For example, the use of HCFC-123 in
large chillers has up to a 13.5 percent energy efficiency advan-
tage over the best alternatives.15 HCFC-123 also has a signifi-
cant refrigerant emission advantage because it is a liquid at
atmospheric pressure and temperature and operates at a partial
vacuum in air conditioning equipment. On the other hand, HFC-
134a (the best competing alternative) is a gas at atmospheric
pressure and temperature and operates at high pressure in air
conditioning equipment, increasing the risk of uncontrolled
emissions. The ODP of HCFC-123 is very low (0.012) but not
zero, while HFC-134a has an ODP of essentially zero.16 HCFC-
123 is scheduled for complete phaseout in 2030 in the developed
countries (with a 99.5 percent phaseout by 2020). However,
HFC-134a is not controlled under the Montreal Protocol, but
rather is controlled under the Kyoto Protocol as one of the basket
of greenhouse gases. HFC-134a has also been targeted by the
European Union for phaseout in automobile air conditioners.17
The lack of coordination between Montreal and Kyoto could dis-
courage building owners from selecting HCFC-123 systems as
the environmentally superior technology. With the substantial
energy efficiency advantage and near-zero refrigerant emissions
over the 30-year lifetime of a large chiller, selection of HCFC-
123 instead of HFC-134a in this application would fall in the
region above the line AB because of the very large LCCP gain
from the greater energy efficiency of the HCFC-123 chiller. This
is illustrated by point H in Figure 2, with the very small ODP of
the HCFC-123 chiller compared to an HFC-134a chiller indi-
cated by the placement of H slightly on the negative side of the
ODP/$ axis.18
Worldwide, in both developed and developing countries,
there are approximately 65,673 — 105,076 CFC chillers con-
taining 24,173 — 38,676 ODP-weighted tonnes of CFC.19 If all
of these CFC chillers were immediately replaced with HCFC-
123 chillers, global greenhouse gas emissions would be signifi-
cantly reduced. Destruction of the CFCs in the old equipment
could offset the lifecycle HCFC-123 emissions not only for the
replacement chillers, but also for chillers required in new con-
struction for decades to come. Mindful of the continuing climate
benefits, by the time the offsets run out the ozone layer is
expected to have largely recovered and might tolerate some ODS
emissions. 
The framework proposed in this article would automatically
incorporate policies designed to allow for destruction credits
associated with permission to use ODSs, either in a Montreal-
only framework or in an integrated framework requiring destruc-
tion sufficient to move a project to a combined regulatory
stringency boundary. Thus, in the preceding example of the
HCFC-123 chiller, the welfare improvement would be unam-
biguous (regardless of the slope of AB) if the HCFC-123 used in
the chiller were offset by destruction of an equivalent or greater
amount of ODP. As such, HCFC-123 chillers are unequivocally
environmentally superior if designed and maintained for supe-
rior energy efficiency and near-zero refrigerant emissions offset
by collection and destruction of ODSs currently contained in
existing equipment and foam products. 
This example shows how the Montreal Protocol could be
strengthened with an accelerated ODS phaseout while at the
same time contributing to climate protection by reducing green-
house gas emissions. All that is required is that controls for
developed countries and financing for developing countries
guide the choice of alternatives and substitutes for ODSs
towards those technologies offering the lowest LCCP. In addi-
tion, as in the chiller example, companies should be permitted to
offset HCFC-123 emissions by destruction of other ODSs when
significant improvements in energy consumption are available. 
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CONCLUSION
Several policy guidelines emerge from this approach. First,
it is environmentally and economically superior to choose alter-
natives or substitutes for ODSs that are ozone-safe (zero ODP)
and that also have lower direct and indirect greenhouse gas
emissions. Second, it can be economically preferable to choose
alternatives or substitutes to ODSs that have a small impact on
ozone (non-zero ODP) if it is judged, based on current or pro-
jected future PWTP, that the resulting lower direct and indirect
greenhouse gas emissions justify the ozone depletion. Third, it is
unequivocally preferable both economically and environmen-
tally to choose alternatives or substitutes to ODSs that have a
small impact on ozone (non-zero ODP) provided that impact is
offset by destruction of existing “legacy” ODS, the destruction
of which is not mandated by the Montreal Protocol and which is
not already required to be destroyed by other national or regional
legislation, and if the replacement technologies result in lower
direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions.
Using a unified analytical framework, we have shown how it
is possible to combine the political willingness to pay to protect
the ozone layer and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. This
approach can be applied to both the current effort to strengthen
the Montreal Protocol and the search for consensus on how to
move beyond Kyoto to mitigate climate change. Practical appli-
cations of this approach would favorably shift investment toward
technology that satisfies broad criteria of environmental protec-
tion and sustainable development and would use emissions trad-
ing to reduce the cost of both ozone and climate protection while
expanding the flexibility of business choice. Economic consider-
ations should never obscure the ethical principles that must pri-
marily guide these policies, but by eliminating perverse
incentives and avoiding expensive mistakes, economics has an
important role to play in promoting cost-effectiveness. The
approach outlined here retains the flexibility and openness to
new scientific understanding that have been hallmarks of the
Montreal Protocol’s success. In building on what has been
accomplished thus far, our obligation to future generations
requires nothing less than effective and intelligent integration of
measures for protection of the ozone layer and stabilization of
the climate system.
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S
mall Island States (“SIS”) fight a high stakes uphill battle
in advocating their interests in climate change treaty
negotiation. This class of 43 nations represents only five
percent of the world’s population, a miniscule portion of the
world’s gross domestic product, and is the most vulnerable class
of states to global climate change.1 The isolation of these states
and their limited capacity to adapt to natural disasters stand to
aggravate the harmful effects of climate change.2
SIS suffer from changing weather patterns, and scientists
predict that some island nations stand to lose substantial portions
of land due to sea level rise.3 Losing this land threatens these
islands’ development efforts as natural resources on the islands
become sparse.4 Island tourism, a major source for investment in
many of these States, also suffers due to shrinking resources and
unpredictable changing weather patterns.5 In recognition of the
common threat and vulnerabili-
ties of the SIS, the Alliance of
Small Island States (“AOSIS”)
was born.6
In 1994, members of
AOSIS met in Barbados and for-
mulated a strategy to confront
climate change, improve SIS
adaptability to climate change,
and make SIS development
more sustainable.7 In 2004, the
impacts of the devastating
tsunami underlined the vulnera-
bility of these island nations.
Motivated by this environmental
catastrophe, the AOSIS drafted
the Mauritius declaration, a pro-active policy strategy declara-
tion that outlines the SIS struggle to exist in the face of the threat
of climate change. These nations, gathering at the UN Confer-
ence on Small Islands in 2005, adopted the Mauritius Declara-
tion and reaffirmed and expanded the Barbados Programme of
Action.8
Additionally, the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change represented light-
ning rods of participation and cooperation among SIS to encour-
age the reduction of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.9 As a
result, participation in these meetings represented a positive ini-
tial step in cooperation among the SIS.10 The synergy of SIS
gave the states more representation, resulting in SIS gaining con-
cessions to provide for financial aid and resources to help the
developing island nations adapt to climate change.11
The cooperation of such isolated States is an encouraging
example of how vulnerable parties with aligned interests can
represent themselves with a force that outweighs the sum of its
parts. The expansion and broadening of this alliance for cooper-
ation beyond SIS themselves could strengthen its force. AOSIS
and non-governmental organizations working on behalf of SIS
should focus efforts of alliances beyond climate change vulnera-
ble states to also work with vulnerable populations and coastal
lowland communities in industrialized nations that are resistant
to the GHG reduction. Although St. Lucia, for instance, and the
United States have different goals and interests at the Kyoto Pro-
tocol negotiation table, this small island nation has its interests
well aligned with areas such as Louisiana or Massachusetts,
areas that are particularly sensitive to rising sea levels. Groups
like the Climate Institute in Washington, D.C. have begun to plan
such  effor t s  th rough the i r
Endangered  Is lands  Cam-
paign.12 This campaign proposes
various partnership programs
between SIS and low coastal
cities in larger countries, one
example being “[w]orking
with the International Hurri-
cane Research Center in Miami
to ensure that state of the art
techniques for storm surge and
wind resistance planning in
South Florida are adapted for
use in [SIS].”13
Much is left to be desired in
terms of having an international
climate change policy that can protect the citizens of SIS from
rising sea levels and increasingly unpredictable and extreme
weather patterns. By broadening the links between all vulnerable
areas of the world at sub-state levels, SIS can raise awareness of
their vulnerability and lobby for the major GHG producers to
curb their emissions. The coming decades present potential
grave consequences for SIS and the major GHG producers have
a moral duty to the front line victims of climate change.
WHAT NEXT FOR THE ALLIANCE OF SMALL
ISLAND STATES IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE ARENA?
by Daniel Brindis*
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effects of climate change.
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INTRODUCTION
European Union (“EU”) Directive 2003/87/EC establishes a
scheme for greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emission allowance trading
(“EU ETS”) within the European Community (“EC”). Under
Article 25(1) of this directive, the European Commission has a
mandate to negotiate and conclude agreements with third coun-
tries establishing a link to national or regional GHG emissions
trading schemes.1 Aside from increased market liquidity and, by
consequence, reduced compliance costs, such a link promises to
lessen competitive distortions between the participating states,
counteract the threat of leakage, and potentially improve the
prospects for a truly global carbon market.2 With various
regional trading schemes currently under development in the
United States,3 the concept of linking emissions-trading markets
attracts attention on both sides of the Atlantic. Accordingly, the
European Council of Environment Ministers, which essen-
tially decides on the adoption
of environmental legislation in
the EU, recently expressed “its
commitment to developing a
strong global carbon market by
linking the EU ETS with other
emissions trading schemes at
national or regional level.”4
Meanwhile, an Executive Order
adopted by the Governor of Cal-
ifornia explicitly calls for the
development of a “program that
permits trading with the Euro-
pean Union (. . .) and other juris-
dictions.”5
Indeed, the subject of linkages between GHG emissions
trading has become a widely discussed issue in climate negotia-
tions and among climate experts. In his review of the economic
costs of climate change, for instance, the acclaimed economist
Sir Nicholas Stern considered linking national, regional, and
sectoral carbon markets as an international priority and a valu-
able opportunity to define a global price for carbon.6 Unsurpris-
ingly, several studies have addressed this issue by outlining
conceptual issues and assessing the mutual compatibility of trad-
ing schemes,7 although few have specifically addressed the legal
challenges raised by such a market link. As a survey of existing
scholarship reveals, a great majority of the conceptual chal-
lenges identified thus far are largely political in nature and rarely
involve legal considerations. While essential for the operation of
a trading link, for instance, the mutual recognition of allowances
has been ultimately declared a “political issue,” and monitoring,
reporting, and verification requirements mainly considered vital
for their effect on confidence in the market.8 In the end, rela-
tively few design elements need to be compatible for a link to
become legally viable,9 with a high degree of harmonization
between connected markets arguably desirable for political and
economic reasons, but not essential as a matter of law.
When considering a market link between emissions trading
schemes, questions of law are likely to emerge in two respects:
first, during the process of implementation, which invariably
necessitates recourse to recognized sources of law and legal pro-
cedures, and, second, during actual operation of the market link,
where the latter may conflict with substantive norms and princi-
ples of international, regional, or domestic law. Questions per-
taining to the operation of a future trading link cannot be
addressed in a comprehensive
manner at this stage, given the
current uncertainties about its
ultimate design.10 Drawing on
the example of a link between
the current market in the EU and
evolving markets in different
regions of the United States, this
article will provide an overview
of legal challenges apparent in
the preparatory process, focus-
ing on the legal nature of a link-
ing arrangement and the
procedural constraints imposed
on its adoption. 
LEGAL NATURE OF A LINKING AGREEMENT
As one scholar succinctly described it, “[t]wo national emis-
sions trading schemes are linked if one country’s allowance can
be used, directly or indirectly, by a participant in the other coun-
try’s scheme for compliance purposes.”11 In other words, sepa-
rate trading schemes can be considered linked if allowances can
flow between the respective schemes. As a result of such a link
BRIDGING THE TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE: 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF A LINK BETWEEN REGIONAL CARBON MARKETS IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
by Michael A. Mehling*
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between trading programs in the United States and the EU, for
instance, participants in the North American market could buy
allowances in the EU ETS for compliance with their domestic
reduction targets, and vice versa. However, a trading link does
not necessarily have to operate in both directions. Rather, one
jurisdiction may choose to create a unilateral link to other mar-
kets, especially if the latter allow any legal or natural person to
own allowances with the option of having these retired or can-
celled. To this end, the jurisdiction in question could simply
decide to recognize allowances purchased and cancelled in a for-
eign trading scheme for compliance purposes at home.12
Although a trading link could also be construed to encompass
the transfer of credits through an overarching framework, such
as the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) set out under
the Kyoto Protocol,13 this article will disregard such indirect
approaches to focus on arrangements suitable for the establish-
ment of a direct bridge between the EU ETS and regional trading
schemes in the United States.
While a unilateral link between trading schemes can be
established through a simple legislative amendment specifying
the conditions for recognition of foreign allowances, a bi- or
multilateral link will typically require negotiations between the
legislators of all affected trading
schemes, resulting in some form
of mutual understanding. Con-
ventionally, this understanding
could be reached by way of: (1)
a purely political arrangement;
(2) a binding international
treaty; or (3) mutual recognition
of allowances by way of recipro-
cal rules in the domestic law 
of participating jurisdictions.
Another approach could involve
transboundary contracts entered
individually or collectively under private law, although this
option is unlikely to offer the certainty and political acceptance
needed for a comprehensive market link.
POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS
A political solution based on informal consultations has the
benefit of obviating lengthy negotiation and ratification proce-
dures. Aside from mere declarations of intent, for instance
through joint statements at political summits, a more formal way
of documenting a convergence of will can lie in the conclusion
of a Memorandum of Understanding, documenting a desired
line of action, but lacking the binding power of a legal commit-
ment. Adding to the less cumbersome procedure, such informal
arrangements are also easier to modify and adapt than binding
treaties. However, given the economic ramifications of a trading
link and the importance of certainty and transparence for smooth
market operation, pressure from stakeholders in the market will
likely prompt legislators to opt for a more reliable, legally bind-
ing solution. 
BINDING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
Article 25(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC has chosen to follow
this latter path by referring to the procedure in Article 300 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”),14
which specifies the adoption of international treaties by the
European Community. A treaty is one of the recognized sources
of international law.15 Its binding force follows from the custom-
ary maxim of pacta sunt servanda,16 which ultimately reflects
state sovereignty limited through voluntary consent.17 The viola-
tion of duties under a treaty counts as a breach of international
law, incurring state responsibility and the possibility of sanc-
tions, often defined in the treaty itself as part of a negotiated
compliance mechanism. While offering a high degree of cer-
tainty, the adoption of an international treaty entails a lengthy
and often contentious ratification process. Likewise, subsequent
amendments to the treaty or a withdrawal from it are again sub-
ject to sophisticated rules of international law.18 Nonetheless,
due to the formal nature and the transparency they offer, interna-
tional treaties are likely to be the instrument of choice for a
future linking agreement. Still, it bears restating that such
treaties can only be concluded by formal subjects of interna-
tional law, a limitation of major
relevance for any transatlantic
linking agreement between
regional trading markets.
RECIPROCAL
COMMITMENTS
Rather than approving an
international arrangement with
binding force, different trading
markets could also enter a polit-
ical commitment to adopt recip-
rocal legislation within their
respective jurisdictions, thereby
ensuring the mutual recognition of emission allowances. Such an
arrangement would ultimately entail an adaptation of the respec-
tive registry systems and thus derive its authority from domestic
law, although it would result from formal or informal negotia-
tions and preparatory meetings between states. Relative to an
international treaty, of course, such a construction would not
have the capacity to bind participating jurisdictions, allowing for
unilateral amendment or termination of the trading link without
prior consent of other parties. In certain situations, this aggre-
gate solution might be the only available means to connect sepa-
rate markets while offering the legal certainty and transparency
of formal law. In that instance, unilateral digression is unlikely
for as long as participants retain the common interest in an oper-
ational trading link.
CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
A final vehicle for the implementation of a linking arrange-
ment is private law, that is, the law governing the mutual rela-
tions between natural and legal persons, notably the law of
contracts and torts as it is called in the common law, or the law of
obligations as it is called in civil legal systems. Different
The concept of linking
emissions-trading markets
attracts attention on both
sides of the Atlantic.
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approaches are conceivable under private law, although these
will all involve some form of contract, either to establish a
longer contractual relationship or purely negotiated in casu to
govern individual transactions. Whether a formal link has been
created or not, transactions leading to a transfer of allowances
will generally involve a contract specifying the terms of a partic-
ular transaction, such as the price and volume of allowances, the
delivery date, a force majeure clause, and default or liability pro-
visions.19 Even in the absence of a formal link, market partici-
pants could use private law to create a bridge between otherwise
separate trading systems by establishing a system for the conver-
sion of permits. An example of this would be a system of private
brokers leveraging arbitration opportunities. Such arrangements
are legally viable due to the fact that many trading schemes,
including the ETS, impose no restrictions on account ownership,
allowing virtually anyone to open an account an thereby enter
the market. Moreover, there is a vital difference between trade in
allowances, which is theoretically open to everyone, and actual
transfer, which is usually limited to market participants.20 In the
voluntary sector, private transactions across trading schemes
have already occurred.21
Unlike public international
law and the rules adopted by the
EC, private law is not a body of
norms adopted across national
frontiers. Instead, it differs from
state to state, often with vast dif-
ferences between historically
separate regulatory traditions
such as the common law, which
is based largely on judicial
precedent, and civil law, which
is based largely on codif ied
rules. Of course, the United
Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods22 has gone some way to
establish a uniform law of sales, but its application to emissions
allowances — the legal nature of which, while not entirely clear,
rules out classification as a good or service23 — is questionable.24
In the absence of a harmonized normative framework, the
contractual arrangements for a trading link will thus be governed
either by the private law of a particular state as specified in the
contract, the most likely case, or by the private law of the state
determined by way of international private law. This latter set of
rules, also known as conflict of laws, merely helps regulate
transboundary relations between private law subjects by deter-
mining which of the competing legal systems is applicable. The
choice of law in contractual relationships is typically selected
based upon either the place where the transaction physically
occurred (lex loci actus) or the doctrine of the proper law, which
is the law with the closest connection to the facts of the case.
Altogether, this allows for great flexibility in the development of
a trading link based on private law, although the scope of appli-
cation will tend to remain limited to individual transactions or
trading on a smaller scale. As mentioned earlier, market partici-
pants are likely to insist on a transparent, legally binding frame-
work for transactions between their respective trading schemes,
favoring the predictability of formal legislation over a contrac-
tual solution based on private law.
PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS OF A
LINKING ARRANGEMENT
As stated in the preceding section, the use of different link-
ing arrangements can trigger differing formal procedures. While
a political solution and contractual arrangements will generally
pose no major challenges in this regard, both international
treaties and domestic legislation mandating the mutual recogni-
tion of foreign allowances may only be adopted in accordance
with sophisticated provisions of legislative procedures and the
institutional distribution of powers. With a view to the express
reference contained in Article 25(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC,
this section will begin with an assessment of the procedural
framework for international agreements linking the EU ETS
with other emissions trading schemes. 
PROCEDURAL ISSUES UNDER EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW
First and foremost, the
mandate set out in Article 25(1)
of Directive 2003/87/EC limits
participation in a linking agree-
ment to “third countries listed in
Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol
which have ratified the Proto-
col,” a limitation which, for the
time being, precludes an inter-
national treaty with the United
States because it has withdrawn
from the Protocol. Thus, the 
usefulness of the Directive in
guiding a transatlantic linking
arrangement is limited and the foregoing restriction will have to
be repealed by way of a legislative amendment. A review process
that may result in an amendment is scheduled to conclude by
June 2007. In this connection, the European Commission
recently indicated its intention to link with trading schemes cur-
rently under development in the United States.25
Although a transatlantic market link based on Article 25(1)
of Directive 2003/87/EC may be ruled out for now, the proce-
dure mandated therein may still serve as a likely model for
future arrangements. Given that Directive 2003/87/EC is only
derived legislation, without prejudice to the powers conferred on
the EC under its constitutive treaty, it is conceivable that the
Council would move forward without observing the constraints
imposed by the foregoing mandate. Article 25(1) does not even
specify the legislative procedure itself, but instead refers to Arti-
cle 300 of the EC Treaty, a general provision setting out the
process for adoption of international agreements with third
states or international organizations. A sophisticated procedure,
Article 300 involves several stages and participation by the
European Commission, the Council, and the Parliament. 
A trading link to the 
EU ETS would not 
violate the Commerce
Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
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Essentially, the Commission is charged with negotiating
international agreements, while the Council approves their sub-
sequent adoption. Before opening negotiations, the Commission
requires authorization by the Council to conduct negotiations on
behalf of the EC, usually through a Council decision based on a
draft by the Commission which occasionally sets out confiden-
tial negotiating guidelines. Upon approval of an agreed text, the
Commission proposes a decision on its conclusion by the Coun-
cil, which may sign or reject the agreement.26 As in the domestic
sphere, ratification is a separate act, again occurring though a
decision adopted subsequently by the Council on the initiative of
the Commission.
Directive 2003/87/EC was adopted on the basis of Article
175(1) and in application of the procedure set out in Article 251
of the EC Treaty, which merely requires a qualified majority in
the Council. Pursuant to Article 300(2) of the EC Treaty, a link-
ing agreement may likewise be adopted with a qualified major-
ity. It is uncertain whether the European Parliament will merely
need to be consulted or has the capacity to reject a trading link,
given that the respective agreement might be understood as
“establishing a specific institutional framework by organi[z]ing
cooperation procedures.” Requiring approval — rather than a
mere opinion — by the European Parliament could have signifi-
cant implications for the prospects of a linking agreement,
because the Parliament has traditionally been more reserved
than the Commission and the Council in deploying market
instruments. 
On a more general level, it merits noting that the EC is
unique in that Member States delegate a significant part of their
treaty negotiation powers to the Community level. Reflecting the
legal and political realities of the EC as a supranational entity
composed of sovereign states, treaty practice has become
increasingly dominated by “mixed agreements,” that is, agree-
ments to which both the EC and its Member States are party as a
result of shared competences.27 In accordance with the doctrines
of attributed powers and the parallelism between internal and
external competences, the adoption of a linking agreement pur-
suant to Article 300 of the EC Treaty will require consideration
of its subject matter to determine the allocation of powers
between the Community and the Member States. 
In the case of environmental agreements, the Community
derives its competence from Article 175(1) of the EC Treaty,
which sets out a general mandate for action on environmental
protection. It holds this power concurrently with the Member
States, which retain authority to regulate the environment until
the EC has acted. Additionally, the Treaty allows Member States
to adopt more stringent environmental measures under Article
176, and generally leaves the enforcement of EC law to their
domestic authorities. 
When the EC adopts common rules internally to regulate an
environmental issue, Member States are generally precluded
from entering into international agreements that affect such
rules or alter their scope.28 Article 176 of the EC Treaty allows
Member States to introduce more stringent measures,29 however,
and Article 174(4) clarifies that:
Within their respective spheres of competence, the
Community and the Member States shall cooperate
with third countries and with the competent interna-
tional organisations. The arrangements for Community
cooperation may be the subject of agreements between
the Community and the third parties concerned, which
shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance with
Article 300. 
The previous subparagraph shall be without prejudice
to Member States’ competence to negotiate in interna-
tional bodies and to conclude international agreements.
Ultimately, clarifying the division of competences within
the EC is a difficult task, with boundaries constantly evolving.30
Depending on their substance and the competencies touched
upon, environmental agreements entered into by the EC may —
but do not have to — be adopted as mixed agreements.31 In
effect, it may be in the interest of both the Community and its
Member States, and possibly also of third states, to opt for an
agreement concluded by the Community only, notably to speed
up the adoption process. At the same time, where competence
for the subject matter of an agreement is shared between the
Community and the Member States, actual implementation will
usually require the participation of both. Past experience shows
the Member States insisting upon mixity even in instances when
it is not required by law.32
In fact, it is perhaps no coincidence that nearly all treaties
on environmental protection have been concluded as mixed
agreements,33 including the Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Kyoto Protocol. With Directive 2003/87/EC
leaving ample discretion to the Member States in its implemen-
tation, there is a certain probability that the latter would insist on
active participation in the negotiations preceding a linking
agreement, prompting recourse to a mixed agreement as the
most suitable instrument. Legal challenges can arise as a result,
specifically regarding the allocation of responsibilities under the
agreement between the Community and the Member States.
Unless their respective duties are separately specified, both the
Community and the Member States will be responsible for
observance of all commitments entered under the agreement.
Likewise, if only part of the Member States chooses to ratify a
mixed agreement alongside the Community, the entirety of
Member States will nonetheless be bound by its provisions, a
departure from the usual notion that each party is only responsi-
ble for the performance of its own obligations.34 Altogether, this
adds to the complexity of a linking agreement, and it is more
than questionable whether the vehicle of choice should be an
international treaty concluded simultaneously by the Commu-
nity and its Member States.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
In the United States, federalism can raise similar concerns
with regard to the admissibility of a regional linking agreement
between individual states, or groups of states, and the EU ETS.
Described by a commentator as altogether “terse” in this
regard,35 the U.S. Constitution contains only four articles per-
taining to treaty powers. Of these, Article I is the most relevant
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for a potential market link, given that its Section 10 prohibits any
state from entering into a “treaty, alliance, or confederation” or
from entering “without the Consent of Congress. . . into any
Agreement or Compact. . . with a foreign Power.”36 In essence,
this provision denies States international legal personality, limit-
ing their ability to participate in diplomatic relations and alto-
gether barring them from the conclusion of an international
treaty.37 Regarding international treaties, the scope of this
restriction is wide, covering all binding international arrange-
ments “regardless of title, designation, or form.”38 Clearly, then,
the States could not enter into a linking agreement with the
European Community under the terms set out by Article 25(1) of
Directive 2003/87/EC if such an arrangement were to be
designed as a formal treaty. 
While U.S. States may be precluded from entering into a
treaty with the EC, they are empowered to adopt a binding
“compact” or “agreement” with the consent of Congress, result-
ing in the question of how these differ from formal treaties.
However, to date no agreement between a State and foreign
power has been successfully
challenged due to the lack of
authority of the State.39 There-
fore, there appears to exist a
potential avenue for a link
between regional trading
schemes in the United States
and the EU ETS. 
Article I, Section 10 of the
U.S. Constitution makes the
conclusion of such an agreement
conditional on approval by Con-
gress. However, even in the
absence  of  Cong ress iona l
endorsement, individual States
may, under certain circum-
stances, enter into an agreement
with foreign powers.40 As the
United States Supreme Court has notably declared, a compact
with a foreign power requires Congressional approval only if it
tends “to the increase of political power in the States which may
encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United
States.”41 Consent to an agreement is thus only required if the
agreement tends to give the state elements of international sover-
eignty, interferes with the full and free exercise of federal
authority, or deals locally with a matter on which there is or
might be national policy.42 As the Restatement Third of the For-
eign Relations Law of the United States comments, “agreements
involving local transborder issues, such as agreements to curb a
source of pollution. . . have been considered not to require Con-
gressional consent.”43 Accordingly, it appears possible, albeit not
certain, that a linking agreement could be adopted without fed-
eral endorsement by way of a state compact or agreement. Still,
Congress can always supersede such state arrangements by leg-
islation.
Should the preceding options prove unfeasible, U.S. States
can always resort to amending their internal legislation with a
view to including rules on the mutual recognition of foreign
allowances. Because neither party is legally bound to maintain
its law, reciprocal legislation adopted concurrently by two or
more jurisdictions does not constitute a treaty, nor an agreement
requiring Congressional consent.44 Affording means of circum-
navigating the constraints of international and constitutional law,
such reciprocal recognition could be based on an informal
understanding setting out the substantive provisions required to
create an operational trading link. Any institutional responsibili-
ties could be assigned to a private body established and funded
by the respective participants, obviating the need for recourse to
international law. Operating through a Memorandum of Under-
standing at the preparatory stage, the Northeastern States partic-
ipating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”)
have already evidenced the feasibility of an informal arrange-
ment to decide certain features of their future trading scheme.
More importantly, States have concluded past reciprocal
arrangements with foreign powers also to overcome procedural
constraints.45 Likewise, the EC
has in the past resorted to infor-
mal understandings as a vehicle
for the settlement of contentious
transatlantic issues.46 Accord-
ingly, States could amend the
legislation implementing their
regional trading scheme, while
the EC could adopt a directive
amending Directive 2003/87/ EC.
In all foregoing cases, a
transatlantic market link would
not appear to contravene the
supremacy of federal law
because, to date, the federal
government has not adopted leg-
islation precluding state law in
the area of GHG emissions trad-
ing. Likewise, a trading link to the EU ETS would not violate the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Contained in Article
I, Section eight, Clause three, the Commerce Clause empowers
Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States.” 
As the concept of commerce can also be applied to environ-
mental markets,47 the Commerce Clause has raised doubts about
the legality of RGGI provisions constraining energy imports
from outside in order to prevent leakages.48 As long as the
United States fails to regulate international trade in GHGs, how-
ever, this clause will remain dormant and merely prohibit states
from passing legislation that improperly burdens transboundary
commerce. Regarding the latter, the U.S. Constitution does “not
prohibit every state law or regulation that has some effect on
interstate or foreign commerce.”49 The Supreme Court has sum-
marized the applicable jurisprudence as follows:
Where the Statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
The European
Commission recently
indicated its intention to
link with trading schemes
currently under
development in the 
United States.
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interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fit. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the ques-
tion becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on
the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether
it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.50 
The creation of a market link facilitates commerce. But
even if a linking arrangement were, in any way, to be considered
burdensome on domestic or international commerce, it appears
likely that its environmental and economic benefits could out-
weigh such effects under the foregoing proportionality assess-
ment. 
CONCLUSION
The goal of this article was to examine the possible legal
ramifications resulting from a linking arrangement between
regional trading schemes in Europe and the United States. While
many legal issues have yet to emerge as such a link begins to
operate in practice, this initial analysis allows for an important
conclusion: even on the austere level of constitutional doctrines
and legislative procedures, a range of legal options is available
for the implementation of a future trading link. Arising obstacles
may be avoided through careful selection of the legal instrument
embodying the market link. Admittedly, some issues will prove
challenging to resolve, such as the creation of a global market
involving various participants, of which only some are party to
an overarching regime based on a common currency. Even in
such a situation, conceptual solutions have already been pro-
posed to bridge regime boundaries, such as the creation of a
clearinghouse or gateway facilitating the transfer of otherwise
incompatible units.51
As they have evolved to date, carbon markets have proven to
be complex entities, embedded in sophisticated networks of con-
tingent interests, traditionally diverse approaches to governance,
and distinct regulatory constraints. Reconciling the inevitable
differences between two or more trading schemes is not solely a
task for lawyers or the law, but a matter of bringing together
divergent preferences and expectations. In essence, the estab-
lishment of a link between different trading schemes will mainly
call for political deliberation, mutual concession, and, to some
extent, the willingness to tolerate remaining differences. For
lawyers, the challenge will be to translate the negotiated consen-
sus into legally viable arrangements, observing applicable rules
of domestic, regional and international law. The rest remains a
matter of political agreement. One might argue with another
scholar that, wherever an economic incentive exists to bridge
different systems, “money will cross the divide.”52 And in the
end, Stuart Eizenstat, who helped negotiate the Kyoto Protocol
on behalf of the United States, may have stated it best by observ-
ing: “The market is pulling the law along.”53
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F
rom solar-powered stadiums to free public transportation,
the “Green Goal” project not only drastically reduced the
environmental impact of the 2006 World Cup games
through such preventative measures, but it went further: for the
first time, an event of this magnitude was “climate-neutral.”1
Through a multilateral effort involving the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme (“UNEP”), the Institute for Applied Ecol-
ogy, the International Football Federation, and the German
Football Association, 100,000 tons of CO2 will be saved through
climate protection projects in India and South Africa, more than
compensating for the 90,000 tons incurred by the games.2
Preference for projects that blend global environmental con-
cerns with lasting benefits for local populations appears to be a
trend for event planners. One such investment project is based in
Tamil Nadu, an area in south-
west India that was ravaged by
the 2004 tsunami.3 It involves
creating facilities that turn cow
dung into biogas, and then chan-
nels the energy source into
homes via new pipes.4 Not only
will the eco-friendly biogas 
protect the local forests and
decrease global greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions, but it will
reduce the number of respiratory
illnesses associated with tradi-
tional wood and kerosene-burn-
ing stoves.5
South Africa will host the
World Cup in 2010 and seeks to
emulate Germany’s carbon-neu-
tral success. For example, the German public transportation sys-
tem was a surprisingly successful feature of the Green Goal
Project. By providing free use of trains and buses to all ticket-
holders, a full 77 percent of fans relied on public transportation,
far surpassing the goal of fifty percent use.6 Noting Germany’s
success, and aware of its own shoddy public transportation sys-
tem, in August 2006 the South African Government agreed to a
multi-million dollar initiative to revamp its bus and rail services
in time for the 2010 World Cup games.7 Teaming up with UNEP
and the Global Environment Facility (“GEF”), South Africa
developed “pilot projects in some of the nine. . .World Cup
cities. . .aimed at developing sustainable transport alternatives
that deliver [GHG] reductions above and beyond those currently
planned.”8
Recognizing that in urban metropolitan areas over a third of
GHG emissions are attributable to the transportation sector,9
both the World Bank and the GEF have implemented various
transportation projects across the world, with particular success
in Latin America.10 Bus rapid transit (“BRT”) systems feature
dedicated bus lanes, a restricted number of stations, efficient
routes, and little downtime.11 South Africa 2010 planners are
envisioning “feeder routes” that link poorer communities to the
BRT system via conventional bus/taxi networks.12 Implementing
these networks, along with bicycle paths, will not only alleviate
congestion during the games and decrease GHG emissions, but
leave a lasting impact on local populations by improving
regional air quality and health,
and saving the average South
African commuter time and
money.13
The International commu-
nity is shifting away from view-
ing major sporting events as
exploitative opportunities, and
moving towards a greener mind-
set that involves both economic
and environmental develop-
ment. UNEP and the Beijing
Organizing Committee for the
Olympic Games are striving to
make the 2008 Olympic Games
“the greenest ever, from cutting
air, water and noise pollution to
transportation, landscaping and
disposal of solid waste.”14 Instead of leaving behind massive
concrete stadiums, events are providing sustainable systems that
benefit local inhabitants. Far from mere publicity stunts, greener
games and the offsetting of GHG emissions instills a sense of
environmental consciousness and global camaraderie connect-
ing all fans and athletes, thus serving as a catalyst for future mul-
tilateral efforts to improve our environment.
SUSTAINABLE SOCCER: 
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INTRODUCTION
Despite widespread support for federal action to limit
global warming pollution,1 the White House and many in Con-
gress continue to sit on their hands, swayed by the Washington
naysayers who claim that a safe, sustainable energy system is too
expensive, especially now when fuel prices are at record highs.
But as is so frequently the case in the environmental arena, the
States are demonstrating that quite the opposite is true. This arti-
cle provides an overview of State initiatives in the Northeast and
California to combat global warming that can serve as a
roadmap for federal policy-makers.
STATES CONTEND CARBON CONTROLS
GOOD FOR LOCAL ECONOMY
In August 2006, California adopted the first economy-wide
cap on global warming pollution after concluding that doing so
would increase State revenues by four billion dollars and bring
eighty thousand new jobs to the Golden State.2 The Northeast
Governors3 came to a similar conclusion in December 2005,
adopting a cap on carbon dioxide emissions from power plants
— the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) — after
economic modeling showed they could reduce pollution by ten
percent from current levels while lowering energy bills for the
average homeowner by over $100 per year.4 And its not just the
“tree-huggers” on the coasts who are gearing up to tackle the
most pressing environmental problem of our time: Governors in
Arizona, New Mexico, Washington, and Oregon have just
announced a plan to collaborate with California on mandatory
pollution caps; their counterparts in Montana, North Carolina,
and Illinois are also rolling up their sleeves to tackle global
warming,5 as are over three hundred mayors nationwide.6
How have these leaders come to conclude that they can
reduce global warming pollution in a smart way that is good for
the local economy and will bring new clean energy businesses
— and jobs — to their States? By focusing on finding solutions
and recognizing that we need well-designed policies in order to
bring these solutions to market in a big way. States are taking a
fresh look at cap-and-trade program design, developing innova-
tive features, and avoiding some of the flaws that have plagued
precursor programs. They are approaching global warming in
the context of a comprehensive review of energy policy, target-
ing the perverse incentives of current regulation, as well as the
market barriers that hinder investment in the cheapest zero-
emission resource — energy efficiency. 
CARBON AUCTION PROCEEDS TO
SUPPORT CLEAN ENERGY
With respect to cap-and-trade design, the most exciting
innovation is the agreement among RGGI States to use at least
25 percent of the value of allowances (pollution permits) to 
benefit consumers and promote clean energy. To date New York,
Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut and Maine have
announced plans to use one hundred percent of their allowances
to benefit consumers, most likely by distributing allowances to
an entity that will auction them to the owners of regulated power
plants and use the proceeds to invest in energy efficiency. This is
a huge shift from existing practices. In the Acid Rain Program,
the NOx Budget Program, and the European Emissions
Allowance Trading Scheme for greenhouse gases, governments
established mandatory caps and allowed trading, but provided
almost all of the allowances to the polluting sources free of
charge. 
In the electric sector giving away carbon allowances serves
no legitimate public policy purpose and will result in windfall
profits to power plant owners. Because allowances are tradable,
they carry an opportunity cost, and therefore power plant owners
will pass the cost of allowances onto customers regardless of
whether or not they pay for them.7 In Europe, free distribution 
of allowances has already resulted in hundreds of millions of
dollars in windfall profits to owners of polluting plants.8 These
dollars could have been used to reduce the cost of the program
for energy consumers, for example, by promoting investment in
energy efficiency or sustainable power generation technologies.
Granted, the Northeastern States have only committed to use 25
percent of the allowances in a wise fashion, but if one follows
the logic behind this commitment (as all States that have decided
this issue have done), there is no public policy justification to use
less than one hundred percent of the allowances for public bene-
fit purposes, and as the States head into their individual rulemak-
ings they have the opportunity to do just that.9
ADDITIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY SAVINGS POSSIBLE
The Northeastern States conducted extensive modeling of
the emissions cap under different scenarios and determined that
by increasing end-use efficiency for customers they could actu-
ally reduce energy bills while implementing the cap.10 Despite
the fact that the Northeast States are among the most energy effi-
cient in the nation, their analyses showed that they could triple
investment in efforts to speed the adoption of high-efficiency
heating and cooling systems, more efficient lighting, and energy-
saving “green” building design without running out of opportu-
nities to save energy for less than it costs to generate additional
electricity. 
Proceeds from the sale of allowances will enable the North-
eastern States to increase the number and size of the programs
STATES TACKLE GLOBAL WARMING
by Dale Bryk*
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those States are implementing to transform markets for energy
intensive products, but they will not be sufficient to promote
investment in all cost-effective energy efficiency opportunities.
To accomplish the latter, the States must also adopt more rigor-
ous building energy codes, which effectively require developers
to consider the occupants’ energy bills when they design build-
ings and choose materials. In addition, the States must adopt
increasingly stringent efficiency standards for energy-using
appliances and equipment. The reduced demand for energy from
such efforts would translate into sizable cuts in energy prices —
for example, a five percent reduction in demand for natural gas
would reduce the price of gas by a whopping twenty percent.11
It’s a simple application of the law of supply and demand, yet our
nation’s myopic focus on supply-side solutions has prevented us
from taking advantage of it.
STATES MUST CREATE REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
THAT REWARD INVESTMENT IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY
One of the main reasons for this perspective is that few util-
ities have any incentive to aggressively promote energy effi-
ciency, because their profits are entirely dependent on how much
power they sell, instead of on how well they meet their cus-
tomers’ energy service needs. From the utilities’ perspective,
even the most cost-effective investments in high efficiency heat-
ing systems, advanced industrial motors, or fuel cells produce
the same effect: a reduction in utility sales and, as a result,
reduced revenues and profits. The utilities’ interest in high vol-
ume energy sales makes it unwise for their industry to invest in
energy efficiency or clean distributed energy technologies which
would enable them to play a central role in efforts to reduce
global warming pollution. 
If we change the way we regulate the industry and allow
utilities to profit from energy-saving as well as energy-making
investments — regardless of how much power they sell — we
will quickly find many more ways to cut waste and lower cus-
tomer bills. These kinds of reforms are good for customers, good
for shareholders, and good for the environment. They are just the
sort of innovative answers that the Northeastern States will be
counting on to deliver global warming pollution cuts at minimal
or no cost to consumers.
California is already leading the way on this front. In the
aftermath of the State’s 2001 energy crisis, utilities, regulators,
and environmental advocates worked to reform a regulatory
framework that had utterly failed to deliver low-cost, environ-
mentally sound energy services to customers. The State’s Public
Utilities Commission adopted a regulatory structure and pro-
curement rules that require the utilities to act as “portfolio man-
agers” for their customers by investing in all cost-effective
energy efficiency resources, promoting rational, economically
efficient consumption decisions by customers, and assembling a
diverse portfolio of supply resources through a combination of
short-and long-term contracts that are designed to minimize
electric bills, the volatility of electric prices, and environmental
impacts. 
During this period, California also enacted the most ambi-
tious appliance efficiency standards in the nation, ridding the
local marketplace of the worst performing products. By the time
the California legislature passed Assembly Bill 32, its global
warming bill last year, the State was already well on its way to
meeting the law’s pollution reduction requirements in the cheap-
est, fastest way possible. 
CONCLUSION
The United States has quite a long way to go before reach-
ing a truly sustainable energy future, but the States are moving
the country in the right direction. They are demonstrating how to
reduce pollution in much smarter ways by adopting policies that
foster long-term investment in least-cost, sustainable energy
resources, promote technological innovation and economic
development, and avoid subsidies for mature, polluting indus-
tries. It is a pretty good start.
Endnotes: States Tackle
Global Warming
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The Everest Base Camp Valley is an example of the natural landscape at risk
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T
he Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“IACHR”) held a hearing to “address matters relating to
Global Warming and Human Rights” on March 1, 2007.1
Weeks before announcing the hearing, the IACHR declined to
consider a petition alleging that the United States’ government’s
refusal to limit the country’s greenhouse gas emissions consti-
tutes a threat to Inuit human rights.2 The Inuit Circumpolar
Council (“ICC”), which represents 150,000 people in northern
Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Russia,3 along with nonprofits
Earthjustice and the Center for International Environmental Law
submitted the petition in December 2005.4 The groups asserted
that climate change disproportionately affects the Inuit, threaten-
ing their lives, health, traditional land rights, personal property,
and livelihoods.5 The petition asked the IACHR, an international
legal body affiliated with the Organization of American States
(“OAS”),6 for “relief from human rights violations resulting
from the impacts of global warming and climate change caused
by acts and omissions of the United States,”7 which is the world’s
largest greenhouse gas producer8 and has rejected any manda-
tory reduction agreements to cut emissions and curtail global
warming.9
Although the IACHR does not have the authority to compel
the United States to restrict its greenhouse gas emissions or
compensate the Inuit, the petitioners hoped that such a ruling
would increase public awareness of the detrimental effects of cli-
mate change and alert governments and corporations to their
potential liability for global warming.10 The petitioners also
anticipated that a favorable ruling would establish a future legal
basis for holding countries, companies, and industries responsi-
ble for their greenhouse gas emissions,11 even inducing a
“stream of litigation, somewhat akin to lawsuits against tobacco
companies.”12 In a letter dated November 16, 2006, however, the
IACHR informed the petitioners that the Commission would not
consider the petition because the information it provided was
insufficient for making a determination. Sheila Watt-Cloutier,
chair of the ICC when the petition was submitted, asked the
IACHR for further explanation of its decision and “invited
[C]ommission members to visit the Arctic for a hearing ‘to pro-
vide testimony and documentation on these problems which are
seriously affecting Inuit survival.’”13
On February 1, 2007, the IACHR informed the petitioners
that it would hold the March 1 hearing at the OAS in Washing-
ton, DC, to address matters raised by the petition without revisit-
ing the petition itself.14 Despite the disappointment of the
petition’s rejection, Martin Wagner, attorney for Earthjustice,
remarks, “We believe that our petition may have helped educate
the Commission concerning the relationship between global
warming and human rights, and thus may have contributed to the
Commission’s desire to investigate the issue. Whatever its gene-
sis, however, this hearing is a very positive step in the direction
of recognizing States’ obligations to prevent human rights viola-
tions resulting from their contribution to global warming.”15 The
environmental community now waits to learn whether the hear-
ing will achieve any of the goals of the petition it supplants.
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INTRODUCTION
T
here is increasing interest in the possibility of using geo-
engineering to solve, or at least to help solve, global cli-
mate change problems.1 Geoengineering has been
defined as “intentional large-scale manipulation of the environ-
ment.”2 The geoengineering proposal receiving the most interest
involves adding small particles to the stratosphere to scatter
some of the incoming sunlight so that it does not reach the Earth.
The outcome would be a reduction in global temperatures that
would offset rising temperatures that many scientists believe
result from increasing levels of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”)
such as carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. This approach differs
from current popular proposals attempting to reduce man-made
emissions of GHGs because
instead of trying to indirectly
affect average global tempera-
tures by human decisions to
increase or decrease GHG emis-
sions, the resulting average
global temperatures would be
directly determined by explicit
human action.
The author has previously
argued that such intentional
reductions in solar radiation
reaching the Earth, which the
author has referred to as “engi-
neered climate selection,” repre-
sent the most effective and
efficient first step towards the
solution of most, but not all, of
the problems associated with cli-
mate change.3 The practical question to consider is how engi-
neered climate selection — or other geoengineering approaches
— might actually be implemented in organizational terms. Even
the best program may turn out badly if poorly implemented, and
the need for a program to be carefully executed is of the utmost
importance due to the risk of unintended consequences.4 This
article will explore some of the possibilities.
One prominent member of the U.S. scientific establishment
recently called for encouraging research, but also for a morato-
rium on large-scale field experiments of geoengineering propos-
als.5 Although it is encouraging to see that some members of the
scientific community may take a more open approach towards
research and publication in this area, efforts that impede future
large scale experimentation are not consistent with the sense of
urgency expressed by advocates of climate change control and
those who favor extremely large expenditures for GHG emission
controls to immediately begin.
IDEAL GOALS FOR GEOENGINEERING
IMPLEMENTATION
Presumably, the goals of any organization charged with
implementing geoengineering for global climate change control
would include several components. There needs to be global
political legitimization of any geoengineering activity. People
and governments are likely to want some assurance that their
interests are being heard and taken into account by any organiza-
tion that would be charged with carrying out such projects.
These projects need to be sub-
ject to a high level of scientific
review and scrutiny. Likewise,
the organization involved needs
to hold a positive view towards
such a program and have the
capability to manage high tech-
nology projects. 
Ideally, the organization
should be cost-efficient while
striving for the rapid achieve-
ment of proposed physical cli-
mate change control goals. One
of the reasons for selecting engi-
neered climate selection and
other geoengineering approaches
is the speed with which they
could be implemented. Quickly
reaching these results should be
an important criterion in selecting an organization to do the
implementation. 
Despite the need for a low-cost and expeditious program,
any geoengineering program needs to be subject to careful
implementation and testing. Given the risk of unintended conse-
quences, careful testing, subscale experiments, and quality con-
trol of all aspects of the program are essential. Moreover, any
* Alan Carlin is a Senior Economist at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) Headquarters in Washington, DC. The author is indebted to Dr. John
Davidson of EPA for comments on earlier drafts. The views expressed are those of
the author alone, however, and do not necessarily reflect those of the EPA or the
U.S. Government.
IMPLEMENTATION & UTILIZATION OF
GEOENGINEERING FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE CONTROL
by Alan Carlin*
A successful program
needs to be subject to
limited legal liabilities
resulting from any adverse
consequences from such
large-scale geoengineering
activities.
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program undertaken needs to have the capability for intermedi-
ate course corrections in case important new information
becomes available. Although it is well established that at least
some technical approaches to engineered climate selection
would be effective in controlling global temperatures,6 there are
a number of unanswered questions that require research and
development.7 Such research may result in the need for mid-
course corrections in the implementation program, necessitating
a need for organizational capability to make such modifications. 
A successful program also needs to be subject to limited
legal liabilities resulting from any adverse consequences from
such large-scale geoengineering activities. It appears likely that
any attempt to implement engineered climate selection will
result in lawsuits claiming damages for adverse weather condi-
tions allegedly resulting from the project.8 Unless these claims
are prohibited in some way or greatly minimized, they could
greatly impede the program.
IMPLEMENTATION PHASES
Any engineered climate selection or other geoengineering
program might ideally follow a number of phases; these phases,
however, need not be carried out by the same organization:
(1) The first phase might be careful laboratory investigation of
any critical uncertainties of the program such as trying to
verify the lack of significant adverse environmental effects
and research on ways to reduce or eliminate them. 
(2) The second phase might focus on careful real world testing
of the proposed engineered climate selection or other geo-
engineering techniques. After initial modeling of engi-
neered climate selection proposals in (1), scientists might
conduct subscale real world experiments at increasing
scales to verify remaining uncertainties, leading to devel-
opment of a detailed plan for final implementation. 
(3) Gaining acceptance of the plan by legitimizing organiza-
tion(s) might likely be the third phase. Additionally, incor-
porating requested appropriate modifications might ensue.
(4) The fourth phase might be the plan’s implementation,
including revisions to the plan based on new information
found after initial approval of the plan. 
(5) The last phase would presumably consist of maintaining
the resulting system after initial implementation. 
IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS
Most likely the quickest and simplest approach would be for
one nation with the needed technical and financial resources to
carry out all phases of the project, perhaps with the assistance of
contracts to the best qualified aerospace (or possibly other) com-
panies to carry out each phase. The cost would be quite small
compared to major military weapon systems and the administra-
tive procedures for such a system’s development are fairly well
established in most countries with large military development
programs. Finally, the initial implementation could probably be
accomplished in a few years’ time if there were no delays caused
by non-technical issues.
One obvious possibility at the opposite extreme would be
for the United Nations (“UN”) to implement such a program.
The UN is already deeply involved in climate change issues and
has an established organization to deal with them. An intermedi-
ate possibility might be an organization of the countries listed in
Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol that are interested and willing to
make a financial contribution to the effort. One such organiza-
tion might be the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”). Another possibility might be the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”). Although NATO does
not include several of Kyoto’s Annex I nations, it does have
experience with large aerospace procurements. 
Less developed countries (“LDCs”) generally express the
view that climate change has been mainly caused by developed
countries; thus in their view it is the developed world’s respon-
sibility to solve it. As a result, the choice of an organization 
representing developed countries would seem appropriate. Pre-
sumably only those countries willing to make a financial contri-
bution would be involved so as to minimize the number of
players and improve the speed with which decisions could be
made. It would also be reasonable for the organization to retain
control over all policy issues, but to contract out the actual
implementation, presumably on the basis of competitive bid-
ding. 
COMPARISON OF CHOICE OF ORGANIZATIONS
USING CRITERIA
Of the three implementation options discussed, the greatest
political legitimization would presumably result from using the
United Nations to oversee such a project. Restricting the coun-
tries involved tends to result in an action appearing less legiti-
mate. In brief, the more countries involved, the stronger the
legitimacy. 
With respect to strong review and scrutiny of a geoengineer-
ing project, the UN has built a strong scientific advisory capabil-
ity in the form of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, although it is not clear how receptive it would be to geo-
engineering. The OECD has a tradition of encouraging social
science input into its deliberations. Various countries have
numerous approaches towards encouraging scientific contribu-
tions to their technically related endeavors. However, the crite-
rion of strong scientific review probably does not strongly favor
any of the approaches considered here over any of the others.
The importance of a positive view towards the program and
the capability to manage high technology projects favors a
nation, or a small group of nations, managing the project. It is
the author’s opinion that the United Nations has been so closely
identified with a regulatory emissions reduction approach to
global climate change control that one can question whether they
would be likely to give geoengineering a fair trial. Additionally,
the UN also may not have much experience managing high tech-
nology aerospace projects. 
Rapidly achieving physical climate change control goals is
more likely to occur where there are fewer countries involved
since fewer voices are likely to result in greater speed in imple-
menting a solution. Though it may jeopardize legitimacy, an
individual country, or a small group of countries, running the
program would be the quickest option.
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Cost minimization also favors a single country approach.
Presumably the more countries there are involved in a program,
the higher the cost of deciding what to do. Likewise, there is a
greater likelihood that some country or countries will have to be
“bought off ” by added expenditures desired by that country.
However, because the costs should be modest, this may not be a
major consideration.
The capability for intermediate course corrections in case of
important new information and careful implementation and test-
ing criteria could presumably be achieved in all three organiza-
tional approaches. These criteria relate to the structure of the
endeavor. Presumably, this capability could be equally well
included in all three — although there may be differences
between how long they might take to actually implement the
plan.
Minimizing or handling any resulting legal liabilities for
alleged adverse consequences, as discussed elsewhere,9 is likely
to be a significant problem with regard to any of the three
approaches. Presumably there are ways to set up a geoengineer-
ing climate change control program that either minimizes such
liability or at least provides for an orderly way to settle such dis-
putes. This is obviously an important area for future legal
research. Important questions to consider are: (1) to what extent
would the exemption provisions of the U.S. Federal Tort Claims
Act apply if the geoengineering were carried out solely by the
United States Government; (2) what if alleged damages did not
occur in the country of origin; and (3) what are the consequences
of other governments or organizations being involved? Once
again, an unrefined answer would seem to be that the fewer
countries involved, the fewer the complications, but this may be
overly simplistic. 
THE BENEFITS OF LEGITIMIZATION SUPPORT A
MULTILATERAL APPROACH
A single country approach has many benefits when assessed
in relation to a number of the individual criteria. However, in the
author’s view these benefits are strongly outweighed for the plan
acceptance, implementation, and maintenance phases, and prob-
ably for the real world testing as well. Real world testing is
already controversial, and is likely to continue to be so even if
gradual scaling up and other safeguards are used. A single coun-
try approach to anything beyond laboratory testing would likely
result in international anger towards the lone country, many law-
suits by groups claiming damages, lack of worldwide public sup-
port, and possible lack of support in the country itself. A
political consensus would appear to be fundamental to a success-
ful effort in each of these phases. 
Thus, multilateral options appear to be more likely to suc-
ceed. Using the UN or possibly another international organiza-
tion to oversee such a program might appear somewhat unwieldy
and cumbersome, but offers much larger advantages in terms of
increased political legitimization. The experience to date, prima-
rily in drafting the Kyoto Protocol, is not particularly encourag-
ing since in order to gain LDC support, the developed nations
felt that they had to agree to shoulder the entire bill. This led to a
lack of support for the Kyoto Protocol in some countries, mainly
the United States. 
One possibility would be for one country to carry out the
laboratory research, because no real world experiments or
implementation decisions would be made during this phase. In
the case of the United States, one observer has suggested the use
of an organization modeled on a mini-energy-version of the U.S.
Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency.10
Increasing interaction with other countries and political legit-
imization would become even more important as the plan devel-
opment progressed in order for it to be accepted by other
countries. Finally, the actual implementation and maintenance
would also be best handled by a politically very legitimate inter-
national organization. 
CONCLUSION
If geoengineering represents the most efficient and effective
first step towards a solution of the global climate change prob-
lem, it is important to analyze how an effective geoengineering
effort might best be organized. It would appear that there would
be some advantages for any laboratory research to be done by a
single country, or perhaps a small group of countries. Overall,
international organizations appear to be best situated to handle
real world testing, plan acceptance, initial implementation, and
maintenance of such a program.
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A
s a result of economic growth, India is experiencing vast
changes in the country’s social, political, and environ-
mental landscape. One such change is the rapid increase
in automobile usage. This drastic increase has serious environ-
mental implications, but addressing the issue — and solving the
problems that it creates — will not be an easy task.
India is riddled with transportation problems. As India’s
population increases, this problem further intensifies. Economic
growth has precipitated the expansion of India’s cities and sub-
urbs. Between 1980 and 2003,
India’s urban population nearly
doubled, and it is expected that
in 2031, 40 percent of India’s
total population, estimated to be
1.42 billion, will reside in urban
areas.1 Predictably, India’s urban
growth is accompanied by a
sharp increase in motor vehicle
ownership: “the total number of
registered motor vehicles in-
creased from 1.86 million in
1971 to 62.7 million in 2003.”2
As India’s urban population
expands, so do the geographic boundaries of Indian cities.
Poorly-planned urban and suburban expansion often leads to
environmentally-unfriendly sprawl, longer commutes, and bad
traffic caused by an increasing dependence on automobiles. One
of the numerous negative results of increased urban air pollution
is the emission of greenhouse gases, which contribute to the
global problem climate change.3 Locally, the impacts of climate
change are evidenced by the shrinking of the Himalayan gla-
ciers, reminding lawmakers that this problem cannot be ignored.
A number of policies have already been implemented in dif-
ferent parts of India to deal with automobile pollution. In Delhi,
for example, pursuant to Supreme Court orders, the city’s fleet of
80,000 buses, taxis, and auto-rickshaws has been converted to
run on Compressed Natural Gas.4 The cleaner public transporta-
tion requirements resulted in a noticeable improvement to the
city’s air quality.5 Delhi has also completed the first stage of a
massive, ultra-modern subway system, designed to decrease
road traffic.6
While these improvements are a step in the right direction,
they are not enough, and, more
importantly, they have not been
implemented in other Indian
cities. The major cities of India
need to take further steps by
improving public transportation
infrastructure, putting more
resources and effort into sustain-
able urban and suburban plan-
ning, and implementing stricter
emissions regulations on private
automobiles. 
While automobile pollution
may be just one factor affecting
global climate change, it is an important factor, and it needs to
be addressed in India, where economic growth is bringing
opportunities to implement sustainable development. India must
take advantage of these opportunities immediately, as the shrink-
ing Himalayan glaciers are proof that the disastrous effects of
climate change are not too far in the future.
The cleaner public
transportation
requirements resulted in 
a noticeable improvement
to the city’s air quality.
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INTRODUCTION
C
laiming that the Kyoto Protocol (“Protocol”) was
“fatally flawed in fundamental ways,”1 on June 2001,
U.S. President George W. Bush simultaneously con-
demned the landmark international agreement against climate
change and announced that the United States would withdraw
from participation in it.2 The United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) drafted the Protocol
in 1997 in order to fight the potentially catastrophic effects of
climate change through an international carbon dioxide (“CO2”)
emissions reduction plan.3 Over 160 nations ratified the Proto-
col. The United States and Australia are the only countries in the
developed world not to participate.4
While the United States signed the Protocol under the Clin-
ton administration, President Bush withdrew, citing economic
concerns and dismay that large, CO2-emitting countries such 
as China and India would be
exempt from Protocol emission
res t r ic t ions  as  deve loping
nations.5 Particularly troubling,
however, was President Bush’s
assertion that the Protocol’s
strategy itself was “fundamen-
tally flawed.” In the view of the
Bush Administration, the Proto-
col improperly focused on CO2
emissions to the exclusion of the
greater problems of black carbon
(“BC”) and tropospheric ozone.6
President Bush implied that
without  a  plan to  l imit  BC
efforts, curbing worldwide CO2 emissions is not sufficient to
address global warming.
If the Bush Administration’s assertion is true, the implica-
tions are staggering. Could it be possible that the countries of the
world had come together and devised a way to address one of the
most urgent global environmental concerns of the century, only
to completely misidentify the nature of the problem? Equally
important is to evaluate whether or not the Bush Administra-
tion’s assertion is justified. Emerging evidence indicates that BC
does play a significant role in contributing to global climate
change. This article argues that the Kyoto Protocol is, and will
continue to be, a powerful force against climate change whether
or not it addresses BC. While BC is unquestionably a powerful
contributing factor to climate change, CO2 remains the largest
contributor to the problem, and a long-term solution requires
CO2 reductions as soon as possible.7 If the Kyoto Protocol can
be amended to incorporate measures to reduce BC emissions
without alienating participating countries, then it is ideal to do
so. Nonetheless, the overall mission of the Protocol remains
sound, even in the face of new information about other con-
tributing factors to climate change. 
WHAT IS BLACK CARBON, AND
WHY IS IT A PROBLEM?
BC in the atmosphere consists of incompletely burned,
microscopic particulate matter resulting from inefficient com-
bustion.8 Specifically, when carbon is burned to generate energy
and heat the burning process also produces CO2 and BC emis-
sions; the amount of matter remaining depends upon how com-
pletely the carbon is burned.9 If the process does not burn away
all solid matter, or if the byproduct is not sequestered, the result-
ing particulates of solid carbon become atmospheric BC. 
BC is not only a byproduct of power production. Addition-
ally, in developed countries the
primary source of BC is from
industrial pollution and motor
vehicle emissions.10 Less devel-
oped nations mainly produce
BC by burning sooty fuels,
using wood-burning stoves and
heaters, and clearing land by
burning crops and forests.11
Industrialized countries release
more CO2 than BC, because
their technology allows them to
burn carbon with high effi-
ciency.12 On the other hand, half
of the world’s atmospheric BC comes from the burning of fields
and forests; 30 percent comes from residential burning of coal,
firewood, and dung; and ten percent comes from diesel
engines.13 For this reason, the worldwide BC problem rests
largely on developing nations.
PROBLEMS WITH BLACK CARBON
BC causes a variety of health problems if inhaled, including
lung disease, asthma, heart disease, and cancer.14 The estimated
health cost of particulate pollution in industrialized countries
ranges from U.S. $200,000 to $2.75 million per ton, per year.15
Further perspective is given by a figure released by the World
Health Organization that air pollution accounts for the deaths of
2.7 million people annually.16
THE BIG BLACK HOLE IN THE KYOTO PROTOCOL:
WAS THE EXCLUSION OF BLACK CARBON REGULATION A “FATAL FLAW”?
by Jon Feldon*
*Jon Feldon is a JD candidate, May 2007, at American University Washington
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Emerging evidence
indicates that BC does
play a significant role in
contributing to global
climate change.
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Atmospheric BC also affects weather patterns. Unlike
greenhouse gasses, which trap heat rising from the earth’s sur-
face, atmospheric BC, visible as haze or smog, or incorporated
into clouds, absorbs incoming sunlight due to its dark color. BC
has the effect of cooling regions directly below it while increas-
ing the net temperature of the earth.17 These changes in temper-
ature destabilize regional weather patterns.18 For example,
NASA scientists link increasing droughts in northern China and
flooding in southern China to atmospheric BC.19
BC’s role in climate change occurs on two levels. Directly,
BC’s dark coloration absorbs heat that would otherwise escape
the atmosphere into space.20 BC also has several indirect con-
tributory effects. Atmospheric BC can be incorporated into
clouds, darkening them, and causing them either to absorb the
40 to 90 percent of solar radiation that they would otherwise
reflect21 or to overheat and burn away entirely.22 Either result
prevents clouds from keeping the planet cool.23 Unlike CO2,
which can stay in the atmosphere for 50 to 200 years, BC only
stays aloft for a few weeks or months.24 Unfortunately, once out
of the air, BC can collect on ice, snow, mountains, and glaciers.25
The darkened snow and ice have a reduced albedo, or reflectiv-
ity, resulting in faster melting
and less sunlight reflected out of
the atmosphere.26 Including all
the different ways BC interferes
with Earth’s heat loss, experts
estimate that BC causes more
than 25 percent of all observed
global warming. When com-
bined with methane (“CH4”) and
other pollutants, these particu-
lates account for least as much
global warming as CO2.27
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
The Kyoto Protocol is an
international agreement made under the UNFCCC at the third
Conference of the Parties28 whereby 165 member nations agreed
to reduce their emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases.29
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed member nations agree to
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by an average of five per-
cent below their 1990 emission levels.30 Developing nations do
not have to reduce their emissions, but can participate in the
Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”). The CDM enables
developed member countries to invest in emission-reducing pro-
grams in developing countries in exchange for credits that count
towards their emission reduction goals.31 Although many
national governments agreed to address climate change at the
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment in Rio de Janeiro, the Kyoto Protocol is the first interna-
tional agreement to protect the environment that is actually
binding and enforceable.32 BC emissions were not considered
under the Kyoto Protocol, largely due to a lack of understanding
at the time about the role that aerosolized BC plays in accelerat-
ing climate change.33
Recently, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change released the results of a six-year study of global
warming.34 The study shows average global temperatures could
rise by 1.5 to 5.8 degrees Celsius within this century, and that the
changes are 90 percent likely to have been caused by human
activity.35 To prevent or mitigate permanent environmental dam-
age, a strong, effective international effort will be necessary.
Currently, the Kyoto Protocol is the only binding international
agreement reflecting the world’s reaction to this problem.36 With
the Protocol set to expire in 2012, the issue of whether or not the
agreement is irredeemably flawed by not regulating BC is criti-
cally important.
THE ARGUMENT FOR INCLUDING BLACK CARBON
IN THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
BLACK CARBON SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTES
TO CLIMATE CHANGE
The primary argument that the Kyoto Protocol mishandles
global warming lies in the fact that BC contributes significantly
to global warming, but is not addressed by the Protocol’s terms.
Stanford University Professor Mark Z. Jacobson states that
reducing BC levels “may slow global warming more than may
any emission reduction of CO2
or CH4 for a specific period.”37
Studies conducted by Jacobson
and others show that BC warms
air much more than CO2 does,
per square unit.38 Ignoring BC
could be dangerous, because
even though BC is less common
in the atmosphere than carbon
dioxide, governments could do
more harm than good if they
increase the release rate of BC
in their attempts to decrease
CO2 emissions. For example, tax
laws in the European Union (“EU”) favor diesel vehicles39
because they get 25 to 35 percent better mileage while emitting
less carbon dioxide than gasoline cars.40 But diesel vehicles
release much more BC than gasoline vehicles.41 If the Bush
Administration and Jacobson are correct, the Kyoto Protocol
resulted in European policies that may actually encourage global
warming. 
REDUCING BLACK CARBON EMISSIONS WILL
RESULT IN MORE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS
A second argument against a Kyoto Protocol without BC
regulations is that BC emission cuts are much more reasonably
accomplished, and will result in more immediately noticeable
effects.42 Whereas CO2 stays in the atmosphere, trapping heat
for decades, BC remains aloft for days or weeks at the most.43
Reduced BC production would have climate and health benefits
right away, while lowering CO2 emissions will not have notice-
able effects for decades.44 A notable proponent of this argument
is Dr. James Hansen, head of the Goddard Institute for Space
Studies at NASA. He believes that CO2 cuts are unreasonable for
modern society whereas BC reductions can easily be achieved
Black carbon’s dark
coloration absorbs heat
that would otherwise
escape the atmosphere 
into space.
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with current technologies.45 Reducing BC, Hansen says, would
give policy-makers a much easier sell to their constituents, who
could appreciate the tangible benefits of reducing BC in their
daily lives.46 Moreover, countries like China, exempt under the
Kyoto Protocol as a developing nation, could be required to meet
BC reduction standards, because the technology to do so is avail-
able and affordable. Reducing BC would also improve societal
health.47 Hansen argues that it would be better to resume focus-
ing on CO2 emissions in the future, when technology will allow
for realistic and significant CO2 emission reductions.48
THE PROBLEMS WITH ADDING BC REGULATIONS
TO THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
A COMPLICATED SCENARIO
Despite the role that BC plays in climate change, and
despite the benefits to reducing BC emissions, there are a few
problems with declaring the Kyoto Protocol a failure based on
the BC issue. For one, BC and other contributory substances
have extraordinarily complex interactions which are not yet
completely understood.49 For example, BC is virtually always
accompanied by organic carbon (“OC”), a white soot-like sub-
stance that reflects light and heat away from the earth and pro-
tects clouds and glaciers from the effects of BC darkening.50
While most scientists agree that substances like BC should be
reduced wherever possible, no one yet knows how much OC off-
sets the problems caused by BC.51 By contrast, scientists have
clearly established that CO2 produces more global temperature
increase than any other substance, including BC.52 Therefore,
reducing CO2 emissions should be the primary focus because its
role in climate change is so prominent and so clearly under-
stood.53 Even though the Kyoto Protocol does not address BC,
the agreement has already begun to see progress in reducing
CO2 emissions worldwide. 
LOGISTICAL ISSUES
While the EU might be misguided in their encouragement
of diesel engines, the practice has worked to reduce net EU CO2
emissions. Revamping regulations now might do more harm in
terms of CO2 emissions than good in terms of BC output. Simi-
larly, the areas where BC is produced in the highest quantities
(developing countries) are also areas where emissions quotas
would be difficult, if not impossible, to meet.54 True, cities pro-
duce a great deal of BC, but comparatively, the planet’s highest
producers of atmospheric BC are poor populations in China,
India, South America, and the former Soviet Union who use
domestic wood burning stoves for cooking and heating and uti-
lize slash and burn agricultural techniques.55 In countries where
older technologies for heating, cooking, and land-clearing pre-
vail, efforts to address BC issues are unlikely. By contrast,
focusing on CO2 has the advantage of requiring the most from
those with the most capacity to reduce emissions today: devel-
oped nations.
CONCLUSION
The Kyoto Protocol is not “fatally flawed,” nor is it perfect.
BC is a large contributor to climate change. However, CO2 is as
much, if not more, of a factor as well. Ideally, the international
community would work together to reduce output of both.
Unfortunately, international agreements are difficult to initiate
and complex to enforce. In this context, the ratification of a bind-
ing agreement which imposes costs on participating nations in
the short-term is a highly respectable achievement in its own
right. Incorporating BC regulations into the Kyoto Protocol is an
excellent idea — provided that member nations would actually
comply with them, and that such requirements would not hamper
the larger goal of reducing the number one long-term cause of
global warming, CO2. Success will come with worldwide con-
sensus that a BC problem exists and that the countries best
equipped to handle the issue should take the lead in addressing
it. The processes that affect climate change are complicated. Any
effort to address the problem, even one that does not account for
absolutely every factor, should be commended rather than dis-
counted.
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E
ach year, the Oxford University Press selects a word to be
added to the New Oxford American Dictionary — a word
that not only reflects the events and concerns of the pro-
ceeding year but also is forward-looking. In 2006, the word of
the year was “carbon neutral.”1 Numerous airlines, businesses,
athletes, entertainers, international institutions, and more have
expressed their commitment to carbon neutrality.2
An average citizen can reduce his or her net impact on the
world’s climate by voluntarily purchasing carbon offset credits at
a relatively low cost. Carbon offsets are credits for emission
reductions achieved by investments in either renewable energy
projects or carbon sinks. Companies that provide offsets allow
consumers to calculate their emissions from travel or home
energy usage.3 Consumers typically make a payment to an offset
provider, and that contribution is passed to another firm promot-
ing carbon dioxide reductions. As of late 2006, about 40 opera-
tions worldwide offered carbon offsets.4
The majority of carbon offset providers invest in some form
of reforestation, concentrating on preserving existing forests or
restoring native tree species in a particular threatened area.
Other companies instead use revenue to fund renewable energy
projects such as wind farms, solar power, and methane capture.5
For example, one company in the United Kingdom has pledged
to introduce energy-efficient wood-burning stoves to developing
world communities; each household stove would reduce carbon
emissions by about 1.5 metric tons a year.6
Criticisms of carbon neutral programs abound. Some doubt
that such schemes actually promote carbon neutrality, and others
outright dispute the program’s effectiveness in controlling cli-
mate change. Many critics view carbon offset programs as a way
to alleviate personal consumer guilt instead of an effective
means to lower greenhouse gas emissions. Some believe that off-
sets give consumers a license to pollute, instead of a reason to
cultivate more energy-efficient habits.7
Reforestation offsets especially have come under scrutiny.
For instance, calculations concerning the amount of carbon
saved through tree-planting programs are based on the assump-
tion that the trees will last at least one hundred years, but there is
no guarantee that the trees planted through reforestation pro-
grams will not succumb to disease or forest fire before that one
hundred year mark. Some scientists suggest that a rise in temper-
ature of two to three degrees Celsius could cause the trees to die
early, break down into methane, and actually worsen the climate
change situation.8
Critics claim that the lack of regulation in the offset market
allows disreputable organizations to sell the same carbon credit
many times over. Additionally, consumers cannot ensure that
their money is actually reaching the intended programs. There
are also concerns that calculations by off-set groups are unreli-
able: different providers often arrive at very different price esti-
mates for offsetting the same amount of carbon.9
The privatized market for carbon offsets could, critics fear,
have ominous effects on public policy. Voluntary offset pro-
grams should not be seen as a substitute for government regula-
tions to control climate change. Indeed, some say that purchasers
of carbon offsets are creating an environment that enables gov-
ernments to avoid creating legislation to slow global warming.10
The general public reaction to carbon offsets has been “bet-
ter safe than sorry.” The more optimistic see voluntary carbon
offsets as a temporary measure for controlling climate change
until more comprehensive legislation can be enacted, and the
more pragmatic believe that carbon offset purchasers are prepar-
ing for an economy in which carbon dioxide and other green-
house gases are closely regulated and heavily taxed.11
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INTRODUCTION
A
ttempts to manage and mitigate global warming can
emerge as a major U.S. business opportunity. A sensi-
ble, sustainable policy to mitigate climate risk can earn
returns, promote lower energy and operating costs, and create
high quality, productive jobs built on technology and climate
based business solutions. Ancillary banking, trading, insurance,
venture capital, and private equity activities will compliment the
opportunity and promote economic development. Companies in
the United States are just starting to appreciate the business
prospects in the formation of their strategic plans.
The U.S. stimulus for action is coming from states, certain
companies, and consumers recognizing that climate change cre-
ates risks for companies we operate and support, invest in, and
manage. As part of a global economy, U.S. companies operating
abroad are already participating in carbon management schemes
because of local Kyoto compliance obligations in their host
countries. Disclosures of climate risk increasingly appear in
lending decisions, credit reviews, and in financial reporting.
Industries are being assessed, and how companies respond and
measure this issue already counts. In the near future, climate risk
strategies may assume levels of fiduciary responsibility with
shareholder, stockholder, and litigation exposure.
We are already seeing the potential impacts on corporate
value from carbon discussions. Presupposing that corporate
counsel can help the company manage these impacts requires
several areas of critical contribution working with the financial,
engineering, marketing, public affairs, and technical staffs of the
company. The development of a portfolio of strategies to recog-
nize and diversify the basis for climate risk over as broad a base
is no longer merely pioneering, it is prudent. Company perform-
ance, market survival, competitive market positions and oppor-
tunities are at stake because carbon is now a commodity. 
CARBON BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY
Climate change management can emerge as a major U.S.
business opportunity independent of Kyoto compliance obliga-
tions as well as a critical economic development imperative for
U.S. businesses.1 Companies face escalating international pres-
sure, natural pressures, rising energy prices, water supply uncer-
tainty, and mounting concerns about air quality affecting their
business operations. A sensible, sustainable carbon policy to
mitigate climate risk can earn returns, promote lower energy and
operating costs, and create high quality, productive jobs for U.S.
companies built on cleaner technology and climate solutions
integrated into their core business activities.2 A company’s man-
agement of these issues can create market differentiation trans-
lating to corporate value. Opportunities are not limited to manu-
facturing or utility companies, but also include service compa-
nies and commercial buildings in their operations and business
choices. New stakeholders such as banking, trading, insurance,
venture capital, engineering, pension plans, and private equity
firms will enhance the opportunity and promote economic devel-
opment with global benefits.3 U.S. companies are just starting to
appreciate the business prospects in the formation of their busi-
ness plans and competitive models to manage climate-based
change.
At present, federal and state initiatives do not dictate solu-
tions for the private sector; instead the policies encourage
domestic companies to address these challenges with balance.
This industry-driven policy approach could be more lasting
because government is pointing business in the right direction
through various Department of Energy and Environmental Pro-
tection Agency climate-based programs, whose policy guidance
compliments the interests of the insurance, pension, financial,
and banking interests that promote separate risk management
objectives. Instead of mandating change, the government thus
serves as an incubator for new solutions regarding climate man-
agement in a process similar to the formation of the advance
markets for biotech, defense, homeland security, satellite com-
munication, clean energy, and the internet industries in the U.S.
economy. 
Carbon management, stewardship, and sustainability will
ultimately become good business in the United States as compa-
nies examine and alter their business models for the future4 pre-
cisely because the old rules of competitive market advantage
have changed. New market strengths and business models are
required that go beyond the old metrics of cheap labor, energy,
raw materials, and commodities. These new models will be cen-
tered on capital, innovation, efficiency, transportation, raw
energy transformation into new fuels, and technology deploy-
ment in the new carbon economy. The old metrics reward risk
management and the bottom line; whereas, the new paradigm in
a carbon constrained world centers on branding and reputation
enhancement, creating a competitive edge, developing new
products or systems, reducing fossil fuel consumption, or the
“greening” of existing products.
Once again, as part of a global economy, U.S. companies are
already being forced to and manage an array of climate risks.
The time horizon for risk management is accelerating and busi-
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ness models are changing as a result. Advanced technologies and
new energy strategies will offer new models for the future and
strand the assets of companies built on the past. Disclosures of
climate risk are now appearing in lending decisions, credit
reviews, and in financial reporting.5 Industries are being
reassessed, and how companies respond and measure climate
challenge already counts. In the near future, climate risk strate-
gies may assume levels of fiduciary responsibility with share-
holder, stockholder, and litigation exposure.6
CORPORATE VALUE
We are already seeing carbon discussions impact corporate
in leading U.S. companies across industries. Positive impacts on
new investments in infrastructure improvements are arising that
create Clean Development Mechanism benefits under the Kyoto
Protocol. These investments are being explored by the manufac-
turing sector, as well as the oil and gas industry mining and
chemical industries. U.S. multinationals have retained Wall
Street firms for this purpose since 2005.
The electric industry experiences direct costs for emissions
abatement through the purchase of allowances and shifts in
fuels, deployment, or geographic location of plants.7 Differences
do exist within the industry over the preference of various con-
trol strategies such as using a cap and trade system or a carbon
tax. Indirect costs to cap emissions are recognized and valued
through, market perceptions of shareholder value, as confirmed
in the Carbon Disclosure Project’s annual carbon reporting and
disclosure exercises. 
Assessments for insurance, bonding, and costs of capital
reflect climate risk factors; this in turn impacts the price and
availability of underlying insurance coverage.8 As a result, new
insurance products coupled with financial risk management
techniques are appearing in the United States. Climate change is
creating a new evaluation of risk factors for investment decisions
versus credit purchases, business units for sales, or acquisitions.9
For the future, transportation logistics impacts and arbitrage
opportunities for fuel, supply, international trade for import
products, airlines, ports and harbors, railroads, and new indus-
tries like biofuels will become even more critical in a carbon
constrained world.10 Energy conversion from fuels, environmen-
tal, transportation, environmental finance, and climate change
management strategies are converging. Certain industries are
leading, while dramatic prospects lie ahead for electric utilities,
oil and gas, commercial real estate, airlines, mining, and trans-
portation sectors to develop more dynamic, market-centered 
carbon strategies.11
FUTURE CONTRIBUTIONS TO CARBON
OPERATIONS BY COUNSEL
Counsel working with the financial, engineering, marketing,
public affairs, and technical staffs can help a company in several
areas of critical contribution to carbon operations.
Standardization is an area whereby counsel can provide
assistance. Counsel can help promote standard terms, defini-
tions, and protocols in contracting, procurement, and chain of
supply transactions. Counsel can also provide assistance by link-
ing carbon and tax or accounting treatments into financial
services, financing and product evaluations. If a company has
contingent liabilities caused by climate exposure, how would the
auditors report those liabilities?12 The degree and extent of
reporting disclosure on this subject would be a concern for the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or the Financial
Accounting Standards Board.13
Carefully assessing the legal nature of a carbon allowance or
credit is another area counsel would be able to provide assis-
tance. For example, counsel would be able to deem if it is a
financial investment, commodity, intangible, derivative, or secu-
rity. The utilization of metrics for measurement, which will pro-
vide new tools to gauge corporate performance are changing,
and should include technical emissions, accounting and eco-
nomic data on products and services, is another area requiring
legal expertise.14
Integrating carbon strategy with procurement, logistics,
transportation, environment, and fuel conversion into energy
functions of a company will be another topic requiring legal
assistance. Such functional integration requires top down man-
agement direction and support because the efficiencies will cre-
ate cost offsets.15 Single dimensional analysis of merely costs
without applying savings efficiencies does not offer the complete
picture enhanced though cross-functional terms.
Counsel will also be able to help businesses keep current
with regulatory advice and strategy in Canada, Europe, and Asia
since they are setting the trends for the future to 2012. After
Kyoto expires or is transitioned to a new regime, understanding
regulatory strategies for extension of carbon management and
trading is essential for protection of corporate assets, divesti-
tures, targets, and merger strategies.16
Assisting companies with linkages to competitive market
intelligence by industry, peer groups, trade associations, and other
benchmark activities on carbon management and finance will be
another responsibility of counsel. Monitoring market intelligence
is of vital importance to ensuring maintenance of a company’s
competitive edge. Additionally, information technology linkages
will also require the assistance of counsel. Speed of information
management is important, but also creates new risks.
Counsel must also work with companies to help expand risk
management strategy over carbon for insurance, bonding, con-
struction, fuels, safety codes, material securities disclosures, and
corporate governance obligations of the company.17
Supporting interactive energy, environment, and fiscal
budgeting tools to measure these new performance parameters
and a new analytical paradigm for carbon is another potential
responsibility of counsel. Intensity and productivity are new
metrics of the future. Counsel must be careful with internet and
data management platforms compromising a company’s confi-
dentiality and data security interests.
Communicating a company’s results to stockholders, share-
holders, employees, regulators, and governance bodies to estab-
lish a leadership position and brand on carbon management is
another issue counsel can provide assistance. Further, companies
will need aid from counsel to manage fiduciary responsibilities.
Guidance will likely be sought to help establish internal systems
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to measure risks, liability, and to minimize future litigation by
early actions that have a strong governance base grounded in
fiduciary responsibility.
Counsel will also be able to provide companies with assis-
tance to reduce environmental/energy costs in existing opera-
tions, creating potential profitability, productivity and
sustainability benefits. Additionally, if carbon disclosure is
measured in lending and insurance underwriting, counsel can
help evaluate whether carbon disclosures should become incor-
porated into representations, warranties in financing, and merg-
ers and acquisitions transactions for companies.18
CONCLUSION
Developing a portfolio of strategies to recognize and diver-
sify the basis for climate risk over as broad a base as possible is
now prudent, not pioneering, because a company’s economic
performance, markets, competitive market positions, and oppor-
tunities are at stake. Investors will demand a management
approach for carbon to assess financial risk from liabilities,
investment opportunities in green products, process or technol-
ogy, and for stakeholder and public relations.19 Responsible
companies will benefit, others will pay.
Carbon is now a commodity with economic value. The
United States must now participate in offset projects in foreign
countries and between industries and in supply chain planning to
satisfy its carbon objectives. Comparable links to carbon trading
platforms in other countries will make a U.S. system more effi-
cient and effective while successfully participating in a global
economy. Moreover, the recognition of such opportunities will
provide the linkage of capital and innovation with clean energy
and carbon management to capture and support the major sus-
tainable investments and growth of the twenty-first century. This
can only be powered by fundamental business recognition of
Thomas Friedman’s current admonition that: “Green is the new
red, white and blue,”20 and that the United States must lead in a
changing global economy by incurring the short-term costs, in
creating new high tech jobs to achieve improved, sustainable
corporate performance.
But in the execution of new policy and a new order of
things, the devil is the details. The United States cannot afford to
create structural errors in a global economy with developing
markets that do not carry the same burdens and responsibilities.
Change is needed. Carbon management and implementation
cannot become a tool to alter the competitive balance of the
world economy and convert the important corporate mission
merely into a new environmental financial derivative. Legacy
markets would face their demise, crippling under costs they can-
not pass-through; developing markets would gain the new com-
petitive edge in costs, labor, commodities, and materials, and the
only final market winners will be the traders of a derivative for a
newly conceived commodity product with little long-term global
value.
The new arbiter of competitive advantage will become inno-
vation, access to capital, new products and processes, sophisti-
cated technology deployment, fuel conversion into more refined
forms of energy, and managing the strength and costs of the
transportation system and logistics to move, store, and ship
products. This will ensure that physical assets stand behind car-
bon management in the new business model to sustain value and
not merely proprietary financial trading with little physical sup-
port nor reality.
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INTRODUCTION
O
n November 29, 2006, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency,1 the decision of which may have major
implications for the regulation of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) and
other greenhouse gases (“GHGs”). The case addresses whether
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has statutory
authority under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) to regulate CO2 and
other GHGs emitted by new motor vehicles, and if it does,
whether such authority is mandatory or discretionary.2 The case
was brought by twelve states, three cities, an American territory,
and various environmental organizations. Although the Court is
unlikely to take a stand on the scientific legitimacy of climate
change, its decision will have important implications for future
climate-related claims, specifically regarding standing and regu-
latory issues. 
BACKGROUND
Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act provides that “[t]he
Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to
time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section,
standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from
any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollu-
tion which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.”3 Several states and environmental groups
claimed that under this section, the EPA must regulate various
GHGs, including CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluoro-
carbons.4 EPA sought public comment, and the White House
requested the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences
(“NAS”) in researching the issue.5
EPA found that the public comments it received did not add
any significant insight to the information studied by the NAS.6
The agency therefore decided to rely on the NAS’s finding that a
causal link between the emission of GHG and climate change
could not be “unequivocally established.”7 Based on the scien-
tific uncertainty of the causes of climate change, EPA chose not
to regulate CO2, nor several other GHGs, under Section 202 of
the CAA.
Petitioners brought suit against EPA in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to compel EPA to
regulate the gases under the CAA.8 The court however found in
favor of EPA, holding that the Administrator “properly exercised
his discretion under Section 202(a)(1).”9 The court reasoned that
the Administrator relied on several factors in making his deci-
sion, including policy judgments in addition to the scientific
uncertainty cited by the NAS report,10 and that “[i]n requiring
the EPA Administrator to make a threshold ‘judgment’ about
whether to regulate, Section 202(a)(1) gives the Administrator
considerable discretion.”11
Petitioners appealed the decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
THE ARGUMENTS
The questions presented to the Supreme Court were: (1)
whether Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA authorizes the EPA
Administrator “to regulate air pollutants associated with climate
change;” and (2) whether the Administrator may “decline to
issue emission standards for motor vehicles based on policy con-
siderations not enumerated” under Section 202(a)(1)?12
In their brief, petitioners argued that the CAA authorizes
EPA to regulate pollutants associated with climate change and
that EPA may not base its decision not to regulate on policy con-
siderations not laid out under the CAA.13 More specifically, peti-
tioners argued that the GHGs associated with climate change are
“air pollutants” subject to regulation under the CAA, that Con-
gress did not intend to forbid EPA from regulating air pollutants
associated with climate change under the CAA, and that the
Agency’s interpretation did not deserve deference under the
standard in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council
because the text was unambiguous, or alternatively because the
Agency’s interpretation was arbitrary and capricious.14
Petitioners further argued that the Administrator’s decision
should be based only on whether air pollutants emitted from
motor vehicles “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger pub-
lic health or welfare,” as provided under Section 202(a)(1) of the
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CAA, or in the alternative, that the CAA makes clear that three
of the factors relied on by the Administrator in making his deci-
sion were irrelevant. In short, the Agency appropriately consid-
ered scientific uncertainty, but it failed to relate such uncertainty
to the statutory endangerment requirement.15 Petitioners also
argued that although Section 202(a)(1) refers to the Administra-
tor’s “judgment” in regulating air pollution, such “judgment”
does not imply “unfettered discretion.”16
The EPA first responded by arguing that petitioners lacked
Article III standing to bring the suit.17 The Agency claimed that
petitioners failed to demonstrate that regulating the pollutants
under the CAA would affect climatic conditions in Massachu-
setts, that the effects of the requested regulation were too specu-
lative to satisfy causation and redressability requirements, and
that petitioners’ references to other regulatory actions do not
establish standing.18 Furthermore, EPA argued that its conclu-
sion that the CAA does not authorize it to regulate GHGs associ-
ated with climate change was reasonable because the main CAA
provisions do not appear to apply to GHGs. Further, the EPA
argued that Congress intended the Agency to collect additional
information before regulating GHGs, made evident through sev-
eral federal statutes, and that regulation of GHGs could have
potentially detrimental economic and political consequences.19
Finally, EPA argued that even if the CAA authorized the
Agency to regulate GHG emissions, its decision to decline exer-
cising such authority was reasonable. First, it claimed that the
principles of administrative law afford federal agencies broad
discretion in choosing whether or not to initiate rulemakings.20
Second, the EPA noted that Section 202(a)(1) does not require
the Agency to make a determination regarding GHGs and the
endangerment standard within a particular time frame, evidenc-
ing Congress’ intent that such a determination is discretionary.21
Finally, the Agency argued that its denial of petitioners’
requested regulation was “a reasonable exercise of agency dis-
cretion” based on the numerous factors it considered.22
THE HEARING
During petitioners’ oral argument, the Justices focused pri-
marily on questions of standing and interpretation of the CAA’s
statutory authority.23 With respect to standing, Justice Scalia
questioned whether the harm alleged by petitioners was in fact
“imminent,” asking “when is the predicted cataclysm?”24 The
Justices were also concerned with the relationship between the
potential harm and regulating GHGs. Justice Alito inquired
whether such potential harm could even be traceable to the emis-
sions petitioners sought to reduce.25 Chief Justice Roberts noted
that even if EPA regulated GHG emissions, the potential harm
may not be reduced; it “depends upon what happens across the
globe.”26
With respect to the statutory authority issue, Justice Scalia
focused on the Act’s endangerment requirement and where the
effects of global warming occurred. He posited, “is it an air pol-
lutant that endangers health? I think it has to endanger health by
reason of polluting the air, and this does not endanger health by
reason of polluting the air at all.”27 He went on to note that the
CAA is about “air pollution. It’s not about global warming and
it’s not about the troposphere.”28
The Justices also focused on the issue of standing during the
government’s oral argument. In particular, the Justices seemed to
suggest that EPA was requiring too strict a correlation between
the potential harm of GHGs and their effect on climate change
relating to petitioners. For example, Justice Souter asked, “But
why do [petitioners] have to show a precise correlation as
opposed simply to establishing what I think is not really con-
tested, that there is a correlation between GHGs and the kind of
loss that they’re talking about; and it is reasonable to suppose
that some reduction in the gases will result in some reduction in
future loss.”29 Justice Souter went on to remark, “They don’t
have to show that it will stop global warming. [Petitioners’]
point is that [regulation of GHGs] will reduce the degree of
global warming and likely reduce the degree of loss.”30
With respect to the statutory authority argument, the Jus-
tices inquired as to whether air pollution encompassed global
warming, and if not, how to reconcile that with the fact that acid
rain, while being an effect and not a pollutant, was regulated
under the CAA.31
CONCLUSION
Massachusetts v. EPA is certain to become a landmark case
in environmental and administrative law. Although public aware-
ness and concern over climate change has existed for many
years, this is the first time that the Supreme Court has entered the
climate change debate. Its decision, expected by June,32 could
set important precedent regarding standing requirements, federal
discretion in regulating environmental harms, and establishing
causation. 
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he world is facing a convergence of numerous social,
economic, and environmental problems, and many say
that it is the first time in human history that this has hap-
pened on such a scale. Yet history, particularly the rise and fall of
previous civilizations, may help us understand what is coming,
and how to handle it so that we do not risk the fall of the human
civilization. In The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity,
and the Renewal of Civilization, author Thomas F. Homer-Dixon
looks to the Roman Empire to examine what will likely happen
when society breaks down under the weight of the problems we
face, and to learn how to prevent the collapse of our civilization.
The pervasive issue of climate change is the key example used
throughout the book.
The author compares the
buildup of societal stresses to the
tectonic stresses in the Earth’s
crust. “Breakdown is often like
an earthquake: it’s caused by the
slow accumulation of deep and
largely unseen pressures beneath
the surface of our day-to-day
affairs. At some point these pres-
sures release their accumulated
energy with catastrophic effect,
creating shock waves that pul-
verize our habitual and often rigid ways of doing things.” The
author identifies five tectonic stresses that he believes are accu-
mulating beneath the surface of our societies: population stress,
energy stress, environmental stress, climate stress, and economic
stress. The author presents an in-depth survey of each of the
stresses he identified that can cause civilization change, and doc-
uments how each of the stresses interact and combine to produce
far wider effects than any one stress could cause individually.
• Population Stress. Currently, humankind is in the process
of transitioning from a system of high birthrates and death
rates to low birthrates and death rates, as seen in most
modern industrial societies. Although birthrates have
declined sharply in many rich and even some poorer coun-
tries, the steady population growth in most poor countries
will more than compensate for it. The author warns that
the key issue is that by the year 2050, while the population
of rich countries will be almost the same as it is today
(around 1.2 billion), the population of poor countries will
have surged from about 5.3 billion to 7.8 billion, further
straining already inadequate resources.
• Energy Stress. The author considers energy as society’s
critical resource as it has enabled human societies to sus-
tain complex social order and maintain steady improve-
ments to our quality of life. Homer-Dixon explains facing
declining energy returns on investment (“EROI”), since
new deposits of our critical fossil fuels are more difficult
to find, and are located in areas
more difficult to reach and
costly to extract. Declining
EROI means higher prices, and
as price surges continue to
recur, tensions will escalate over
access to critical oil supplies. 
• Environmental Stress. The
author presents the view that
environmental crisis is engulf-
ing the entire planet despite sta-
tistics showing that people’s
lives are generally improving, with longer average life
expectancy, more food availability, and lower infant mor-
tality. The author contends that these statistics provide
false comfort. Although in the short-term humans can con-
tinue to generate wealth by using nature’s capital, eventu-
ally, when nature’s capital nears exhaustion, overstressed
ecosystems will lose their resilience and suddenly col-
lapse. 
• Climate Stress. Homer-Dixon feels that abrupt warming is
likely because the Earth’s climate is an extremely complex
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system with the potential of containing a number of stable
states. Although it can be difficult to shift such a complex
system from one equilibrium state to another, when the
shift does occur, it can happen abruptly and unexpectedly.
The author acknowledges that warming could produce
benefits, however the author contends that harmful out-
comes will be far more common and serious, particularly
for poor countries that cannot easily adapt to changing
environmental patterns. 
• Economic Stress. Eco-
nomic instability can 
genera te f r us t ra t ion ,
resentment, and anger that
can, under the right condi-
tions, tear countries apart.
The author addresses the
income gap between rich
and poor countries as cre-
ating an inequality of
opportunity, which in turn
produces discontent and social instability.
Although each of these stresses individually can raise the
risk of social breakdown, Homer-Dixon warns that it is the con-
vergence of these stresses that pose the greatest threat by making
breakdown both more likely and rapid. The upside of all of these
dire predictions is that the author believes that breakdown is not
necessarily a bad thing. With breakdown comes the opportunity
for the creative renewal of technologies, institutions, and soci-
eties in the absence of a rigid bureaucracy. The author terms this
type of breakdown “catagenesis,” and emphasizes that this is the
type of breakdown management for which we should strive
when the inevitable social earthquakes occur. 
To achieve catagenesis rather than catastrophe, Homer-
Dixon counsels that we must as a society become comfortable
with change so that we can use imagination in adapting to new
circumstances, rather than blindly trying to maintain the status
quo. We must develop integrated, rather than compartmental-
ized, solutions by bringing
together experts of many differ-
ent fields to develop proactive
policies. Finally, we must value
resilience over efficiency with
regards to our vital goods sup-
ply, like energy and food. A dis-
tributed supply of our critical
infrastructure needs will provide
society with a margin for error
that can handle supply disrup-
tions.
According to the author, resilience and flexibility are the
key characteristics for ensuring that a society can adapt to
change and bounce back from breakdown. Despite the author’s
prolific examples of doomsday scenarios that arise from the
accumulation of the various stressors, the author is optimistic
that we, as a society, can choose among the plausible futures that
are shaping in front of us. The challenge will be overcoming the
tendency to try and preserve the status quo, and instead adapt to
and thrive in a world of constant change.
Resilience and flexibility
are the key characteristics
for ensuring that a society
can adapt to change.
by Scott Johnson*
EUROPE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION PROPOSES A
NEW ENERGY PLAN LESS THAN ONE MONTH
BEFORE RELEASE OF LANDMARK IPCC 
REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE
On January 10, 2007, as various meteorological organiza-
tions suggested a high probability that 2007 will be the world’s
warmest year ever,1 the European Commission (“EC”)
announced a new plan to intensify its campaign to limit green-
house gas emissions and bolster energy security with a new
energy policy for Europe.2 The policy, grounded in goals of: (1)
an internal European energy market; (2) use of low-carbon
energy; and (3) increased energy efficiency, proposes that, under
a future “global agreement,” developed nations should reduce
greenhouse gas emissions to an average of 30 percent below
1990 levels by 2020, and by 50 percent of 1990 levels by 2050.3
In the interim, the EC noted that the EU should lead the way by
reducing its emissions by twenty percent by 2020.4 The EC will
seek endorsement of its proposals during the Spring European
Council scheduled for March 2007, and will propose legislation
following discussions there.5 The United Nations reacted posi-
tively to the proposal, and Yvo de Boer, head of the UN Climate
Secretariat in Bonn, “urged EU governments to adopt the goals
quickly.”6 Other groups, including Greenpeace, criticized the
proposal as a “political and scientific blunder” more the result of
“political bargaining . . . than climate change science.”7
On February 2, 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (“IPCC”) issued a report entitled Climate Change
2007: The Physical Science Basis (“IPCC Report”), which con-
cluded, with 90 percent certainty, that human activity is respon-
sible for marked increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide,
methane, and nitrous oxide concentrations since 1750.8 The
IPCC Report attributed the carbon dioxide increase primarily to
fossil fuel use and land-use change, and the methane and nitrous
oxide increases primarily to agriculture.9
Organizations across the globe reacted differently when the
IPCC report was released in Paris.  For example, Exxon Mobil
Corporation, a former supporter of groups that question climate
change science, appears to have changed its position, stating that
the debate is no longer about whether human-induced climate
change is happening, but what should be done to remedy it.10
Exxon officials assert the company has stopped funding skeptics
of climate change science.11
AFRICA
RESEARCH SUGGESTS PROFOUND IMPACT OF
GLOBAL WARMING ON AFRICAN CONTINENT
Global warming is likely to affect Africa profoundly, as
long-term droughts intensify and uncertainty regarding the
effect of climate change persists,12 and recent studies suggest
that continued warming in Africa poses serious risks to food
security and peace.13 While climates across Africa always have
been variable, recent research suggests that “new and dangerous
extremes” are evident, as historically dry areas become drier,
and wet areas wetter, threatening escalating drought in places
already desperate for water, and flooding where too much rain
already falls.14 Prior to his departure from the UN in December
2006, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan highlighted the
problem at a UN climate summit in Nairobi,15 equating the dan-
ger of climate change in Africa to “conflict, poverty, and the
spread of weapons.”16 At that summit, Mr. Annan announced a
UN plan to advance clean development in Africa, including
renewable energy projects and forestry programs designed to
minimize greenhouse gas emissions.17 Such efforts, however,
could be futile, considering that some commentators maintain
that Africa itself has played “virtually no role” in climate
change.18 The UN also recently highlighted the lack of means in
Africa to detect and adapt to changing patterns of drought,
flooding, and disease, and announced a new initiative, “ClimDev
Africa,” to intensify climate observation and risk management in
eight African countries, later to expand to half of the continent.19
ASIA
CHINA’S FIRST NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE
ASSESSMENT WARNS OF CONTINUED WARMING
China, which is among the most significant global green-
house gas emitters, recently released its first national assessment
of global climate change.20 The assessment, as reported by Chi-
nese state media, suggested that temperatures in China might
increase significantly in coming decades.21 The Chinese govern-
ment, in contrast to the position often taken by the United States
prior to the IPCC Report, is not shy with respect to recognition
of the effect of human activity on climate change and the poten-
tial impact that such change could have on the China’s ability to
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develop.22 Among the potential effects of warming in China are
worsening drought, extreme weather, glacial and river decline,
and permafrost loss.23 In addition, as recently reported by the
Chinese State Forestry Administration, the risk of forest fires,
wood-destroying pests, and tree disease also are expected to
increase, as 2007 is expected to be the warmest year ever in parts
of China.24
On February 6, 2007, China inaugurated a three-year, $1.7
million domestic carbon dioxide credit exchange program,
assisted by the UN and prominent steel producer Arcelor Mittal,
which, if successful, could be the first such program established
in a developing nation.25 Centers in twelve western Chinese
provinces will assist investors in locating local industries in
which to fund clean development projects.26 Emphasizing the
importance of clean development in China, UN China coordina-
tor Khalid Malik noted that many “market-based instruments
[have] emerged to support this effort, with carbon trading
emerging as a major opportunity.”27
AUSTRALIA/
NEW ZEALAND
AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER CHANGES
POSITION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
On January 25, 2007, Australian Prime Minister John
Howard, a self-described “climate change skeptic,” indicated a
shift in his position, claiming himself a “climate-change realist,”
and saying, while delivering a national plan for Australian water
security, that “he now accepts [that] global warming has con-
tributed to Australia’s long-running drought.”28 Howard noted
that Australia’s “current trajectory of water use and management
was not sustainable,” and that while Australian “rainfall has
always been highly variable . . . [t]he deviation around average
rainfall is enormous . . . [and] seems to be getting bigger.”29 Fol-
lowing this change of position, Australia’s developing carbon
trading may receive increased support.  On February 7, 2007,
New Zealand’s Climate Change Minister, David Parker, said
New Zealand would study the carbon trading system Australia is
designing “to see if it is possible to set up a transtasman mar-
ket.”30
NORTH AMERICA
NOAA ALSO RECOGNIZES ANTHROPOGENIC
INFLUENCE ON CLIMATE
On January 9, 2007, reported as the first time under the
Bush administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (“NOAA”) stated, in a press release, that anthro-
pogenic greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate
change.31 NOAA’s statement, which indicated that 2006 was the
warmest year on record for the contiguous United States since
recordkeeping began in 1895,32 surprised some critics, who had
complained in the past that the administration and NOAA had
not been “open” with such information.33 Despite such recogni-
tion, however, even with the recent shift in control of the U.S.
Congress, certain political commentators do not expect that the
United States’ position on the Kyoto Protocol will change, par-
ticularly without concurrent change in China’s position.34
Another new potential factor in the United States climate debate
is recent research from the University of California at Davis,
which, contrary to the view that climate change impacts are
likely to be gradual and easily anticipated, provides support for
concerns that climate shifts could be unexpectedly severe and
erratic as atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations continue
to increase.35
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